영문목차
Author Acknowledgements=ix
Foreword=xi
Preface=xiii
Executive Summary=xv
1. Introduction=1
1.1. Two causes of crises and two solutions=2
2. Investor Panic=6
2.1. Why panics occur=6
2.2. Korea: the canonical case=6
2.3. Limitations of existing responses to the panic problem=7
3. Problems with Fundamentals Implying a Need to Restructure=13
3.1. Korea: an alternative interpretation=13
3.2. Limitations of existing responses to the restructuring problem=13
4. Problems with Existing Approaches to Reducing Moral Hazard=15
4.1. New rules for IMF lending=16
4.2. The ad hoc approach=17
5. Officially Sanctioned Standstills as a Solution to the Panic Problem=19
5.1. Implementation=21
5.2. Objections=23
5.3. Impact on borrowing costs=25
5.4. Implications=31
6. Collective Action Clauses as a Solution to the Restructuring Problem=33
6.1. Rationales=33
6.2. Objections=35
6.3. Impact on borrowing costs=36
6.4. Implications=38
7. Recommendations=40
Appendix: Other Initiatives=43
A.1. UDROPs=44
A.2. Creditor committees=45
A.3. Mediation=47
References=49
Table 5.1. Creditor rights in sample countries=20
Table 5.2. Basic regression results (dependent variable is launch spread)=28
Table 5.3. Regression results without sovereign borrowers (dependent variable is launch spread)=29
Table 5.4. Regression results without government borrowers (dependent variable is launch spread)=30
Table 6.1. Spreads, governing laws and sovereign interactions (selectivity corrected, where dependent variable is launch spread)=37