The 13 February agreement is largely composed of two parts. The first is the "initial implementation measure" and the "time frame," which are to be carried out by the relevant countries for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula by realizing the North's abolition of nuclear weapons program. The second is that the participants of six party talks must make common efforts to establish a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula. The discussion of a peace regime on the Korean peninsula had temporarily entered the realm of "theoretical discussion and restrained discussion" after the phase of sanctions against North Korea, which was created after North Korea's nuclear test. Since the 13 February agreement, it has come to the arena of discussion possessing the equivalent value with "the North's effort to abolish the nuclear weapons program".
How should we view President Bush's comment on the declaration to end the war? Ordinary ROK citizens may wonder why there is a discussion of declaring the end to the war at a time when 54 years have passed since the gun roars between the North Korean Army and the United States, between the North Korean PRC forces and the participating UN countries, came to an end. Nevertheless,, on international law, the United States and North Korea, and the North and the South, are still at war. The settlement of warring relations must be done through a "declaration between the leaders " or an "agreement through the authorities." In this respect, the effort to settle the "technically at war state on the Korean peninsula" by seeking a declaration to end the war will provide a meaningful turning point in seeking permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.
For the declaration of terminating the war to become an actually meaningful turning point with regard to a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, the following several tasks must be resolved.
First, the "declaration to end the war" itself should not be a goal. Mutual trust must be premised so that a political declaration cannot be broken. A declaration without the premise of mutual trust is likely to end up a "tactical option" and the "tactical adjustment of position." Military trust must be matured between the parties that have hostile consciousness so that a new "declaration to end the war" will not be necessary.
Second, a "declaration to end the war" must contain the "establishment of the promotional mechanism" to proceed toward a "peace regime on the Korean peninsula" after the declaration and the "timeframe of the target year." It must include how peace will be further institutionalized after the declaration to end the war. To be concrete, it is necessary to put forth the establishment of an organ that will deal with various issues, such as the normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea, the signing of a peace agreement, and the formation of a peace management organ.
Third, the "declaration to end the war" must be handled in conjunction with the "resolution of the North's nuclear issue." The unresolved North's nuclear issue is directly linked with "confidence building," which is a practical condition in declaring the end to the war.
The declaration to end the war is not the final form in a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula but the beginning of a peace regime. It must institutionalize peace as a process, and at the same time [it] must include our value of wishing for reunification as the ultimate form of peace and the will of the surrounding countries to guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula.