영문목차

Acknowledgements=ix

Introduction / Peter M. Jackson=xi

PART I. CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS

1. Adam Smith([1776] 1976), 'Of the Division of Labour' and 'Of the Principle Which Gives Occasion to the Division of Labour', in R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner(eds), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Volume I, Chapters 1 and 2, Oxford, UK : Clarendon Press, 13-30=3

2. Philip Selznick(1948), 'Foundations of the Theory of Organization', American Sociological Review, 13(1), February, 25-35=21

3. Luther Gulick(1937), 'Notes on the Theory of Organization', in Luther Gulick and L. Urwick(eds), Papers on the Science of Administration, Chapter 1, Columbia University, NY : Institute of Public Administration, 3-45=32

4. R.H. Coase(1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4(16), November, 386-405=75

5. Herbert A. Simon(1951), 'A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship', Econometrica, 19(3), July, 293-305=95

6. Robert Gibbons(2005a), 'Four Formal(izable) Theories of the Firm?', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58(2), October, 200-45=108

PART II. ORGANISATIONAL BOUNDARIES

7. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart(1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership : A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), August, 691-719=157

8. Oliver Hart and John Moore(1990), 'Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), December, 1119-58=186

9. Oliver E. Williamson(1979), 'Transaction-Cost Economics : The Governance of Contractual Relations', Journal of Law and Economics, 22(2), October, 233-61=226

10. Bengt Holmström and John Roberts(1998), 'The Boundaries of the Firm Revisited', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(4), Fall, 73-94=255

11. Benjamin Klein(2007), 'The Economic Lessons of Fisher Body―General Motors', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 14(1), February, 1-36=277

12. Herbert A. Simon(1991), 'Organizations and Markers', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), Spring, 25-44=313

13. Filipe M. Santos and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt(2005), 'Organizational Boundaries and Theories of Organization', Organization Science, 16(5), September-October, 491-508=333

PART III. PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS

14. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz(1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, 62(5), December, 777-95=353

15. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling(1976), 'Theory of the Firm : Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), October, 305-60=372

16. Eugene F. Fama(1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), April, 288-307=428

17. Stephen A. Ross(1973). 'The Economic Theory of Agency : The Principal's Problem', American. Economic Review, 63(2), May, 134-9=448

18. James A. Mirrlees(1976). 'The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization', Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1), Spring, 105-31=454

19. Bengt Holmström(1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), Spring, 74-91=481

PART IV. AGENCY AND PERFORMANCE

20. Bengt Holmström(1982), 'Moral Hazard in Teams', Bell Journal of Economics, 13(2), Autumn, 324-40=501

21. Robert Gibbons(2005b), 'Incentives Between Firms(and Within)', Management Science, 51(1), January, 2-17=518

22. George P. Baker(1992), 'Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement', Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), June, 598-614=534

23. Hideshi Itoh(1991), 'Incentive to Help in Multi-Agent Situations', Econometrica. 59(3), May, 611-36=551

24. W. Bentley MacLeod(2007), 'Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement', Journal of Economic Literature. XLV(3), September, 595-628=577

25. Margaret A. Meyer and John Vickers(1997),' Performance Comparisons and Dynamic Incentives', Journal of Political Economy, 105(3), 547-81=611

PART V. NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN THEORIES

26. Sidney G. Winter(2006), 'Toward a Neo-Schumpeterian Theory of the Firm', Industrial and Corporate Change, 15(1), 125-41=649

27. F.A. von Hayek(1937), 'Economics and Knowledge', Economica, 4(13), February, 33-54=666

28. Nicolai J. Foss(2002), "'Coase vs Hayek" : Economic Organization and the Knowledge Economy', International Journal of the Economics of Business, 9(1), 9-35=688

29. Kenneth J. Arrow(1975), 'Vertical Integration and Communication', Bell Journal of Economics, 6(1), Spring, 173-83=715

30. Richard P. Rumelt(1984), 'Towards a Strategic Theory of the Firm', in Robert Boyden Lamb(ed.), Competitive Strategic Management, Chapter 26, Englewood Cliffs, NJ : Prentice-Hall Inc., 556-70=726

31. David Teece and Gary Pisano(1994), 'The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms : An Introduction', Industrial and Corporate Change, 3(3), 537-56=741

32. Anna Grandori(2001), 'Neither Hierarchy nor Identity : Knowledge-Governance Mechanisms and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Management and Governance, 5(3-4), 381-99=761

영문목차

Acknowledgements=ix

An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I

PART I. MANAGEMENT AND GOVERNANCE

1. Oliver E. Williamson(2005), 'The Economic of Governance', American Economic Review, 95(2), May, 1-18=3

2. Jean Tirole(2001), 'Corporate Governance', Econometrica, 69(1), January, 1-35=21

3. Marianne Bertrand and Antoinette Schoar(2003), 'Managing with Style : The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXVIII(4), November, 1169-208=56

4. Raaj K. Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz(1991), 'The Quality of Manager in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(1), February, 289-95=96

PART II. CO-ORDINATION MECHANISMS

5. Jacques Cremér(1995), 'Arm's Length Relationships', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CX(2), May, 275-95=105

6. Claude Ménard(2004), 'The Economics of Hybrid Organizations', Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 160(3), September, 345-76=126

7. Walter W. Powell(1990), 'Neither Marker Nor Hierarchy : Network Forms of Organization', Research in Organizational Behavior, 12, 295-336=158

8. George P. Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy(2008), 'Strategic Alliances : Bridges Between "Islands of Conscious Power"', Journal of Japanese and International Economics, 22(2), June, 146-63=200

PART III. HIERARCHY AND INTERNAL ORGANISATION

9. Joseph E. Stiglitz(1975), 'Incentives, Risk, and Information : Note Towards a Theory of Hierarchy', Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), Autumn, 552-79=221

10. John Geanakoplos and Paul Milgrom(1991), 'A Theory of Hierarchies Based on Limited Managerial Attention', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 5(3), September, 205-25=249

11 . Roy Radner(1992), 'Hierarchy : The Economics of Managing', Journal of Economic Literature, XXX(3), September, 1382-415=270

12. Mark Casson(1994), 'Why are Firms Hierarchical?', Journal of the Economics of Business, 1(1), 47-76=304

13. Oliver Hart and John Moore(2005), 'On the Design of Hierarchies : Coordination versus Specialization', Journal of Political Economy, 113(4), August, 675-702=334

14. Dilip Mookherjee(2006), 'Decentralization, Hierarchies, and Incentives : A Mechanism Design Perspective', Journal of Economic Literature, XLIV(2), June, 367-90=362

15. Yingyi Qian, Gérard Roland and Chenggang Xu(2006), 'Coordination and Experimentation in M-Form and U-Form Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 114(2), April, 366-402=386

PART IV. ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN

16. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.(1962), 'Introduction―Strategy and Structure', in Strategy and Structure : Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1-17=425

17. Henry Ogden Armour and David J. Teece(1978), 'Organizational Structure and Economic Performance : A Test of the Multidivisional Hypothesis', Bell Journal of Economics, 9(1), Spring, 106-22=442

18. Neil Fligstein(1985), 'The Spread of the Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919-1979', American Sociological Review, 50(3), June, 377-91=459

19. David Thesmar and Mathias Thoenig(2000), 'Creative Destruction and Firm Organization Choice', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4), November, 1201-37=474

20. Masahiko Aoki(1990), 'Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm', Journal of Economic Literature, XXVIII(1), March, 1-27=511

21. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz(1986), 'The Architecture of Economic Systems : Hierarchies and Polyarchies', American Economic Review, 76(4), September, 716-27=538

PART V. POWER POLITICS AND AUTHORITY

22. James G. March(1962), 'The Business Firm as a Political Coalition', Journal of Politics, 24(4), November, 662-78=553

23. Philippe Aghion and Jean Tirole(1997), 'Formal and Real Authority in Organizations', Journal of Political Economy, 105(1), February, 1-29=570

24. George Baker, Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy(1999),' Informal Authority in Organizations', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(1), 56-73=599

25. Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales(1998), 'Power in a Theory of the Firm', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2), May, 387-432=617

26. Wouter Dessein(2002), 'Authority and Communication in Organizations·, Review of Economic Studies, 69(4), October, 811-38=663

영문목차

Acknowledgements=ix

An introduction by the editor to all three volumes appears in Volume I

PART I. CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP

1. Jacques Crémer(1993), 'Corporate Culture and Shared Knowledge', Industrial and Corporate Change, 2(3), 351-86=3

2. Julio J. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner(1993), 'Leadership Style and Incentives', Management Science, 39(11), November, 1299-318=39

3. Benjamin E. Hermalin(1998), 'Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership : Leading by Example', American Economic Review, 88(5), December, 1188-206=59

4. Eric Van den Steen(2005), 'Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 21(1), 256-83=78

PART II. ORGANISATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES

5. James N. Baron(1988), 'The Employment Relation as a Social Relation', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 2(4), December, 492-525=109

6. Donald W. Griesinger(1990), 'The Human Side of Economic Organization', Academy of Management Review, 15(3), 478-99=143

7. Edward P. Lazear(1991), 'Labor Economics and the Psychology of Organizations', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(2), Spring, 89-110=165

8. Julio J. Rotemberg(1994), 'Human Relations in the Workplace', Journal of Political Economy, 102(4), August, 684-717=187

9. Paul Osterman(1994), 'Supervision, Discretion. and Work Organization', American Economic Review, 84(2), May, 380-84=221

10. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmström(1994), 'The Internal Economics of the Firm : Evidence from Personnel Data', Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4), November, 881-919=226

11. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi(1997), 'The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity : A Study of Steel Finishing Lines', American Economic Review, 87(3), June, 291-313=265

12. Canice J. Prendergast(1995), 'A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations', Journal of Labor Economics, 13(3), July, 387-400=288

13. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean Tirole(1999), 'Advocates', Journal of Political Economy, 107(1), February, 1-39=302

PART III. CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES

14. Edwin G. Dolan(1971), 'Alienation, Freedom, and Economic Organization', Journal of Political Economy, 79(5), September-October, 1084-94=343

15. Samuel Bowles(1985), 'The Production Process in a Competitive Economy : Walrasian, Neo-Hobbesian, and Marxian Models', American Economic Review, 75(1), March, 16-36=354

16. Charles Perrow(1986), 'Economic Theories of Organization', Theory and Society, 15(1/2), January, 11-45=375

17. William Lazonick(1991), 'Business Organization and Economic Theory', in Business Organization and the Myth of the Marker Economy, Chapter 8, Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 265-302=410

PART IV. ECONOMICS OF BUREAUCRACY

18. William A. Niskanen(2001), 'Bureaucracy', in William F. Shughart II and Laura Razzolini(eds), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Chapter 11, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 258-70=451

19. Julius Margolis(1975), 'Comment', Journal of Law and Economics, 18(3), December, 645-59=464

20. Albert Breton and Ronald Wintrobe(1975), 'The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau : A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy', Journal of Political Economy, 83(1), February, 195-207=479

21. Thomas McGuire, Michael Coiner, and Larry Spancake(1979), 'Budget-maximizing Agencies and Efficiency in Government', Public Choice, 34(3/4), 333-57=492

22. William A. Niskanen, Jr.(1994), 'A Reassessment', in Bureaucracy and Public Economics, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA : Edward Elgar Publishing, 269-83=517

23. Brian Levy(1987), 'A Theory of Public Enterprise Behavior', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 8(1), March, 75-96=532

PART V. COMPLEXITY AND ORGANISATION

24. Ilya Prigogine(1987), 'Exploring Complexity', European Journal of Operational Research, 30(2), June, 97-103=557

25. Philip Anderson(1999), 'Complexity Theory and Organization Science', Organization Science, 10(3), May-June, 216-32=564

26. Peter Howitt and Robert Clower(2000), 'The Emergence of Economic Organization', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 41(1), January, 55-84=581

27. Haridimos Tsoukas(1998), 'Introduction : Chaos, Complexity and Organization Theory', Organization, 5(3), August, 291-313=611

28. Bill McKelvey(1997), 'Quasi-natural Organization Science', Organization Science, 8(4), July-August, 352-80=634

29. Daniel A. Levinthal(1997), 'Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes', Management Science, 43(7), July, 934-50=663