Albert Venn Dicey is a well-known Victorian constitutionalist but has not been seriously introduced to Korean academia as a legal theorist. Considering his great influence on English lawyers and the teaching of English public law, however, it is worthwhile to analyse his constitutional theory as well as his understanding on law in terms of legal philosophy underlying it. But the author's interest in Dicey in this short essay is not only focussed upon an interpretation of his philosophical stance but also Dicey's intellectual and political background. Firstly, the author argues that Dicey is a successor of Austin's analytical positivism not only because his approach of legal research and teachings separating law from history and political science represents the positivist separation between fact and value but also because his constitutional theory regarding parliamentary sovereignty as a legal fact, fully recognised by the law of England, mirrors Austin's understanding of law as a command of sovereign. Secondly, the author tries to prove depending on English critics of Dicey that his liberal political stance plays an important role in the shaping of his legal theory. The underlying purpose of this essay is not to argue that a legal theory is a mere facade of political ideals of its authors. Rather the author aims to give some fundamentalist scholars a chance to think how we can study a legal theory without having a glance at its intellectual and political background.