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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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Title page

Contents

Abstract 3

1. Introduction 4

1.1. Main Questions and Results 6

1.2. Related Literature 8

2. General Framework 10

2.1. Remarks 13

3. Discrete Version 15

3.1. Benchmark: Always Ask, No Offer 16

3.2. Monotonic-Ask Equilibrium 17

3.3. Non-Monotonic Ask Equilibrium 19

3.4. Discouragement 20

3.5. The Waiting Trap 22

3.6. Signal of Need and Likelihood of an Offer 24

4. Continuous Version with Disappointment 25

4.1. Granting an Ask 26

4.2. Asking 28

4.3. Offering 29

4.4. Equilibrium 32

4.5. Uniqueness and Comparative Statics 37

5. Conclusion 39

6. Appendix 41

6.1. Non-monotonic ask equilibrium 41

6.2. Discouragement effect 41

6.3. Asking decision when the reference point is prior mean g 49

6.4. Proof of Proposition 1 49

6.5. Proof of Proposition 4 50

6.6. Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2 51

6.7. Proof of Proposition 5 52

References 54

Tables

Table 1. No-Offer Equilibrium 16

Table 2a. Monotonic-Ask Equilibrium 17

Table 2b. Non-Monotonic-Ask Equilibrium 19

Table 3a. Discouragement Effect Prevents Asking at Moderate Need 20

Table 3b. No Discouragement Effect When Offers Are Infeasible 20

Table 3c. Discouragement Effect Prevents Asking at High Need 22

Table 4a. The Waiting Trap 22

Table 4b. No-Waiting Equilibrium 22

Figures

Figure 1. Timing of moves and information structure. P is for "prior," F for "final," w for material "welfare" or need, g for "generosity." 12

Figure 2. Asking (or Not) and Receiving (or Not) 27

Figure 3. Equilibrium 35