영문목차
Contents
Preface
Part 1. Theoretical Underpinnings
Chapter 1. Purpose and Method
1.1 Bringing Theory to Bear on Data
1.2 Bringing Data to Bear on Theory
1.3 A Possible Objection and a Rejoinder
1.4 Blueprint
1.5 Scylla and Charybdis
1.6 Coda
Chapter 2. Theories and Explanations
2.1 The Realist Paradigm and Classical Deterrence Theory
2.2 Coda
Chapter 3 Perfect Deterrence Theory: An Overview
3.1 Axioms and General Theoretical Characteristics
3.2 Explaining the Absence of War
3.3 Theoretical Propositions, Empirical Expectations, and Policy Implications
3.4 Coda
Part 2. Explaining the Great War
Chapter 4. Bismarck's System
4.1 The Tripartite Crisis Game
4.2 Outcomes and Preferences
4.3 Analysis
4.4 Explaining the Austro-German Alliance of 1879
4.5 Coda
Chapter 5. Vienna, Berlin, and the Blank Check
5.1 Background
5.2 The Tripartite Crisis Game Redux
5.3 Analysis
5.4 Coda
Chapter 6. La Guerre Europeenne
6.1 Asymmetric Escalation Game
6.2 Preferences
6.3 Some Caveats
6.4 Analysis
6.5 Discussion
6.6 Coda
Chapter 7 Britain's Strategic Dilemma
7.1 Modeling the Deterrence versus Restraint Dilemma
7.2 Preference Assumptions
7.3 Information and Utility Assumptions
7.4 Analysis
7.5 Explaining Britain's Foreign Policy in 1914
7.6 Coda
Part 3. Endgame
Chapter 8. Questions, Answers, Implications
8.1 Explanation
8.2 Theoretical Assessment
8.3 Implications and Final Thoughts
References
Index