영문목차

List of Tables=x

List of Figures=xiii

Acknowledgments=xv

1. Extraordinary Events and Public Opinion=1

Catastrophes as Regular Critical Moments in American Politics=3

The Political Importance of Collective Experiences and Attributions of Blame=7

Hurricane Katrina as a Test Case=9

Advantages and Limits of Our Tests=14

Overview of the Book=16

2. A Theoretical Framework for Systematically Examining Extraordinary Events=22

Normal Politics versus Extraordinary Moments=24

Extraordinary Events as Political Context=27

Media Coverage and the Information Environment in Extraordinary Events=29

Public Reactions : Affective Attributions of Blame in Times of Crises=34

Affective Attributions and Their Consequences for Political Opinions=39

Affective Attributions and the Anger―Punishment Link=42

Summary and Conclusions=44

3. The Media Message Environment and the Emotional Context of Hurricane Katrina=46

Media Data=46

Public Attentiveness and Media Selection Following Hurricane Katrina=48

Emotional Primes in Coverage of Hurricane Katrina=50

Affective Engagement of the Public=54

Media, Politics, and Blame Following Hurricane Katrina=60

Summary and Conclusions=74

4. Affective Attributions : Assigning Blame during Extraordinary Times=76

Public Agreement with Blame Frames=77

Empirical Expectations from the Theory of Affective Attributions=82

Empirical Models and Results, Attributions of Blame=84

Race and Attributions of Blame=93

The Emotional Fallout from Attribution of Blame=98

Empirical Models and Results, Anger=100

Summary and Conclusions=103

5. Federalism in a Multiple-Message Environment : Are the Appropriate Leaders Held Accountable?=105

Evaluations of the Performance of Leaders during Hurricane Katrina=107

Attributions and the Assignment of Political Responsibility=108

Multiple Messages, Federalism, and Assignment of Responsibility=111

Empirical Models and Results=118

Direct Effects of Anxiety and Anger on Evaluation=129

Conditional Effects of Anger on Evaluation=130

Summary and Conclusions=133

6. Attributions of Blame, Political Efficacy, and Confidence in Government=135

Public Confidence in Government=137

Efficacy, Confidence, and the Case of Hurricane Katrina=139

Empirical Results, Confidence in Government=147

Examining Longer-Term Effects of Katrina with a Cuing Experiment=155

Summary and Conclusions=158

7. Attributions, Emotions, and Policy Consequences=160

Informational and Punitive Policy Proposals Following Hurricane Katrina=161

Results of Ordered-Probit Models of Agreement with Proposed Policies=170

A Closer Look at Limiting Presidential Authority and Understanding the Influence of Emotion=177

Summary and Conclusions=181

8. Extraordinary Events and Public Opinion : Some Broader Perspectives=183

A Review of Individual-Level Findings=185

Collective Trauma, Shared History, and the Political Implications of Disasters=189

Some Final Normative Thoughts=198

Appendix A. Survey Data and Methodology=201

Appendix B. Data and Methodology for Survey Experiment=202

Appendix C. Coding of News Transcripts and Video Data=204

Methodology for Video Coding of FNC and CNN Broadcasts=204

Methodology for Transcript Coding for ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, and FNC Broadcasts=205

Appendix D. Multivariate Model Results for Chapter 4=208

Appendix E. Multivariate Model Results for Chapter 5=212

Appendix F. Multivariate Model Results for Chapter 6=214

Appendix G. Multivariate Model Results for Chapter 7=219

References=223

Index=247

1.1. Selected Major Disasters Covered by NBC Nightly News, 1986-2010, Ordered by Amount of Coverage=6

3.1. Emotional Engagement by Level of Attentiveness=57

3.2. Attention and Emotion, by Race(Std Errors)=59

3.3. Percentage of All News Segments Containing Implicit or Explicit Attributions of Blame, Transcript Segments=71

4.1. Distribution of Public Responses to Attributions of Blame, in Percentages=79

4.2. Distributions of Responses of Belief that State Failure Had an Effect on National Government Response Time, in Percentages=79

4.3. Agreement with Attributions by Partisanship, in Percentages=81

4.4. Ordered-Probit Models of Attributions of Blame, Select Coefficients for Focal Variables=86

4.5. Predicted Probabilities of Agreement with Societal Breakdown Frames, by Race=95

4.6. Select Ordered-Probit Coefficients from the Model of Anger=102

5.1. Evaluations of Leader Performance in the First Few Days after the Storm, in Percentages=108

5.2. Mean Evaluations of President Bush, Governor Blanco, and Mayor Nagin=114

5.3. Mean Evaluations of Bush, Blanco, and Nagin by Dominant Attribution Frame=117

5.4. Select Ordered-Probit Coefficients from Models of Evaluations of Leaders=119

5.5. Predicted Probabilities of Evaluations of Bush, Blanco, and Nagin, by Party and Attribution to Nature=124

5.6. Predicted Probabilities of Evaluations of Bush, Blanco, and Nagin, by Party and Attribution to National Government=125

5.7. Comparing Coefficients across Performance Models of Bush with and without the Angry Interaction=131

6.1. Ordered-Probit Models of External Efficacy=144

6.2. Individual-Level Confidence in Government to Handle Future Catastrophes, in Percentages=149

6.3. Select Ordered-Probit Coefficients from Models of Confidence in Government to Handle Future Crises=150

6.4. Predicted Probabilities of Feeling Less Confident, by Attribution Agreement and Level of Anger=152

6.5. Select Coefficients from a Negative Binomial Model of Lowered Confidence in Crisis Response=154

6.6. Experimental Effects of Crisis Prompts on Level of Confidence in Government=156

6.7. Selected Coefficients, Ordered-Probit Models of Confidence in Government=157

7.1. Public Opinions about Post-Katrina Policies, in Percentages=162

7.2. Select Coefficients from Ordered-Probit Models of Public Policy Preferences=171

7.3. Predicted Probability of Agreement and Disagreement with Policy When the Independent Variable Is at Its Minimum and Maximum=173

8.1. Summary of Main Hypotheses and Supportive Evidence=186

D.1. Ordered-Probit Models of Attributions of Blame=209

D.2. Ordered-Probit Model of Anger about New Orleans=211

E.1. Ordered-Probit Models of Evaluations of Leaders=212

E.2. Ordered-Probit Models of Evaluations of Leaders with Anger Interaction=213

F.1. Ordered-Probit Model of External Efficacy=215

F.2. Ordered-Probit Models of Confidence in National Government to Handle Future Catastrophes=216

F.3. Negative Binomial Model of "Less Confident" Count=217

F.4. Ordered-Probit Model of Confidence in Government to Assist Victims and Maintain Order=218

G.1. Ordered-Probit Models of Policy Preferences=220

G.2. Ordered-Probit Models of Policy Preferences, with Emotion Interactions=221

2.1. Overview of the Opinion Formation Process during Extraordinary Events=24

2.2. Causal Linkages in Opinion Formation during Extraordinary Events=41

3.1. Average Primetime News Viewers Based on Nielsen Ratings for FNC, CNN, and MSNBC, Combined=47

3.2. Count of Attributions of Blame on All Networks, Three-Day Moving Average=73

4.1. Effects of Party Identification on Agreement with Attribution to National Government, Conditioned by Level of Anxiety=88

4.2. Effects of Party Identification on Agreement with Attribution to State Government, Conditioned by Level of Anxiety=88

4.3. Effects of Party Identification on Agreement with Criminal Behavior Attribution, Conditioned by Level of Anxiety=90

4.4. Effects of Party Identification on Agreement with Attribution to Nature, Conditioned by Level of Anxiety=90

4.5. Effects of Party Identification on Agreement with Non-evacuation Attribution, Conditioned by Level of Anxiety=91

4.6. Effects of Party Identification on Agreement with National Government Attribution, No-Anxiety and Low-Anxiety Respondents=93

5.1. Effect of Attribution of Blame to National Government on the Probability of a "Poor" Evaluation of President Bush, Conditioned by Level of Anger=132

6.1. Predicted Probabilities of Feeling Efficacious by Levels of Blame Attribution and Anger=146

6.2. Predicted Probabilities of Confidence in Government, by Experimental Prompt=158

7.1. The Effect of Blaming National Government on Agreement with Limiting Presidential Authority, Conditioned by Level of Anger=179

7.2. The Effect of Party Identification on Agreement with Limiting Presidential Authority, Conditioned by Level of Anxiety=180

8.1. Frequency of Disaster Polling Questions, 1986-2010=196