목차
Volume I
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction Kym Anderson and Bernard Hoekman xi
PART I AN OVERVIEW
1. Bernard Hoekman (2002), 'The WTO: Functions and Basic Principles', in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, Chapter 6, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 41-9, references 3
PART II THE NEED FOR MULTILATERAL TRADE RULES AND DISCIPLINES
2. Jacob Viner (1924), 'The Most-Favored-Nation Clause in American Commercial Treaties', Journal of Political Economy, 32 , February, 101-29 15
3. James Meade ([1942] 1987), 'A Proposal for an International Commercial Union', British War Cabinet Paper, reproduced in World Economy, 10 , December, 399-407 44
4. W. Max Corden (1987), 'On Making Rules for the International Trading System', in Robert M. Stem (ed.), U.S. Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy, Chapter 10, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 413-26 53
5. John A.C. Conybeare (1988), 'Managing International Trade Conflicts: Explanations and Prescription', Journal of International Affairs, 42 , Fall, 75-91 67
6. Charles P. Kindleberger (1989), 'Commercial Policy between the Wars', in Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume VIII: The Industrial Economies: The Development of Economic and Social Policies, Chapter II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 161-96,
1153-5 84
7. Brian R. Copeland (1990), 'Strategic Interaction among Nations:
Negotiable and Non-Negotiable Trade Barriers', Canadian Journal
of Economics, XXIII , February, 84-108 123
8. Douglas A. Irwin (1993), 'Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Policies in the World Trading System: An Historical Perspective', in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Chapter 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 90-119 148
9. Paul Krugman (1997), 'What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?', Journal of Economic Literature, XXXV , March, 113-20 178
10. Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini (1999), 'Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?', Economics and Politics, 11 , July, 109-44 186
11. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger (2002), 'The Theory of Trade Agreements', in The Economics of the World Trading System, Chapter 2, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 13-41, references 222
12. Wilfred J. Ethier (2004), 'Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World', Review of International Economics, 12 , August, 303-20 254
13. Joseph F. Francois and Will Martin (2004), 'Commercial Policy Variability, Bindings, and Market Access', European Economic Review, 48 , June, 665-79 272
PART III NON-DISCRIMINATION
14. Harry G. Johnson (1965), 'An Economic Theory of Protectionism,
Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs Unions' , Journal of Political Economy, 73 , June, 256-83 289
15. Frieder Roessler (1985), 'The Scope, Limits and Function of the
GATT Legal System', World Economy, 8 , September, 287-98 317
16. Andrew Caplin and Karla Krishna (1988), 'Tariffs and the Most
Favored-Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Approach', Seoul
Journal of Economics, 1 ,267-89 329
17. Rodney D. Ludema (1991), 'International Trade Bargaining and the
Most-Favored-Nation Clause', Economics and Politics, 3 , March,
1-20 352
18. Richard H. Snape (1993), 'History and Economics of GATT's
Article XXIV', in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, Chapter 12, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf and New York: St. Martin's Press, 273-91 372
19. Warren F. Schwartz and Alan O. Sykes (1996), 'Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System' , International Review of Law and Economics, 16 , March, 27-51 391
20. Aaditya Mattoo (2000), 'MFN and the GATS', in Thomas Cottier
~ and Petros C. Mavroidis (eds), Regulatory Barriers and the Principle
of Non-Discrimination in World Trade Law, Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, Chapter 2, 51-99 416
21. Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis (2001), 'Economic and Legal
Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause', European .{ournal of
Political Economy, 17 , June, 233-79 465
22. Damien 1. Neven (2001), 'How Should "Protection" be Evaluated in Article III GATT Disputes?', European Journal of Political Economy, 17 , June, 421-44 512
23. Phillip McCalman (2002), 'Multi-lateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause', Journal of International Economics, 57 , June, 151-76 536
Name Index 563
Volume II
An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I
PART I RECIPROCITY
1. J .M. Finger (1974), 'GATT Tariff Concessions and the Exports of
Developing Countries - United States Concessions at the Dillon
Round', Economic Journal, 84 (335), September, 566-75 3
2. lM. Finger (1976), 'Effects of the Kennedy Round Tariff
Concessions on the Exports of Developing Countries' , Economic
Journal, 86 (341), March, 87-95 13
3. Jagdish N. Bhagwati and Douglas A. Irwin (1987), 'The Return of
the Reciprocitarians - US Trade Policy Today', World Economy, 10
, June, 109-30 22
4. Carolyn Rhodes (1989), 'Reciprocity in Trade: The Utility of a
Bargaining Strategy', International Organization, 43 , Spring,
273-99 44
5. Ayre L. Hillman and Peter Moser (1996), 'Trade Liberalization as Politically Optimal Exchange of Market Access', in Matthew B. Canzoneri, Wilfred J. Ethier and Vittorio Grilli (eds), The New Transatlantic Economy, Chapter 10, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 295-312 71
6. Bernard M. Hoekman and Patrick A. Messerlin (2000), 'Liberalizing Trade in Services: Reciprocal Negotiations and Regulatory Reform', in Pierre Sauve and Robert M. Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, Chapter 17, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 487-508 89
7. J. Michael Finger and L. Alan Winters (2002), 'Reciprocity in the WTO' , in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, Chapter 7, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 50-60, references 111
PART II POLICY TRANSPARENCY: NOTIFICATION AND SURVEILLANCE
8. lM. Finger (1982), 'Incorporating the Gains from Trade into Policy',
World Economy, 5, December, 367-77 125
9. Richard Blackhurst (1991), 'Strengthening GATT Surveillance of Trade-Related Policies', in Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Meinhard Hilf (eds), The New GATT Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal and Economic Problems, Second Edition, Deventer and Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 123-55 136
10. Sam Laird (1999), 'The WTO's Trade Policy Review MechanismFrom Through the Looking Glass', World Economy, 22 , August, 741-64 169
11. Joseph F. Francois (2001), 'Maximising the Benefits of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism for Developing Countries' , in Bernard Hoekman and Will Martin (eds), Developing Countries and the WTO: A Pro-active Agenda, Chapter 9, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 147-65 193
PART III MODALITIES FOR NEGOTIATING MARKET ACCESS
12. Robert M. Stern (1976), 'Evaluating Alternative Formulae for
Reducing Industrial Tariffs', Journal of World Trade Law, 10 , JanuarynFebruary,50-64 215
13. Robert E. Baldwin (1986), 'Toward More Efficient Procedures for
Multilateral Trade Negotiations' , Aussenwirtschaft, 41, 379-94 230
14. Robert E. Baldwin and Richard N. Clarke (1987), 'Game-Modeling
Multilateral Trade Negotiations', Journal of Policy Modeling, 9 ,
Summer, 257-84 246
15. Aaditya Mattoo (2002), 'Negotiating Improved Market Access Commitments' , in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (eds), Developmcent, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, Chapter 28, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 280-89, references 275
16. Simon J. Evenett (2002), 'Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procurement' , in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, Chapter 40, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 417-27, references 286
17. Joseph Francois and Will Martin (2003), 'Formula Approaches for
Market Access Negotiations', World Economy, 26 , January, 1-28 299
PART IV TARIFFICATION OF QUANTITATIVE TRADE RESTRICTIONS
18. Anne O. Krueger (1974), 'The Political Economy of the Rent
Seeking Society', American Economic Review, 64 , June, 291-303 329
19. James E. Anderson (1985), 'The Relative Inefficiency of Quotas:
The Cheese Case', American Economic Review, 75 , March,
178-90 342
20. L. Alan Winters (1987), 'Negotiating the Abolition of Non-Tariff
Barriers', Oxford Economic Papers, 39 , New Series; September,
465-80 355
21. Brian Hindley (1987), 'GATT Safeguards and Voluntary Export
Restraints: What Are the Interests of Developing Countries?', World
Bank Economic Review, 1 , September, 689-705 371
22. Irene Trela and John Whalley (1990), 'Unraveling the Threads of the MFA', in Carl B. Hamilton (ed.), Textiles Trade and the Developing Countries: Eliminating the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in the 1990s, Chapter 2, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 11-45 388
23. Bernard M. Hoekman and Michael P. Leidy (1990), 'Policy Responses to Shifting Comparative Advantage: Designing a System of Emergency Protection', Kyklos, 43 , February, 25-50 423
24. Merlinda D. Ingco (1996), 'Tariffication in the Uruguay Round:
How Much Liberalisation?', World Economy, 19 , July, 425-46 449
25. Dean Spinanger (1999), 'Textiles Beyond the MFA Phase-Out',
World Economy, 22 , June, 455-76 471
26. David W. Skully (2001), Economics of Tariff-Rate Quota Administration, Technical Bulletin No. 1893, April, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, 1-23 493
27. J. Michael Finger (2002), 'Safeguards: Making Sense of GATTI WTO Provisions Allowing for Import Restrictions' , in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo and Philip English (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, Chapter 22, Washington, DC: The World Bank, 195-205, references 516
Name Index 527