List of AbbreviationsChapter 1 IntroductionChapter 2 The Conceptual Framework2.1 Types of Information Exchange2.1.1 Based on the Ancillarity to Other Conduct2.1.1.a Ancillary Information Exchanges2.1.1.b Pure Information Exchanges2.1.2 Based on the Stage of the Concertation2.1.3 Based on the Anti-competitive Subject Matter of the Information2.1.4 Based on the Primary Flow of Information2.1.4.a Horizontal Exchanges2.1.4.b Vertical Exchanges (With Indirect Horizontal Effects)2.2 Characteristics of the Information Exchange2.2.1 The Inner Layer2.2.1.a Public Availability (Public vs Private Data)2.2.1.b Commercial Sensitivity (Strategic vs Non-strategic Private Data)2.2.1.c Level of Detail (Aggregated vs Disaggregated Data)2.2.1.d Age (Historic Data vs Recent Data vs Future Intentions)2.2.2 The Outer Layer2.2.2.a Frequency2.2.2.b Public Availability2.2.2.c Market CoverageChapter 3 The Economic Framework3.1 Efficiencies3.1.1 Benefits for Suppliers (Horizontal Market Transparency)3.1.2 Benefits for Customers (Vertical Market Transparency)3.1.3 The Shortcomings of Static Models3.1.4 The Stronger Weight of Vertical Transparency for Competition Policy3.2 Foreclosure: A Negligible Concern3.3 Collusion: The Main Concern3.3.1 The Theory of Collusion3.3.1.a Meaning3.3.1.b Forms3.3.1.c Conditions for Collusion3.3.1.d Factors That Facilitate Collusion3.3.1.d.1 Introduction3.3.1.d.2 Factors Where the Effects on Collusion Is Clear3.3.1.d.3 Factors Where the Effects on Collusion Is More Ambiguous3.3.1.d.4 The Desirable Analytical Approach3.3.2 The Theory of Tacit Collusion3.3.2.a Meaning3.3.2.b Terminology3.3.2.c Situations in Which Tacit Collusion Can Occur3.3.3 The Concept of `Facilitative Practices'3.3.3.a Meaning3.3.3.b Forms3.3.3.c Information Exchange as a Facilitative Practice3.3.3.d Current Shortcomings3.3.4 The Role of Market Transparency for Collusion: It Is Mainly About Past Data3.3.4.a The Notion of Market Transparency3.3.4.b The Ways in Which Market Transparency Facilitates Collusion3.3.4.c The Requirement of Causal Attribution3.3.4.d The Balancing of Pro- and Anti-competitive Effect: Circumstances Matter3.3.5 The Role of Communication for Collusion: It Is Mainly About Future Intentions3.3.5.a The Notion of Communication3.3.5.b The Ways in Which Communication Facilitates Collusion3.3.5.c The Importance of Communication for Competition Policy3.3.6 The Risk Classification of Information Exchanges3.3.6.a The Theoretical Level: The Effect of Each Factor on Collusion3.3.6.b The Practical Level: Identifying the Most Harmful Factors for Collusion3.3.6.c The Policy Level: The Principle of IndispensabilityChapter 4 The Legal Framework of Art. 101 TFEU4.1 The Structure of Art. 101 TFEU4.1.1 Prohibition4.1.2 Exemption4.1.3 Consequences of an Infringement4.2 The Concept of a `Concerted Practice'4.2.1 Guidance by the EU Courts4.2.1.a Demarcation from the Concept of an `Agreement'4.2.1.a.1 The Concept of `Agreement'4.2.1.a.2 The Concept of a `Concerted Practice' as a Residual Clause4.2.1.a.3 The Fluid Boundaries Between Both Concepts4.2.1.b The Element of a `Concertation'4.2.1.b.1 Dyestuffs (First Definition)4.2.1.b.2 Suiker Unie (Independence Doctrine)4.2.1.b.3 Cimenteries and Subsequent Case Law (Element of Reciprocity)4.2.1.b.4 Eturas (Importance of Evidentiary Issues)4.2.1.c The Element of `Practice'4.2.1.c.1 Dyestuffs (First Vague Indication of a Second Element)4.2.1.c.2 Anic and Hiils (Requirement of Subsequent and Casual Conduct on the Market)4.2.1.c.3 T-Mobile (Single Meeting Is Sufficient for Presumption)4.2.2 Guidance by the Literature4.2.2.a The Jurisprudential Literature4.2.2.a.1 The Importance of the Element of `Concertation'4.2.2.a.2 The Sources of Concertation4.2.2.a.3 The Lack of Consensus on the Conceptual Meaning4.2.2.a.4 The Two Strands of the Conceptual Meaning4.2.2.b The Analytical Philosophical Literature4.2.2.b.1 Black: Communication Should Matter4.2.2.b.2 Del Mar: Conduct Analysis vs Economic Analysis4.2.3 Evidentiary Issues4.2.3.a Burden of Proof4.2.3.b Standard of Proof4.2.3.b.1 Meaning4.2.3.b.2 The Ambiguous Case Law on the Exact Test4.2.3.b.3 The Concept of `Effort Probatoire'4.2.3.c Types of Evidence4.3 The Classification as a Restriction of Competition by Object or Effect4.3.1 The Object/Effect Dichotomy4.3.1.a Preliminary Observations4.3.1.a.1 Distinct Concepts4.3.1.a.2 Linguistic Considerations4.3.1.a.3 Normative Justifications for the Dichotomy4.3.1.b Analytical Similarities4.3.1.b.1 Restriction of Competition vs Restriction in the Freedom of Action4.3.1.b.2 Relevance of the Counterfactual4.3.1.b.3 Relevance of Pro-competitive Effects4.3.1.b.4 Context-Specific Assessment4.3.1.c Analytical Differences4.3.1.c.1 Nature of the Analysis: Plausibility vs Likelihood of Anti-competitive Effects4.3.1.c.2 Burden of Proof4.3.1.c.3 Appreciability on Competition (De Minimis Doctrine)4.3.1.c.4 Likelihood of Exemption4.3.2 Identifying Restrictions by Object4.3.2.a The Case Law in the Past: Emphasis on `Category-Building' and Abstract Legal Formulas4.3.2.a.1 Category-Building and the Steady Shift Away from It4.3.2.a.2 The Long-Lasting Struggle to Settle on an Abstract Legal Formula4.3.2.a.3 The Challenges of Employing an Abstract Legal Formula4.3.2.b The Current Case Law: The Importance of Context and Experience4.3.2.b.1 Contextual Approach: The Context Is Everything4.3.2.b.2 Cautious Approach: The Importance of Sufficient Experience (or in Dubio Pro Effectu)4.3.2.c The Theoretical Perspective4.3.2.c.1 The Plausible Efficiency Theory (Positive Theory)4.3.2.c.2 The Intended Ends Theory (Normative Theory)4.3.2.c.3 The Risk Offence Theory (Normative Theory)Chapter 5 The Importance of Information Exchanges for the Implementation of Economic Collusion Theories in Art. 101 TFEU5.1 Parallel Conduct and Circumstantial Evidence5.1.1 The Legal Challenges of Tackling Mere Parallel Conduct5.1.1.a The Legal Challenge of Solely Relying on Circumstantial Evidence5.1.1.b The Differences Between the Legal and Economic Analysis5.1.2 The Leading Cases: A Lost Fight to Tackle Parallel Conduct under Art. 101 TFEU?5.1.2.a The Early Days: 1950s and 1960s5.1.2.b The Dyestuffs Case5.1.2.c The Suiker Unie Case5.1.2.d The Zinc Producer Group Decision vs the Cartonboard Decision5.1.2.e The Compagnie Royale Asturienne Des Mines Case5.1.2.f The Woodpulp II Case5.1.2.g The BPB Case5.1.2.h The CISAC Case5.1.3 Concluding Remarks5.1.3.a The Descriptive Perspective: Parallel Conduct Is Merely Weak Circumstantial Evidence5.1.3.b The Normative Perspective: Is the Strict Stance When Solely Relying on Circumstantial Evidence Justified?5.1.3.c The Prescriptive Perspective: The Implications for Competition Policy5.2 Facilitative Practices in the Commission Guidelines5.2.1 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines5.2.1.a R&D Agreements5.2.1.b Production Agreements5.2.1.c Joint Purchasing Agreements5.2.1.d Joint Commercialisation Agreements5.2.1.e Standardisation Agreements5.2.1.f Other Types of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements5.2.1.g Conclusion5.2.2 Vertical Guidelines5.2.2.a Definition and Scope5.2.2.b Agency Agreements5.2.2.c Single Branding Agreements5.2.2.d Exclusive (Territorial) Distribution Agreements5.2.2.e Exclusive Customer Allocation Agreements5.2.2.f Selective Distribution Agreements5.2.2.g Upfront Access Payments5.2.2.h Category Management Agreements5.2.2.1 Resale Price Restrictions5.2.2.2 Conclusion5.2.3 Technology Transfer Guidelines5.2.3.a Definition and Scope5.2.3.b Licensing Agreements5.2.3.c Technology Pools5.2.3.d Conclusion5.2.4 Concluding Remarks Regarding Information Exchanges5.2.4.a Information Exchange Is the Most Relevant and Universal Manifestation of a Facilitative Practice5.2.4.b The Scope and Nature of Ancillary Information ExchangeChapter 6 Pure Information Exchange6.1 The Commission's View6.1.1 Early Policy Statements6.1.1.a 1968 Notice6.1.1.b 1977 Report6.1.1.c 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines6.1.1.d 2008 Maritime Guidelines6.1.2 Early Decisional Practice6.1.3 2011 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines6.1.3.a Introduction6.1.3.b Analytical Framework6.1.3.c Collusion Concerns6.1.3.d Conclusion6.2 Restrictions by Effect Cases6.2.1 Case Law and Decisional Practice6.2.1.a The John Deere Case6.2.1.b The Eudim Decision6.2.1.c The CEPI-Cartonboard Decision6.2.1.d The Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl Decision6.2.1.e The Thyssen Stahl Case6.2.1.f The EATA Decision (Borderline Case)6.2.1.g The Asnef-Equifax Case6.2.2 Descriptive Perspective: Identifying Some Common Themes6.2.2.a The Issue of Disaggregation6.2.2.b The Importance of the Market Structure Analysis6.2.2.c The Lack of Using of Art. 101(3) TFEU6.2.3 Normative Perspective: Are Safe Harbours Desirable?6.2.3.a Safe Harbours Based on Market Shares6.2.3.b Safe Harbours for Certain Types of Information Exchange6.2.3.c `Safe Zones'6.2.3.d Conclusion6.3 Restrictions by Object Cases6.3.1 Case Law and Decisional Practice6.3.1.a The Fatty Acid Decision (Borderline Case)6.3.1.b The Tate & Lyle Case6.3.1.c The T-Mobile Case6.3.1.d The Two Bananas Cases6.3.1.e The E-Book Commitment Decision6.3.1.f Foreign Exchange Spot Trading Cartels (Forex Cartels)6.3.2 Descriptive Perspective: Identifying Common Themes6.3.2.a The Market Context Matters6.3.2.b The Lack of Plausible Efficiencies6.3.2.c The Practical Importance of the Concept of a Concerted Practice6.3.2.d The Temporal Perspective: Future Intentions Are Problematic6.3.2.e The Means of Communication: Private Communication Is Problematic6.3.3 Normative Perspective: What Should Be the Scope of the Object Box?6.3.3.a Is the Dispute Between the Case Law and the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines Justified?6.3.3.b Is the Exclusion of the Exchange of Disaggregated Data from the Object Box Justified?6.4 Public Announcements Cases6.4.1 Economic Perspective6.4.1.a The Pro-competitive Aspect of Public Announcements6.4.1.b The Anti-competitive Aspect of Public Announcements6.4.2 Case Law and Decisional Practice6.4.2.a The Dyestuffs Case6.4.2.b The Woodpulp II Case6.4.2.c The Container Shipping Commitment Decision6.4.3 Descriptive Perspective: Identifying the Problematic Features6.4.3.a The OECD Paper on Unilateral Announcements6.4.3.b The Container Shipping Commitment Decision6.4.3.c The Literature: Contingent Announcements Are Problematic6.4.4 Normative Perspective: Classification as a Restriction by Object or Effect?6.4.4.a Is There Scope for Classification as a Restriction by Object?6.4.4.b The Role of Circumstantial Evidence6.5 The Proposal for a More Coherent Analytical Framework6.5.1 The Object Box: A Proposal for Identifying Restrictions by Object6.5.1.a The Issue6.5.1.b The Need to Go Beyond an Abstract Legal Formula6.5.1.c Step 1: Context Analysis6.5.1.c.1 General Analytical Considerations6.5.1.c.2 Application to Pure Information Exchanges6.5.1.d Step 2: Objectified Plausibility Analysis for Claimed Efficiencies6.5.1.d.1 General Analytical Considerations6.5.1.d.2 Application to Pure Information Exchanges6.5.1.d.3 A Concerted Practice That Restricts Competition by Object: What Else!6.5.2 The Effect Box: A Proposal to Assess Restrictive Pure Information Exchanges6.5.2.a The Issue6.5.2.b The Need to Further Developed the Concept of a Facilitative Practice6.5.2.c Step 1: Context Analysis6.5.2.d Step 2: Building a Robust Theory of (Tacit) Collusion6.5.2.e Step 3: Efficiencies6.5.2.f Step 4: Weighting Collusion Concerns Against Efficiencies (and the Importance of Less Restrictive Alternatives)Chapter 7 ConclusionBibliographyTable of CasesTable of Legislation, Guidelines and TreatiesIndex