영문목차
표제지 = 0,1,3
감사의 글 = 0,4,1
Table of Contents = 0,5,2
Abstract = 0,7,2
I. Introduction = 1,9,3
II. The central bank's signaling and reputation concerned with the monetary policy = 3,11,1
1. The cheap-talk game between the central bank and the private sectors. = 3,11,1
1.1 The model = 3,11,2
1.2 Equilibrium = 5,13,4
2. Acquiring a Reputation in Monetary policy = 8,16,1
2.1 The Model = 8,16,2
2.2 Equilibrium = 9,17,4
III. The chain-store game between the central bank and the speculator = 12,20,2
1. The reputation game against one speculator = 12,21,1
1.1 The Model = 13,21,2
1.2 Equilibria = 14,22,3
2. The chain-store game against the many short-run speculators = 17,25,1
2.1 The model = 17,25,2
2.2 Equilibria = 18,26,5
3. The reputation of the central bank against Many simultaneous long-lived speculator = 22,30,3
IV. Conclusion = 25,33,1
Appendix = 26,34,2
Reference = 28,36,2