The two-decades long North Korea's nuclear development issue has still remain unsolved. This paper attempts to evaluate and prospect the U.S. nuclear arms control policy toward North Korea on the basis of 2x2 game model. For this purpose, the U.S. policies toward North Korea are analyzed through the 2x2 game model, dividing the each administration- Bill Clinton(1993-2000), George W. Bush(2001-2008) and Barrack Obama(2009-present) respectively.
The negotiating records showed that the Clinton administration had a cooperative strategy, whereas North Korea had a non-cooperative strategy-that is, the U.S. played a 'chicken game,' North Korea did a 'prisoner's dilemma game." Under the Bush administration, the nuclear game between the U.S. and North Korea has resulted in prisoner's dilemma situation. Consequently, any fruitful result had come out except harsh confrontation. Under the Obama administration, the chance will be grown that the U.S. will choice un-cooperative strategy and North Korea will take cooperative strategy. Considerations for More developed North Korea's nuclear capability as well as for its succession problem could make this kind of expectation. However, the other chances also cannot be neglected, because the variation of each gammer's perception for its internal and external environment can make strategic turning.