Recently, Korea concluded free trade agreements(FTAs) with the US and the EU. Although there were discontents within domestic loser groups in both negotiations, Korea and her partner governments succeeded in settling inter-governmental negotiations. Then why did Korea-Japan FTA negotiations reach such a deadlock, although it faced domestic political protests in the same way as KORUS and Korea-EU FTA negotiations? This study intends to analyse reasons of such a situation and suggest new strategies for Korea to break it through.
To this end, based on two-level game theory, this study analyses both domestic politics and the win-set game of Korea-Japan FTA negotiations. Information from survey on Japanese experts are used in analysing domestic politics in Japan.
On the basis of these analyses, this research suggests the 'mid-level' agreement as a realistic strategy to settle Korea-Japan FTA negotiations instead of 'high-level' one. Because political pressures from domestic loser groups are severe in both countries, Korea and Japan have to prepare a more plausible negotiation agenda so that domestic loser groups in both countries accept it.