영문목차
List of figures=vii
List of tables=ix
Foreword / Francesco Parisi=x
Acknowledgements=xii
PART I. THEORY
1. Introduction=3
2. Short- to medium-term residual effects=10
2.1. Introduction=10
2.2. The model=13
2.2.1. Agent relations=14
2.2.2. Agent's optimal compliance=23
2.2.3. Legislature's optimal timing rule=25
2.3. Comparing welfare=27
2.4. Discussion=29
2.5. Conclusion=31
Appendix=33
3. Long-term residual effects=35
3.1. Introduction=35
3.2. Social norms=37
3.2.1. The norm consumer=41
3.2.2. The norm producer=44
3.3. From voluntary to involuntary compliance=47
3.3.1. The introduction of a norm=50
3.3.2. The disappearance of second-party enforcement=51
3.3.3. The disappearance of first-party enforcement=54
3.4. Conclusion=56
4. Information and commitment=58
4.1. Introduction=58
4.2. The model=64
4.3. Equilibrium analysis=67
4.3.1. The insufficient reputation reward setting=67
4.3.2. The sufficient reputation reward setting=68
4.3.3. The equivalence setting=69
4.4. Comparing welfare=70
4.5. Conclusion=73
Appendix=75
5. Temporary tax legislation=77
5.1. Introduction=77
5.2. Cost-benefit analysis=81
5.2.1. The normative neutrality of rent extraction=87
5.2.2. The ambiguous cost of uncertainty=91
5.2.3. The unambiguous cost of reelection strategy=96
5.3. Conclusion=100
PART II. EVIDENCE
6. Passage probability=105
6.1. Introduction=105
6.2. Theory=106
6.3. Data and summary statistics=109
6.4. Findings=112
6.5. Conclusion=122
7. Sponsor's age=124
7.1. Introduction=124
7.2. Theory=125
7.3. Data and summary statistics=126
7.4. Findings=134
7.5. Conclusion=135
8. Conclusion=137
Bibliography=142
Index=147
4.1. Legislating the revelation of harm magnitude=62
4.2. Legislating the revelation of harm cause=62
4.3. Legislating the revelation of behavioral options=63
4.4. Comparative statics=70
5.1. A shifting baseline for a five-year tax cut=84
5.2. A shifting baseline for an increase in revenues=85
6.1. Number of bills that became law tabulated by type, 110th Congress=109
6.2. Number of bills that became law tabulated by the party of the sponsor, 110th Congress=111
6.3. Sponsor statistics, 110th Congress=111
6.4. Committee statistics, 110th Congress=113
6.5. Logit estimates, 110th Congress=114
7.1. Bills tabulated by type, 110th Congress=126
7.2. Descriptive statistics of sponsor's age, tabulated by committee and bill type, 110th Congress=133
7.3. Logit estimates, 110th Congress=134
2.1. A stylized model of agent relations=17
2.2. Phase diagram for the agent relations game with replicator dynamics=22
3.1. Equilibrium purchases of interpersonal relations S, with money income x=44
3.2. Compliance equilibrium in the shadow of normative investment=52
3.3. Social relations in the shadow of normative investment=53
3.4. Coordinated guilt elimination=56
4.1. Stylized model of information revelation given a temporary or permanent enactment=65
5.1. Reelection through temporary taxation=97
6.1. The effect of non-permanence on the probability of passage at various levels of real duration=118
6.2. The effect of real duration on the probability of passage=119
6.3. The effect of non-permanence on the probability of passage with varying number of co-sponsors=120
6.4. The effect of the number of co-sponsors on the probability of passage=121
6.5. The effect of a non-permanent bill on the probability of passage within committees=121
7.1. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=1025, 110th Congress=127
7.2. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=703, 110th Congress=128
7.3. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=322, 110th Congress=128
7.4. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=76, 110th Congress=129
7.5. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=34, 110th Congress=129
7.6. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=42, 110th Congress=130
7.7. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=635, 110th Congress=130
7.8. Relative frequency of sponsor's age, N=390, 110th Congress=131
7.9. Real duration plotted against sponsor's age with least squares fit, 110th Congress=132
7.10. Co-sponsors plotted against sponsor's age with least squares fit, 110th Congress=132