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List of Figures=xi

List of Tables=xiv

List of Boxes=xvii

List of Contributors=xviii

Introduction / By Tito Boeri=1

Part I. Understanding Highly Skilled Migration in Developed Countries : The Upcoming Battle for Brains / By Herbert Brücker ; Simone Bertoli ; Giovanni Facchini ; Anna Maria Mayda ; Giovanni Peri=15

Introduction=17

1. Selecting the Highly Skilled : An Overview of Current Policy Approaches=23

1.1. A classification of skill-selective immigration policies=24

1.2. Skill-selective immigration policies in traditional immigration countries=25

1.3. Skill-selective immigration policies at the EU level=29

1.4. Skill-selective immigration policies in a group of EU member countries=30

1.5. Present and future policies to attract highly skilled immigrants : evidence based on UN data=34

1.6. Conclusions=35

2. Global Trends in Highly Skilled Immigration=36

2.1. Highly skilled immigrants in the OECD=37

2.2. How large is the global pool of highly skilled labour?=47

2.3. Looking at the top of the skill distribution=50

2.4. The competition for foreign students=54

2.5. How do highly skilled immigrants assimilate into host labour markets?=60

2.6. Conclusions=64

3. The Determinants of Highly Skilled Migration : Evidence from OECD Countries 1980-2005=66

3.1. The empirical model=68

3.2. Data=71

3.3. Regression results=81

3.4. Discussion and conclusions=93

4. The Effects of Brain Gain on Growth, Investment, and Employment : Evidence from OECD Countries, 1980-2005=106

4.1. A production function framework=108

4.2. Data on employment, capital intensity, and productivity=111

4.3. The effects of immigration and brain gain=112

4.4. The effects of immigration and brain gain in bad economic times=121

4.5. Conclusions=124

5. The Political Economy of Skilled Immigration=127

5.1. The elements of a political economy model of immigration policy=128

5.2. Understanding individual attitudes towards skilled migrants=130

5.3. From individual preferences to immigration policy=144

5.4. Empirical assessment=149

5.5. Conclusions=156

6. Can the Battle for Brains turn into a Tragedy of the Commons?=169

6.1. International mobility of labour and human capital formation at origin=172

6.2. A model of the Battle for Brains=175

6.3. Conclusions=182

7. Conclusions=184

7.1. Incremental shifts toward more skill-selective immigration policies=184

7.2. Skilled migration flows are concentrated in a few countries characterized by skill-selective immigration polices=185

7.3. The wage premium for education and skill-selective immigration policies is an important driver of skilled migration=186

7.4. Immigration and the brain gain are beneficial for receiving economies=186

7.5. How do immigration and the brain gain affect economies in the downturn of the business cycle?=187

7.6. Why do skill-selective immigration policies not find more support?=187

7.7. Will the policy equilibrium shift towards more skill-selective immigration policies?=188

7.8. Can the upcoming skill contest produce losers among destination and sending countries?=188

References=190

Comments=199

Franco Peracchi=199

Sascha Becker=203

Part II. Quantifying the Impact of Highly Skilled Emigration on Developing Countries / By Frédéric Docquier ; Hillel Rapoport=209

Introduction=211

8. The Size of the Brain Drain=213

8.1. Extensive measures of the brain drain=214

8.2. Magnitude of 'South-South' migration=220

8.3. Accounting for country of training=223

8.4. The brain drain of scientists and health professionals=225

9. Theory, Evidence, and Implications=233

9.1. Endogenizing economic performances=234

9.2. The human capital channel=238

9.3. The screening-selection channel=250

9.4. The productivity channel=254

9.5. The institutional channel=261

9.6. Summing up : brain drain and economic performance=267

9.7. The transfer channel=272

10. Policy Issues=277

10.1. Implications for education (and other) policies in sending countries=278

10.2. Immigration (and emigration) policy=281

10.3. Taxation policy : the case for a Bhagwati tax=284

10.4. Migration flows and immigration policy in times of crisis=287

11. Conclusion=290

References=291

Comments=297

Antonio Spilimbergo=297

Alessandra Venturini=302

Index=309

List of Boxes

5.1. The political economy of international factor mobility=146

9.1. Predicting GDP per capita=237

9.2. Brain drain and human capital accumulation=240

9.3. Brain drain and the screening channel=253

9.4. Brain drain and total factor productivity=256

9.5. Brain drain and remittances=274

List of Tables

1.1. The Canadian point system.=26

1.2. The Australian skilled migration system, 2009.=27

1.3. The New Zealand point system.=28

1.4. The UK point-based system(Tier 1).=31

1.5. Governments' policy on highly skilled immigrants by income group, 2007.=34

2.1. Immigrants with tertiary education in OECD countries, 2001.=40

2.2. Source countries of highly skilled immigrants in the OECD by income level, 2001.=44

2.3. Source countries of highly skilled immigrants in the OECD by region, 2001.=45

2.4. Immigrant and emigrant population with tertiary education in OECD countries, 2001.=47

2.5. Total population and immigrants with tertiary education by country groups, 2001.=48

2.6. Immigrant and native population with a PhD degree, 2001.=51

2.7. Immigrant population with a completed university degree in selected OECD countries, 1970-2005.=52

2.8. Immigrants with tertiary education in key management and highly skilled professional positions, 2006.=53

2.9. Foreign students by educational programme in the OECD, 2006.=57

2.10. Field of study of foreign and native students(ISCED 5 and ISCED 6), 2006.=58

A2.1. Wage income by selected skill groups in USA and Canada, 2000/01.=65

A2.2. Wage income by selected occupations in USA and Canada, 2000/01.=65

3.1. Basic specifications : effects of average wage and wage premia on total immigration and the selection of immigrants, 14 OECD receiving countries, 1980-2005.=83

3.2 Effect of immigration laws on total immigration and selection by education.=86

3.3 Effect of welfare generosity on total immigration and selection by education.=89

3.4 Effect of labour market regulation on total immigration and selection by education.=90

3.5 Effect of R&D intensity on total immigration and selection by education.=92

A3.1. List of the countries of origin of migrants for the bilateral migration data.=104

A3.2. Percentage of immigrants with tertiary education, 14 OECD countries 1985, 1995, and 2005.=104

A3.3. Correlation matrix for the immigration laws(14 countries, 1980-2005).=105

A3.4. Country-specific effects in attracting immigrants and in selecting highly educated.=105

4.1. Impact of yearly immigrant flows and share of highly educated immigrants : yearly changes, OLS estimates.=113

4.2. First stage of the 2SLS : power of the instruments.=117

4.3. Impact of yearly immigrant flows and share of highly educated immigrants : yearly changes, 2SLS estimates.=119

4.4. Five-year differences 2SLS estimates, instruments : gravity push-factors only.=120

4.5. Impact of immigration in 'normal' and 'bad' economic times : period 1980-2005, 2SLS estimates, instruments : gravity push-factors only.=123

A4.1. Annualized growth rates of inputs, productivity, and output.=126

5.1. Correlations between pro-immigration attitudes and, respectively, individual skill and income through the labour market and the welfare state channels.=134

5.2. Economic and non-economic determinants of attitudes.=136

5.3. Summary statistics of individual-level variables(ESS).=141

5.4. Summary statistics of individual-level variables by country and of country-level variables(ESS).=142

5.5. Determinants of individual attitudes towards skilled migration(ESS).=143

5.6. Does the median voter rule?=150

5.7. The impact of interest groups on US H1B visas.=156

A5.1. Summary statistics of individual attitudes towards immigration(ISSP 1995) and country-level variables.=163

A5.2. Summary statistics of individual attitudes towards immigration(ISSP 2003) and country-level variables.=164

A5.3. Heckman selection model―ISSP 1995.=165

A5.4. Heckman selection model―ISSP 2003.=167

8.1. Top-30 suppliers PhDs to the USA.=226

8.2. Researchers employed in science and technology in the USA in 2003.=228

9.1. Empirical analysis of the incentive mechanism.=244

9.2. Robustness analysis of the incentive mechanism.=246

9.3. Explaining TFP growth with diaspora externalities.=258

9.4. Skilled migration and FDI accumulation.=265

List of Figures

2.1. Foreign-born population with tertiary education attainment in selected destination countries, 1975-2000.=41

2.2. Share of source countries in highly skilled immigrant stock by income level, 1975-2000.=46

2.3. 25+ population with tertiary educational attainment, countries classified by income, 1975-2000.=49

2.4. Participation of foreigners in tertiary education and advanced education programmes in the OECD-27, 1998-2006.=55

2.5. Annual wage incomes of PhD graduates in USA, 2000.=62

2.6. Annual wage incomes of PhD graduates in Canada, 2001.=62

2.7. Annual wage incomes of highly skilled professionals(ISCO 2) in USA, 2000.=63

2.8. Annual wage incomes of highly skilled professionals(ISCO 2) in Canada, 2001.=63

3.1. Annual inflows of immigrants into the OECD-14 as percentage of population, 1980-2005.=72

3.2. Average composition of immigration flows into the OECD-14 by education, 1980-2005.=73

3.3. Average behaviour of the Immigration laws : 14 OECD countries, population weighted.=76

A3.1. Immigration rates 1980-2005.=97

5.1. Determination of immigration policy.=129

5.2. The tax adjustment model.=132

5.3. The benefit adjustment model.=132

5.4. The impact of individual attitudes towards skilled immigrants(2002-2003) on skilled migration policies (2007).=150

5.5. The impact of individual attitudes towards skilled immigrants(2002-2003) on skilled migration policies (2007).=151

5.6. Top 10 spenders for immigration, 2001-2005.=153

5.7. Top 10 sectors with the highest number of visas, 2001-2005.=153

5.8. Scatterplot―lobbying expenditures for immigration and number of H1B visas.=154

5.9. Scatterplot―membership rates in unions and employee professional associations and n umber of H1B visas.=155

A5.1. Per capita GDP and skill composition of natives relative to immigrants, 1995.=162

A5.2. Per capita GDP and skill composition of natives relative to immigrants, 2003.=162

6.1. Aggregate scale of migration and migrants' education.=181

8.1. Highly skilled emigration rates in 2000.=217

8.2. Change in highly skilled emigration rates(1990-to-2000 ratio).=218

8.3. Skill ratio of emigration rates in 2000(high-to-low ratio).=219

8.4. Ratio of extended-to-OECD highly skilled emigration rates in 2000.=221

8.5. Impact of non-OECD destinations on highly skilled emigration rates in 2000.=222

8.6. Impact of non-OECD destinations on low-skilled emigration rates in 2000.=222

8.7. Ratio of corrected-to-general brain drain rates in 2000.=223

8.8. Corrected and general brain drain rates for selected countries in 2000.=224

8.9. Physicians per 1,000 people, year 2004.=230

8.10. Medical brain drain, year 2004.=231

8.11. Change in medical brain drain, 1991-2004.=232

9.1. Costs of the brain drain under the traditional view(as a percentage of the observed GDP per capita) as a function of the highly skilled emigration rate.=238

9.2. Short-run effect of highly skilled emigration rate(X-axis) on the proportion of educated residents as percentage points(Y-axis).=248

9.3. Short-run effect of highly skilled emigration rate(X-axis) on the proportion of educated residents as percentage points(Y-axis).=249

9.4. Brain drain and the relative ability of highly skilled residents.=254

9.5. Long-run TFP response(Lodigiani's specification).=260

9.6. Long-run TFP response(Lucas' specification).=261

9.7. Brain drain and the risk premium on returns to capital.=267

9.8. Short-run brain drain cost under traditional and modern views(Scenario 1).=269

9.9. Short-run brain drain cost under traditional and modern views(Scenario 2).=270

9.10. Short-run brain drain cost under traditional and modern views(Scenario 3).=270

9.11. Short-run and long-run impacts(Scenario 2).=271

9.12. Brain drain and the between-country inequality(Scenario 2).=271

9.13. Brain drain impact GDP per capita and income per capita(Scenario 2).=275

9.14. Calibrated propensity to remit of low-skilled migrants(Y-axis) for selected recipient countries as a function of yo(X-axis).=276

10.1. Europe's(EU15) share in the brain drain from developing countries. 283

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알라딘제공
This volume considers the global competition to attract talents and the brain gain and brain drain associated with high-skilled migration. Part I provides an overview of immigration policies specifically aimed at selecting and attracting skilled workers. Part II looks at the consequences of brain drain for sending countries.

The worldwide race to attract talents is getting tougher. The US has been leading the race, with its ability to attract PhD candidates and graduates not only from emerging countries, but also from the European Union. However, a growing number of countries have adopted immigration policies specifically aimed at selecting and attracting skilled workers. This book describes the global competition to attract talents. It focuses in particular on two phenomena: the braingain and brain drain associated with high-skilled migration. Part I provides an overview of immigration policies designed to draw in skilled workers. It describes the economic gains associated with skilled immigration in the destination countries and the main determinants of the inflows of skilled immigrants (such as wage premia on education and R&D spending). It also discusses why skill-selective immigration policies do not find more support in receiving countries and shows that interest groups are actively engaged in affecting policies towardsskilled migrants. Part II examines the consequences of brain drain for the sending countries. It reviews the channels through which skilled emigration can affect the source countries and looks at remittances, return migration, diaspora externalities, and network effects that may compensate the sendingcountries for their loss of human capital. Contrary to traditional wisdom, the results indicate that most developing countries experience a net gain from skilled emigration.