AcknowledgementsList of AbbreviationsTable of CasesTable of Legislation and Treaties1 Introduction1.1 Nature of the Subject1.2 From Meta-Regulation to Technocratic Fine-Tuning1.2.1 What Is Regulation?1.2.2 Command-and-Control Regulation, Self-Regulation and Meta-Regulation1.2.3 Technocratic Fine-Tuning1.3 Terminology1.4 The Structure of the Book2 Why and How Society Seeks to Limit Bank Failures2.1 Society's Concern with Bank Failures2.1.1 Introduction2.1.2 What Banks Do2.1.3 How Banks Fund Themselves2.1.4 Why Do Bank Failures Cause Concern?2.2 The Pre-Crisis Turn Towards Meta-Regulation2.2.1 Introduction2.2.2 Capital Requirements2.2.3 Liquidity Requirements2.2.4 Conclusions2.3 The Reorientation Towards `Technocratic Fine-Tuning' in Post-Crisis Banking Regulation2.3.1 Introduction2.3.2 The Minimum Own Funds Requirement and the Continued Use of the IRB-Approach2.3.3 Pillar 2 Requirements2.3.4 Capital Buffer Requirements2.3.5 The Leverage Ratio2.3.6 Liquidity Requirements2.3.7 Structural Reform and Central Counterparty Clearing2.3.8 Conclusions2.4 The Safety Net: Deposit Insurance, Central Bank Liquidity Support and Government Rescues2.4.1 Introduction2.4.2 Deposit Insurance2.4.3 State Aid2.4.4 Problems Associated with the Safety Net3 The Emergence of Bank-Specific Insolvency Proceedings3.1 One Size Fits All: The General Approach to Corporate Financial Distress and Insolvency3.1.1 Introduction3.1.2 What are Insolvency Proceedings?3.1.3 Liquidation Proceedings3.1.4 Restructuring Proceedings3.2 Why are General Insolvency Proceedings Deemed Unsuitable for Banks?3.2.1 The Difference between the Objectives Pursued3.2.2 The Substantive Scope of the Official's Powers3.2.3 The Procedural Aspects of the Official's Powers3.2.4 The Decision-Makers3.3 Fragmentation: The Different Approaches to Bank Insolvency Prior to the Global Financial Crisis3.4 Consensus: The Adoption of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive3.4.1 The Origins of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive3.4.2 Resolution and Early Intervention3.4.3 Financing Arrangements and Obligations to Prepare for Resolution3.4.4 Cross-Border Resolution and the Single Resolution Mechanism3.5 Winding-Up Proceedings for Smaller Banks4 Creditor Priority in General Insolvency Proceedings4.1 Introduction4.2 Priority in Liquidation Proceedings: The Tension between Party Autonomy and Prescriptive Rules4.2.1 The Possibilities for Taking Security and the Priority of Security Interests4.2.2 Transaction Avoidance of Security Interests4.2.3 Priority Among Unsecured Creditors4.3 Creditor Priority in Modern Restructuring Proceedings4.3.1 English Law4.3.2 German Law4.3.3 Norwegian Law4.3.4 Conclusions4.4 Understanding the Creditor Priority Regime of General Insolvency Law4.4.1 Introduction4.4.2 Property-Oriented Arguments for the Priority of Secured Credit4.4.3 Efficiency-Oriented Theories of Secured Credit4.4.4 Priority Among Unsecured Creditors5 Creditor Priority in the Winding-Up of Banks5.1 Introduction5.2 Secured Claims5.2.1 Introduction5.2.2 The Settlement Finality Directive and the Financial Collateral Directive5.2.3 Covered Bonds5.3 Unsecured Claims5.3.1 Depositor Preference5.3.2 Bondholder Subordination5.4 Creditor Priority in Group and Cross-Border Settings6 Creditor Priority in Bank Resolution6.1 Introduction6.2 Priority Under the Different Resolution Powers6.3 Secured Claims6.3.1 The Bail-in Tool6.3.2 The Transfer Tools6.4 Unsecured Claims6.4.1 The Bail-in Power: Scope6.4.2 The Bail-in Power: Priority6.4.3 The Transfer Tools6.4.4 The Discretion of the Resolution Authority6.5 Creditor Priority in Group and Cross-Border Settings6.6 The `No Creditor Worse Off Principle'7 The Rationales of Bank-Specific Creditor Priority Rules7.1 Introduction7.2 A Matter of Adapting General Principles to Special Circumstances?7.3 Falling Like Dominoes: Creditor Priority and Direct Contagion7.4 Creditor Priority and Indirect Contagion: Fire Sales and Informational Contagion7.5 The Reorientation of Bank-Specific Creditor Priority Rules: From Party Autonomy to Prescriptive Rules8 Administrative Law and Creditor Priority: The Case of MREL (Minimum Requirements for Own Funds and Eligible Liabilities)8.1 How Administrative Law and Decisions Increasingly Influence Private Contracting Over Priority8.2 Background8.3 The First Iteration of the MREL Regime8.4 The Emergence of a Global Consensus: Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC)8.5 The Revision of the MREL Regime8.5.1 Quantitative Requirements8.5.2 Subordination and Other Qualitative Requirements8.5.3 Judicial Review of MREL Decisions8.6 Who Will Invest in MREL Instruments?9 From Meta-Regulation to Technocratic Fine-Tuning: The Phases of Creditor Priority in Bank Insolvency Proceedings9.1 The Phases of Creditor Priority in Bank Insolvency Proceedings9.2 Technocratic Fine-Tuning and Creditor Priority9.2.1 Technocratic Fine-Tuning9.2.2 The Tensions and Trade-Offs Involved9.2.3 Creditor Priority in Bank Insolvency Law and Technocratic Fine-Tuning10 What is the Future of Bank-Specific Creditor Priority Rules?10.1 The End of Creditor Priority?10.2 MREL and Financial Stability10.3 Banking Union and the Further Harmonisation of Bank-Specific Priority Rules10.3.1 The Proposed European Deposit Insurance Scheme and Creditor Priority10.3.2 The Single Resolution Mechanism and Creditor PriorityBibliographyIndex