Contents
A. Despite the increased profile of other threats such as cyber security, counterterrorism work rightly remains the primary focus of the intelligence and security Agencies... 3
B. The shape of the terrorist threat is potentially changing from tightly organised cells under the control of structured hierarchies to looser networks of small groups and individuals who operate more independently.... 3
C. The Committee shares the concerns of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation over what happens when individual Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs) come to the end of their two-year limit.... 3
D. The threat the UK is facing from cyber attacks is disturbing in its scale and complexity. The theft of intellectual property, personal details and classified information causes significant harm, both financial and non-financial.... 4
E. Whilst work is under way to develop those capabilities that will protect the UK's interests in cyberspace, it is now halfway through the Spending Review period, and we are therefore concerned that much of this work... 5
F. Cyber security will continue to be a significant threat beyond the end of this Spending Review period. We are pleased to see that the funding for the National Cyber Security Programme will be extended into 2015/16.... 6
G. The Committee recognises the significant contribution that the Agencies are making to the international efforts regarding Iran's nuclear weapons programme. Such work should continue to receive a high priority.... 6
H. The support provided by the Agencies and Defence Intelligence to the UK's military operations in Afghanistan has been invaluable. We are, however, concerned that Defence Intelligence's intelligence collection capabilities... 6
I. The Committee has repeatedly warned of the risks of cutting resources - in particular to Defence Intelligence - to the UK's ability to provide the necessary level of global coverage... 6
J. Closed Material Procedures allow evidence to be heard which, under Public Interest Immunity arrangements, was previously excluded from cases altogether (sometimes leading to the abandonment of proceedings... 7
K. The Committee welcomes the real changes made by the new Joint Intelligence Committee Chair, which demonstrate an understanding of how the JIC should operate at the centre of the UK intelligence machinery... 7
L. There does seem to be a question as to whether the claimed savings and efficiencies that the Agencies must secure during the Spending Review period are independently verifiable and/or sustainable... 7
M. Whilst we are reassured that some of the savings envisaged under the Corporate Services Transformation Programme (CSTP) will be achieved by other means, we note that the Committee was not kept informed about these changes... 8
N. We recognise that during the run-up to the Olympics operational requirements were, rightly, prioritised over efficiency savings but time is running out: we are already over halfway through the Spending Review... 8
O. The Agencies have said that they are "fairly confident" that operational capabilities will be protected during the Spending Review period: given the surprising lack of clarity around the collaborative savings programme 8
P. Whilst SCOPE Phase 1 was successful, Phase 2 was beset by problems and delays and it is disappointing that it was abandoned. The strict security requirements led to a complex... 9
Q. The decision to cancel SCOPE Phase 2 was taken after an 'informal review' outside the normal governance arrangements, reducing accountability and inevitably raising questions over due process... 9