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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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Title page

Contents

Abstract 3

1. Introduction 4

2. Conceptual Framework 8

2.1. Model 8

2.2. Hypotheses 10

3. Experimental Design 13

3.1. Delegation Game with Known Return to Effort 14

3.2. Delegation Game with Unknown Return to Effort 17

3.3. Experimental Procedures 18

3.4. Descriptive Statistics 19

4. Results 24

4.1. Locus of Control and the Preference for Agency 25

4.2. Locus of Control and Beliefs about the Return to Effort 26

4.3. Locus of Control and Effort Decisions 27

4.4. Locus of Control and Decision-Making by Gender 28

4.5. Summary: Channels Linking Locus of Control to Decision-Making 31

5. Conclusion 32

References 35

A. Appendix 41

A.1. Parameters of the Delegation Games 41

A.2. Experimental procedures 41

A.3. Descriptive Statistics 44

A.4. Additional Results on Beliefs and Effort Threshold for Delegation 46

Tables

Table 1. Locus of Control Item Scores and Index by Treatment 20

Table 2. Locus of Control and the Preference for Agency 26

Table 3. Locus of Control and Beliefs about the Return to Effort 27

Table 4. Locus of Control and Effort Decisions 28

Table 5. Locus of Control and Decision-Making by Gender 30

Table 6. Summary of Hypotheses and Results 32

Figures

Figure 1. Illustration of the experimental design 18

Figure 2. Average Certainty Equivalents of Control and Delegation Lotteries (in experimental points) 21

Figure 3. Beliefs of Chance of Success (own project) 23

Figure 4. Effort Decisions by Treatment 24

Appendix Tables

Table A.1. Parameters of the Games 41

Table A.2. Correlation between Locus of Control (loc) and Big Five Personality Traits, by Treatment 44

Table A.3. Share of Principals that choose Project A, by Treatment 45

Table A.4. Locus of Control and Beliefs about the Return to Effort from the Agent 48

Table A.5. Locus of Control and Effort Threshold for Delegation 49

Appendix Figures

Figure A.1. Distribution of the Locus of Control Index by Treatment 44

Figure A.2. Average Certainty Equivalents of Control and Delegation Lotteries (in experimental points) in the Unknown Return Treatment 46

Figure A.3. Principals' Beliefs about Chance of Success of the Agent's Project 47