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Figures and Tables=viii
Acknowledgments=ix
1. High Court-Elected Branch Interactions in Latin America=1
1.1. Introduction=1
1.2. Patterns of High Court-Elected Branch Interaction=1
1.3. Explaining Interbranch Interactions : The Court Character Thesis=22
1.4. Structure of the Book=34
2. Setting the Scene : Latin America's Triple Transition and the Judicialization of Economic Governance=36
2.1. Introduction=36
2.2. Argentina's Legal Transition=36
2.3. Argentina's Economic Transition and the Judicialization of Economic Governance=44
2.4. Brazil's Legal Transition=50
2.5. Brazil's Economic Transition and the Judicialization of Economic Governance=57
2.6. Conclusions and Comparisons=63
3. Politicization and the Political Court in Argentina=66
3.1. Introduction=66
3.2. Judicial Centralization : High Courts in the Hot Seat=70
3.3. Court Crafting Argentine Style : Politicization=73
3.4. Why Politicize? An Institutional Account=78
3.5. A Political Court=87
3.6. Conclusions=91
4. Professionalization and the Statesman Court in Brazil=93
4.1. Introduction=93
4.2. Judicial Centralization=95
4.3. Brazil's Politics of Court Crafting : Professionalization=100
4.4. Explaining High Court Professionalization : An Institutional Account=103
4.5. A Statesman Court=112
4.6. Conclusions and Comparisons=117
5. The Political Court, and High Court Submission and Interbranch Confrontation in Argentina=120
5.1. Introduction=120
5.2. Interbranch Interactions over Economic Governance in Argentina : Court Submission and Confrontation=123
5.3. Explaining Interbranch Interactions : The Court Character Thesis=133
5.4. Case Studies=139
5.5. Conclusions=153
6. The Statesman Court and Interbranch Accommodation in Brazil=155
6.1. Introduction=155
6.2. Interbranch Accommodation in the Economic Policy Realm in Brazil=156
6.3. An Institutional Account of Interbranch Interactions : The Court Character Thesis=170
6.4. Case Studies=176
6.5. Conclusions and Comparisons=188
7. Conclusions and Implications=192
7.1. Introduction=192
7.2. Findings and Lessons=194
7.3. Broader Debates and Implications=199
Appendix 1.1. Case-Selection Methodology, Argentina and Brazil=211
Appendix 5.1. Eighteen Crucial Economic Policy Cases Decided by the Argentine CSJN(1984-2003)=216
Appendix 5.2. Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases=222
Appendix 5.3. Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases=223
Appendix 5.4. Considerations Imputed to be Important to Argentine CSJN Rulings on Eighteen Crucial Economic Policy Cases and Approach to Decision Making=224
Appendix 5.5. Elected Branches' Compliance with and Retaliation against CSJN Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power=232
Appendix 6.1. Twenty-Six Crucial Economic Policy Cases Decided by the Brazilian STF(1985-2004)=234
Appendix 6.2. Intensity of Brazilian STF Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases=247
Appendix 6.3. Intensity of Brazilian STF Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases=249
Appendix 6.4. Considerations Imputed to be Important to Brazilian STF Rulings on Twenty Crucial Economic Policy Cases/Case Pairs and Approach to Decision Making=251
Appendix 6.5. Elected Branches' Compliance with and Retaliation against STF Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power=260
Notes Concerning Citations to Interviews and Newspaper Articles=263
References=263
Index=283
1.1. Patterns of High Court-Elected Branch Interaction=7
1.2. Approaches to High Court Decision Making and Corresponding Considerations and Models of Judicial Behavior=13
1.3. Patterns of Interbranch Interaction over Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil, and Corresponding Court Character and Politics of Court Crafting=32
3.1. Changes in CSJN Size and Composition and Selected Initiatives to Impeach Justices=75
5.1. Patterns of High Court-Elected Branch Interaction over Economic Governance in Argentina=122
5.2. Patterns of High Court-Elected Branch Interaction over Economic Governance in Argentina(eighteen cases decided 1984-2003, in chronological order)=124
6.1. Pattern of High Court-Elected Branch Interaction over Economic Governance in Brazil=157
6.2. Pattern of High Court-Elected Branch Interaction over Economic Governance in Brazil(twenty cases/case pairs decided 1985-2004, in chronological order)=159
1.1. Explaining patterns of high court-elected branch interaction : The Court character thesis=23
5.1. Explaining patterns of interbranch interaction over economic governance in Argentina : The Court character thesis=134
6.1. Explaining patterns of interbranch interaction over economic governance in Brazil : The Court character thesis=171
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