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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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Title page

Contents

1. Institutional Background 9

1.1. Homeowners' insurance 9

1.2. Rate Regulation 10

2. Data and Measurement 11

2.1. Data 11

2.2. Measuring Rate-setting Frictions across U.S. States 13

2.3. Interpreting Rate-setting Frictions: Insurer or Regulator Driven? 14

2.4. Assessing the Severity of the Rate-setting Frictions 15

3. Regulation and Cross-Subsidization 17

3.1. Asymmetric Rate Spillovers Across U.S. States 17

3.2. Shift in Products and Risks Across States? 20

3.3. Role of Competition 21

3.4. Robustness 23

3.5. Regulatory Friction and Climate Risk 25

4. Implications: Long-run Decoupling of Rates from Risk and Insurance Availability 26

4.1. Decoupling of Rates and Risk 26

4.2. Insurance Availability 29

5. Mechanisms and Theory 31

5.1. What Drives Cross-Subsidization? 31

5.2. Theory: A Brief Sketch of a Model of Insurance Rate-setting with Regulatory Frictions 33

6. Conclusion 34

References 36

Appendix 58

Tables

Table 1. Summary statistics 47

Table 2. Rate Wedge predicts future losses 48

Table 3. Rate-setting response to same-state losses 49

Table 4. Asymmetry in rate spillovers: ling decision 50

Table 5. Asymmetry in rate spillovers: rate change received 51

Table 6. Asymmetry in rate spillovers: splitting out-of-state losses by state type 52

Table 7. Product lings in response to out-of-state losses 53

Table 8. Heterogeneity in rate spillovers: by single-state insurers 54

Table 9. Learning about similar risks 55

Table 10. Heterogeneity in rate spillovers: by nancing frictions 56

Table 11. Exits and contract terminations 57

Figures

Figure 1. Decoupling of insurance rates from risk 40

Figure 2. Distribution of Rate Wedge 41

Figure 3. Underwriting profitability by state types 42

Figure 4. Market competition by state types 43

Figure 5. Regulatory frictions and climate losses 44

Figure 6. Long-run growth in insurance rates 45

Figure 7. Decoupling of insurance rates from risk: long-run evidence 46

Appendix Tables

Table B.3.1. Correlation between the baseline friction measure and alternative measures 66

Table C.1. Insurer characteristics by market share 75

Table C.2. Regulator characteristics and rate-setting friction 76

Table C.3. Heterogeneity in rate spillovers: by market concentration 77

Table C.4. Heterogeneity in rate spillovers: by insurer rank 78

Table C.5. Heterogeneity in rate spillovers: by exposure to high-friction states 79

Table C.6. Classification of geographical regions 80

Table C.7. Number of insurer exits from states between 2009 and 2018 81

Table C.8. Heterogeneity in rate spillovers: by ownership structure 82

Appendix Figures

Figure A.1. Losses from climate disasters in the U.S. 59

Figure A.2. Homeowners' insurance aggregate premia written 60

Figure A.3. Significance of homeowners' insurance for households 61

Figure A.4. California 62

Figure A.5. Oklahoma 62

Figure A.6. Illinois 63

Figure A.7. Florida 63

Figure C.1. Homeowners' contract types over time 68

Figure C.2. Homeowners' insurance: market concentration 69

Figure C.3. Execution time and Friction 70

Figure C.4. Fraction of claims closed without payments by state type 71

Figure C.5. Insurance coverage by state type 72

Figure C.6. Insured risk by state type 73

Figure C.7. Fraction of premiums sold by single-state insurers 74