영문목차
Preface=xi
Acknowledgements=xv
Part I. Foundations=1
1. Markets and organizations=3
1.1. The economic problem=3
1.2. The division of labour=4
1.3. Specialization=7
1.4. Coordination=8
1.5. Markets and organizations=10
1.6. Information=13
1.7. The environment and institutions=15
1.8. Historical perspective=21
1.9. Summary : the conceptual framework of this book=23
1.10. Outline of the book=24
Questions=26
Note=26
2. Markets=27
2.1. Introduction=27
2.2. Market interaction : analysis of demand and supply=28
2.3. The theory of demand=31
2.4. The theory of production=33
2.5. Market coordination=38
2.6. The paradox of profits=39
2.7. Comments on standard microeconomic theory=40
2.8. Economic Man (homo economicus) and his further development=42
2.9. Summary : how economic decisions are coordinated by the market=44
Questions=45
Note=46
3. Organizations=47
3.1. The world of organizations=47
3.2. Organizational coordination=48
3.3. Types of organizations=53
3.4. Organizational markets=58
3.5. Organized markets=59
3.6. Summary : how organizations achieve coordination=61
Questions=63
Notes=64
4. Information=65
4.1. Coordination and information=65
4.2. Hidden information=70
4.3. Hidden action=76
4.4. The value of information=81
4.5. Summary : information problems for markets and organizations=84
Questions=85
Note=86
5. Game theory=87
5.1. Introduction=87
5.2. The coordination game=88
5.3. The entry game=92
5.4. Auctions=96
5.5. The prisoner's dilemma : single-stage and iterated=101
5.6. Evolutionary game theory=110
5.7. Summary : insights from game theory=115
Questions=117
Part II. Economic Approaches=119
6. Behavioural theory of the firm=121
6.1. Introduction=121
6.2. The firm as a coalition of participants=121
6.3. Organizational goals=125
6.4. Organizational expectations=128
6.5. Organizational choice=129
6.6. From bounded rationality to behavioural economics=131
6.7. Summary : goals and decisionmaking within the firm in behavioural theory=134
Questions=136
7. Agency theory=138
7.1. Introduction=138
7.2. Separation of ownership and control=139
7.3. Managerial behaviour and ownership structure=141
7.4. Entrepreneurial firms and team production=147
7.5. The firm as a nexus of contracts=150
7.6. Theory of principal and agent=152
7.7. Summary : agency relations between owners, managers and employees=162
Questions=163
Note=166
8. Transaction cost economics=167
8.1. Introduction=167
8.2. Behavioural assumptions : bounded rationality and opportunism=169
8.3. Dimensions of transactions=175
8.4. Peer groups=180
8.5. Simple hierarchies=182
8.6. Multistage hierarchies : U-form and M-form enterprises=184
8.7. Organizational markets=185
8.8. Markets and organizations : are these all there is?=188
8.9. Governance in a three-level schema=195
8.10. Summary : effect of transaction costs on choosing between markets and organizations and organizational forms=196
Questions=198
9. Economic contributions to business/competitive strategy=201
9.1. Introduction=201
9.2. Industry analysis=204
9.3. Competitor analysis=208
9.4. Competitive strategy=211
9.5. Resource-based view of the firm=212
9.6. Dynamic capabilities=215
9.7. Move and counter move=219
9.8. Summary : how economic analysis can contribute to the formulation of competitive strategies=228
Questions=229
10. Economic contributions to corporate strategy=230
10.1. Introduction=230
10.2. Unrelated diversification=233
10.3. Related diversification=239
10.4. Horizontal multinationalization=244
10.5. Vertical integration=248
10.6. Summary=253
Questions=255
11. Evolutionary approaches to organizations=257
11.1. Introduction=257
11.2. Giraffes=257
11.3. Organizations and giraffes=260
11.4. Organizational ecology=263
11.5. An evolutionary theory of economic change=270
11.6. Comparison=275
11.7. The evolution of dynamic capabilities=278
11.8. Further developments=285
11.9. Summary : the evolutionary perspective=290
Questions=292
Notes=293
12. All in the family=294
12.1. Introduction=294
12.2. The basic conceptual framework=294
12.3. Family resemblances=295
12.4. Family differences=299
12.5. Summary : all in the family?=306
12.6. New developments : organizations as complex, adaptive systems=308
Questions=317
Note=317
Part III. Applications=319
13. Mergers and acquisitions=321
13.1. Introduction=321
13.2. The significance of M&A=323
13.3. Success and failure of M&A transactions=327
13.4. Strategy, acquisitions and hidden information=329
13.5. Auctions=331
13.6. The winner's curse and hubris=335
13.7. Adverse selection : remedies for hidden information=339
13.8. Moral hazard : remedies for hidden action=343
13.9. Transaction specificity and hold-up=347
13.10. Alignment of managers and shareholders=349
13.11. Summary : economic approaches to M&A=353
Questions=354
Notes=355
14. Hybrid forms=356
14.1. Introduction=356
14.2. Long-term relations between buyers and suppliers=358
14.3. Joint ventures=360
14.4. Business groups=362
14.5. Informal networks=372
14.6. Franchising=373
14.7. Comparing several hybrid forms=377
14.8. Summary : hybrid forms as governance structures between ideal markets and ideal organizations=378
Questions=379
15. Corporate governance=380
15.1. Introduction=380
15.2. The first public company=383
15.3. The use of incentive contracts=387
15.4. Internal monitoring=392
15.5. External monitoring=396
15.6. How markets constrain agency costs=397
15.7. Institutional frameworks : market-orientated and network-orientated systems of corporate governance=401
15.8. The evolution of different corporate governance systems in the world=408
15.9. Summary : how the agency problems of corporate governance can be reduced by organizational and/or market solutions=409
Questions=410
Note=410
Bibliography=411
Index=427