The Jin dynasty operated a mobilization system in which he prepared for small-scale conflicts with a few standing troops during peacetime and mobilized reserve troops to respond to emergencies such as the outbreak of large-scale war. Since the mobilization system was the system that the Jin dynasty requisitioned personnel engaged in production activities in peacetime as troops in emergencies, it is difficult to confirm its operation in the early and late period of the Jin Dynasty, which were always in the state of war. Therefore, the process of mobilization measures was analyzed through four cases: attack on the Southern Song in Zhenglong years(1160-1161), northern expedition in Mingchang(明昌)-Cheng'an(承安) Years (1195-1199), counter-attack against the Kaixi Northern Expedition (1204-1207), and the disputes with Western Xia, when the transition from peacetime to wartime occurred during the middle period of the Jin dynasty.
Researching the historical materials related to the attack on the Southern Song in Zhenglong years, it is confirmed that the mobilization force was requisitioned in April of the 6th year of Jeongryong, and that the expeditionary force was launched in September of the same year and would invade the Southern Song in October. Surveying the circumstances surrounding the northern expedition between Mingchang-Cheng'an Years, it is confirmed that at the beginning of Zhangzong's reign, the number of standing troops on the northern border of the Jin dynasty fighting against the invasion of the northern nomadic tribes was not sufficient. therefore, it can be seen that the period during which the large expeditionary force was organized was from January to June in the 6th year of Mingchang. Because Southern Song started the Kaixi Northern Expedition without a declaration of war, the Jin dynasty had no choice but to issue a mobilization order only after the war started in earnest. So, until the mobilization order was given and the actual mobilization took place, it can be confirmed that the standing troops in the south of Jin were insufficient to fight the Southern Song's northern expedition army during peacetime. It is also confirmed that a mobilization order was issued in April of the 6th year of Taihe(泰和) for the counterattack against the Kaixi Northern Expedition, and the troops that were summoned as a result started counterattack from October of the same year. Examining the dispute between the Jin dynasty and Western Xia, despite frequent invasions by Western Xia , the Jin dynasty did not take clear military countermeasures, which is also presumed to be due to insufficient standing troops. After discussing punishment for Western Xia in May of the 3rd year of Zhenyou(貞祐), it is confirmed that it was after the battle of Keron fort(克戎寨) and Shuyang Fort(熟羊寨) in November of the 3rd year of Zhenyou that the Jin dynasty began an active offensive using mobilization forces.
Through this, the following interpretation can be derived. First, the mobilization system required a mobilization preparation period before the requisitioned reserve forces were used as the military, and in the case of the Jin dynasty, this period was generally five to six months. Second, defense during the mobilization preparation period was carried out by a fewwstanding troops, who were in charge of delaying operations and blocked the enemy's advance in order to secure a preparation period for mobilization in emergencies such as large-scale wars. This defense system was able to successfully prevent the invasion of the Southern Song, because the Jin dynasty had a long-depth from the southern frontier to its capital. but the Southern Song had an infantry-oriented army. However, it was difficult to secure sufficient mobilization preparations from the northern nomadic tribes, beacaus the Jin dynasty had a short distance from the border to the capital and the northern nomadic tribes had great mobility. Therefore, in the 3rd year of the DA'AN(大安), when the Ongud(汪古部), which had defended the front line during the first invasion of Mongolian to Jin, surrendered to Mongolia without fighting, the defense bases behind it collapsed one after another due to a lack of preparation. In the end, the Jin dynasty, still not braced for attack, had to be forced to fight at the final defense line, the Yehuling-Huihe fortress(野狐嶺-會河堡) in front of Juyong Pass(居庸關), and after the main army was completely destroyed in the decisive battle with Mongolia, it could not recover national power and entered the path of ruin.