This paper summarizes the political directions Pyongyang has displayed in its nuclear diplomacy for the past ten years in a time sequential manner. The particular focus has been on Pyongyang's insistence on maintaining various options to choose from and its political ability to materialize them. The study has looked into North Korea's major policy transitions and the changes in position prominently demonstrated in its diplomacy with the U.S., China, and South Korea.
During the period studied, Pyongyang has shown flexible attitudes,which include: 1) its radical transition from aggressive nuclear and missile capacity building to returning to the negotiation table; 2) its transition of the main issue from demanding corresponding security measures to demanding sanctions relief; 3) its transition of the up-front goal from showing off its retaliation deterrence capacity to strike the U.S. mainland to completion of nuclear war-fighting capabilities in the regional arena; and 4) its transition from hedging against China, focusing on its possible negotiation with the U.S., to hedging against the U.S., focusing on its possible closer ties with China. Such flexibility has been quite successful as a way to realize the strategic objectives that North Korea wanted to achieve in the first place.