Both the profit of the tour operator and the profit of the travel agency are affected by the prices of predesigned and optional tours. As the price-setting process takes place in the form of a sequential game, in which the price of the predesigned tour is affected by the price of the optional tour, the travel agency needs to predict what the tour operators will do. Our key findings are summarized as follows: First, when travel agency sets the price of the optional tour higher than the benefit which can be made from optional tour, tour operator set the price of optional tour package a maximum benefit which can be made from predesigned tour to maximize the profits by selling only predesigned tour. Second, when the price of optional tour does not exceed the benefit that can be made from optional tour, the price of optional tour package maximum benefit which can be made from predesigned tour to maximize the profits by selling optional package tour together. Third, when the price of predesigned tour is very low, tour operator set the price of predesigned tour higher than a maximum benefit which can be made from predesigned tour to maximize the profits by selling only optional package tour. Fourth, when tour operator gets negative profits from predesigned tour area, he set the price of predesigned tour higher than maximum benefits to maximize the profits by selling only optional tour package as in third.