The unsatisfying result of inter-Korean negotiations on arms control and disarmament is, in fact, due to a difference in perspectives on peace of the two Koreas stemmed from deep-rooted distrust, and this generated continuous disagreements in the perception of arms control itself as well as in its negotiation process while arms control is a useful means to build peace.
Operational arms control is, without any question, a necessary task that needs to be accomplished at any cost in order to secure transparency in military relations of the two Koreas and the best shortcut to war deterrence and mutual, peaceful co-existence of the two Koreas.
However, unfortunately the inter-Korean military talks which used to provide a negotiation table for arms control issues have been repeatedly halted since the inter-Korean relations deteriorated. It now lost its momentum, and it is unlikely to function again as a key mechanism in the foreseeable future.
Therefore, now it becomes imperative to develop new strategic plans to promote military confidence-building and operational arms control through realistic analysis of past experiences in early-stage military confidence-building efforts and measures such as the military talks, inter-Korean transportation supports, and communication system operations to ease tension in the West Sea.
Given such circumstances, this paper studies causes of the past failurein inter-Korean operational arms control and proposes a desirable progress plans for operational arms control in case when the negotiations resume as North Korean nuclear issue is resolved and the two Koreas enter into a new phase of dialogue.
First, the concept of operational arms control is defined as differentiated from military confidence-building measures, and the environmental conditions on which operational arms control is being discussed are assessed through analysis of hitherto military-related suggestions and arguments made by the two Koreas and military talks behaviors. Upon theses analyses, the paper finally suggests functions and requirements of operational arms control and presents a design of operational arms control measures and its structure desirable for the inter-Korean relations as setting up the role of operational arms control in the Korean Peninsula.