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List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Part I Foundations
1 Persuasion and Domination
1.1 Strategies of Propaganda in Autocracies
1.2 Antecedents, Empirical and Theoretical
1.3 Our Explanation
1.4 Data, Empirical Approach, and Key Findings
1.5 Beliefs, Nominally Democratic Institutions, and Autocratic Politics
2 A Theory of Autocratic Propaganda
2.1 Bayesian Persuasion
2.2 Environment
2.3 Analysis
2.4 Propaganda Strategies in the Baseline Model
2.5 Endogenizing Public Policy
2.6 Implications of Censorship and Information Access
2.7 Implications of State Capacity
2.8 Implications of Elite Threats
2.9 In the Absence of Elections
2.10 Choosing to Consume Propaganda, or Not
2.11 Conclusion
2.12 Technical Appendix
3 A Global Dataset of Autocratic Propaganda
3.1 Introduction
3.2 How to Build a Propaganda Collection
3.3 Dictionary-Based Semantic Analysis
3.4 Measuring Pro-regime Propaganda
3.5 Measuring Coverage of the Opposition
3.6 Measuring Propaganda Narratives
3.7 Our Data in Context
3.8 Why State-Run Newspapers
3.9 Conclusion
Part II The Political Origins of Propaganda Strategies
4 The Politics of Pro-regime Propaganda
4.1 Empirical Strategy
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
4.3 Pro-regime Propaganda in Global Perspective
4.4 The Berlin Wall as an Exogenous Shock: Gabon
4.5 Causal Mechanisms, Alternative Explanations, and Survey Experiments: China
4.6 Conclusion
5 Narrating the Domestic
5.1 Socrates, Propaganda Narratives, and a Theory of Rhetoric
5.2 Economic Performance and Public Goods: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence
5.3 Economic Crises in Congo and China
5.4 Politics: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence
5.5 Democracy and Electoral Politics in Russia and Uzbekistan
5.6 Sports: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence
5.7 National Athletics in Uganda and The Gambia
5.8 Conclusion
6 Narrating the World
6.1 Where Propaganda Strategies Converge
6.2 International News: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence
6.3 The Flaws of Western Democracies, as Told by Russia and China
6.4 International Cooperation: Theory and Cross-Country Evidence
6.5 Visions of International Engagement in Russia and China
6.6 Engaging with Xi Jinping and Dana Rohrabacher in Congo and Uzbekistan
6.7 Conclusion
7 Threatening Citizens with Repression
7.1 Threats of Repression as Political Communication
7.2 Theory
7.3 Cameroon, Anglophone and Francophone
7.4 “Overall Social Stability Is Always Good” in China
7.5 Moments of Crisis in Uzbekistan and Tunisia
7.6 Conclusion
Part III The Propaganda Calendar
8 The Propagandist’s Dilemma
8.1 The Propagandist’s Dilemma
8.2 Theory
8.3 Accounting for Propaganda Campaigns
8.4 Propaganda and Election Seasons in Global Perspective
8.5 Managing the Propagandist’s Dilemma: Congo
8.6 Reserving Electoral Propaganda for after Election Day: Uzbekistan
8.7 Semantic Distinctiveness during Election Seasons
8.8 Conclusion
9 Memory and Forgetting
9.1 Enforced Amnesia
9.2 Theory
9.3 The Informational Response
9.4 The Tiananmen Massacre as a Focal Moment
9.5 Han, Uyghur, and the Politics of Fear
9.6 A Survey Experiment
9.7 Conclusion
Part IV Propaganda, Protest, and the Future
10 Propaganda and Protest
10.1 Propaganda, Voting, and Collective Action
10.2 Pro-Regime Propaganda and Protest
10.3 Do the Effects of Pro-Regime Propaganda Persist over Time?
10.4 Propaganda-Based Threats of Repression and Protest
10.5 Conclusion
11 Conclusion
11.1 Electoral Constraints, Propaganda, and Autocratic Politics in the Twenty-First Century
11.2 What We Learned
11.3 Shaping the Beliefs That Inspire Citizens
11.4 Loosening the Constraints That Empower Citizens
11.5 Absurdity, the “Big Lie,” and Democratic Decay
11.6 Bringing Down the Dictator
References
Index

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Propaganda in autocracies : institutions, information, and the politics of belief 이용현황 표 - 등록번호, 청구기호, 권별정보, 자료실, 이용여부로 구성 되어있습니다.
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알라딘제공
A dictator's power is secure, the authors begin in this muscular, impressive study, only as long as citizens believe in it. When citizens suddenly believe otherwise, a dictator's power is anything but, as the Soviet Union's collapse revealed. This conviction - that power rests ultimately on citizens' beliefs - compels the world's autocrats to invest in sophisticated propaganda. This study draws on the first global data set of autocratic propaganda, encompassing nearly eight million newspaper articles from fifty-nine countries in six languages. The authors document dramatic variation in propaganda across autocracies: in coverage of the regime and its opponents, in narratives about domestic and international life, in the threats of violence issued to citizens, and in the domestic events that shape it. The book explains why Russian President Vladimir uses Donald Trump as a propaganda tool and why Chinese state propaganda is more effusive than any point since the Cultural Revolution.