영문목차
PREFACE=xiii
1. The Return of Monetary Rules=1
1. The Importance of Price Stability=4
1.1. Toward a New "Neoclassical Synthesis"=6
1.2. Microeconomic Foundations and Policy Analysis=10
2. The Importance of Policy Commitment=14
2.1. Central Banking as Management of Expectations=15
2.2. Pitfalls of Conventional Optimal Control=18
3. Monetary Policy without Control of a Monetary Aggregate=24
3.1. Implementing Interest-Rate Policy=25
3.2. Monetary Policy in a Cashless Economy=31
4. Interest-Rate Rules=37
4.1. Contemporary Proposals=39
4.2. General Criticisms of Interest-Rate Rules=44
4.3. Neo-Wicksellian Monetary Theory=49
5. Plan of the Book=55
PART I. Analytical Framework=61
2. Price-Level Determination under Interest-Rate Rules=61
1. Price-Level Determination in a Cashless Economy=62
1.1. An Asset-Pricing Model with Nominal Assets=64
1.2. A Wicksellian Policy Regime=74
2. Alternative Interest-Rate Rules=85
2.1. Exogenous Interest-Rate Targets=86
2.2. The Taylor Principle and Determinacy=90
2.3. Inertial Responses to Inflation Variation=94
3. Price-Level Determination with Monetary Frictions=101
3.1. A Model with Transactions Frictions=102
3.2. Interest-Rate Rules Reconsidered=105
3.3. A Comparison with Money-Growth Targeting=106
3.4. Consequences of Nonseparable Utility=111
4. Self-Fulfilling Inflations and Deflations=123
4.1. Global Multiplicity Despite Local Determinacy=123
4.2. Policies to Prevent a Deflationary Trap=131
4.3. Policies to Prevent an Inflationary Panic=135
3. Optimizing Models with Nominal Rigidities=139
1. A Basic Sticky-Price Model=143
1.1. Pricesetting and Endogenous Output=143
1.2. Consequences of Prices Fixed in Advance=155
1.3. A New Classical Phillips Curve=158
1.4. Sources of Strategic Complementarity=163
2. Inflation Dynamics with Staggered Pricesetting=173
2.1. The Calvo Model of Pricesetting=177
2.2. A New Keynesian Phillips Curve=187
2.3. Persistent Real Effects of Nominal Disturbances=188
2.4. Consequences of Persistence in the Growth of Nominal Spending=197
2.5. Consequences of Sectoral Asymmetries=200
3. Delayed Effects of Nominal Disturbances on Inflation=204
3.1. Staggered Pricing with Delayed Price Changes=207
3.2. Consequences of Indexation to Past Inflation=213
4. Consequences of Nominal Wage Stickiness=218
4.1. A Model of Staggered Wagesetting=221
4.2. Sticky Wages and the Real Effects of Nominal Disturbances=226
4. A Neo-Wicksellian Framework for the Analysis of Monetary Policy=237
1. A Basic Model of the Effects of Monetary Policy=238
1.1. Nonlinear Equilibrium Conditions=239
1.2. A Log-Linear Approximate Model=243
2. Interest-Rate Rules and Price Stability=247
2.1. The Natural Rate of Interest=247
2.2. Conditions for Determinacy of Equilibrium=252
2.3. Stability under Learning Dynamics=261
2.4. Determinants of Inflation=276
2.5. Inflation Stabilization through Commitment to a Taylor Rule=286
2.6. Inflation Targeting Rules=290
3. Money and Aggregate Demand=295
3.1. An Optimizing IS-LM Model=295
3.2. Real-Balance Effects=299
4. Fiscal Requirements for Price Stability=311
5. Dynamics of the Response to Monetary Policy=320
1. Delayed Effects of Monetary Policy=321
1.1. Consequences of Predetermined Expenditure=322
1.2. Habit Persistence in Private Expenditure=322
2. Some Small Quantitative Models=336
2.1. The Rotemberg-Woodford Model=336
2.2. More Complex Variants=345
3. Monetary Policy and Investment Dynamics=352
3.1. Investment Demand with Sticky Prices=353
3.2. Optimal Pricesetting with Endogenous Capital=357
3.3. Comparison with the Basic Neo-Wicksellian Model=361
3.4. Capital and the Natural Rate of Interest=372
PART II. Optimal Policy=381
6. Inflation Stabilization and Welfare=381
1. Approximation of Loss Functions and Optimal Policies=383
2. A Utility-Based Welfare Criterion=392
2.1. Output-Gap Stability and Welfare=393
2.2. Inflation and Relative-Price Distortions=396
3. The Case for Price Stability=405
3.1. The Case of an Efficient Natural Rate of Output=407
3.2. Consequences of a Mildly Inefficient Natural Rate of Output=411
3.3. Caveats=416
4. Extensions of the Basic Analysis=419
4.1. Transactions Frictions=420
4.2. The Zero Interest-Rate Lower Bound=427
4.3. Asymmetric Disturbances=435
4.4. Sticky Wages and Prices=443
4.5. Time-Varying Tax Wedges or Markups=448
5. The Case of Larger Distortions=455
7. Gains from Commitment to a Policy Rule=464
1. The Optimal Long-Run Inflation Target=468
1.1. The Inflationary Bias of Discretionary Policy=469
1.2. Extensions of the Basic Analysis=476
2. Optimal Responses to Disturbances=484
2.1. Cost-Push Shocks=486
2.2. Fluctuations in the Natural Rate of Interest=501
3. Optimal Simple Policy Rules=507
3.1. The Optimal Noninertial Plan=510
3.2. The Optimal Taylor Rule=513
4. The Optimal State-Contingent Instrument Path as a Policy Rule=517
5. Commitment to an Optimal Targeting Rule=521
5.1. Robustly Optimal Target Criteria=522
5.2. Implementation of a Targeting Rule=527
8. Optimal Monetary Policy Rules=534
1. A General Linear-Quadratic Framework=535
1.1. Optimal State-Contingent Paths=536
1.2. Alternative Forms of Policy Rules=543
1.3. Robustness to Alternative Types of Disturbances=547
1.4. Existence of Robustly Optimal Policy Rules=550
1.5. Optimal Instrument Rules=555
2. Optimal Inflation Targeting Rules=559
2.1. A Model with Inflation Inertia=560
2.2. A Model with Wages and Prices Both Sticky=565
2.3. A Model with Habit Persistence=568
2.4. Predetermined Spending and Pricing Decisions=569
2.5. Optimal Policy for a Small Quantitative Model=573
3. Optimal Interest-Rate Rules=582
3.1. An Optimal Rule for the Basic Neo-Wicksellian Model=583
3.2. Consequences of Inflation Inertia=592
3.3. Predetermined Spending and Pricing Decisions=604
3.4. Optimal Policy under Imperfect Information=606
4. Reflections on Currently Popular Policy Proposals=610
4.1. The Taylor Rule=610
4.2. Inflation-Forecast Targeting=619
REFERENCES=747
INDEX=765
A.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1=627
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.2=628
A.3. Log-Linearization and Determinacy of Equilibrium=630
A.4. Proof of Proposition 2.3=635
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2.4=637
A.6. Proof of Proposition 2.5=638
A.7. Proof of Proposition 2.7=639
A.8. Proof of Proposition 2.8=640
A.9. Proof of Proposition 2.9=641
A.10. Proof of Proposition 2.10=643
A.11. Proof of Proposition 2.11=644
A.12. Proof of Proposition 2.12=645
A.13. Proof of Proposition 2.13=646
A.14. Proof of Proposition 2.14=646
A.15. Proof of Proposition 2.15=647
A.16. Monetary Frictions with an Alternative Timing Convention=649
A.17. The Example of Schmitt-Groheacute and Uribe=653
B.1. Non-CES Demand and Variable Markups=656
B.2. Proof of Proposition 3.3=657
B.3. Proof of Proposition 3.4=659
B.4. Proof of Proposition 3.5=661
B.5. Proof of Proposition 3.6=662
B.6. Proof of Proposition 3.7=664
B.7. Proof of Proposition 3.8=666
C.1. Determinacy of Equilibrium in Small Linear Models:Useful Results=670
C.2. Proof of Proposition 4.3=676
C.3. Proof of Proposition 4.4=677
C.4. Proof of Proposition 4.5=681
C.5. Proof of Proposition 4.6=682
C.6. Proof of Proposition 4.7=683
C.7. Proof of Proposition 4.9=683
C.8. Proof of Proposition 4.11=685
D.1. Alternative Interpretation of the Habit Persistence Model=687
D.2. Proof of Proposition 5.1=688
D.3. Proof of Proposition 5.2=691
E.1. Proof of Proposition 6.1=692
E.2. Proof of Proposition 6.3=694
E.3. Proof of Proposition 6.6=696
E.4. Proof of Proposition 6.7=698
E.5. Proof of Proposition 6.9=700
E.6. Proof of Proposition 6.10=703
E.7. Proof of Proposition 6.11=705
E.8. Proof of Proposition 6.12=707
F.1. Proof of Proposition 7.6=709
F.2. Proof of Proposition 7.9=710
F.3. Proof of Proposition 7.10=712
F.4. The Optimal Noninertial Plan=713
F.5. Proof of Proposition 7.15=714
F.6. Proof of Proposition 7.16=715
G.1. Assumptions 8.3 and 8.4=716
G.2. Assumption 8.5=719
G.3. Technical Lemmas=719
G.4. Proof of Proposition 8.5=721
G.5. Proof of Proposition 8.6=723
G.6. Proof of Proposition 8.7=724
G.7. Proof of Proposition 8.8=727
G.8. Proof of Proposition 8.9=730
G.9. Proof of Proposition 8.10=737
G.10. Proof of Proposition 8.11=739