1 Introduction 11 Puzzle for Analysis 12 Prevailing Explanations 43 Veto Player Theory and Hypothesis 94 Methodology 134.1 Case Study 134.2 Case of Realization of SOEs for Overseas OilDevelopment 144.3 Comparison of Japan and Korea 155 Significance of This Study 196 Structure of the Book 202 The Establishment of the JPDC in the 1960s 231 Japan’s Political Institutions in the 1960s 241.1 Institutional Veto Players: The Prime Minster,Ministries, and the Diet 241.2 Partisan Veto Players: The LDP and Opposition Parties 311.3 Interest Group Veto Players in the 1960s 352 The Debate on Petroleum Industry Lawand a State-Owned Oil Company 382.1 Background: Trade Liberalization and the ArabianOil Company 392.2 Debate on the Petroleum Industry Lawand a State-Owned Oil Company 433 New Initiatives for a State-Owned Oil Company 523.1 MITI’s Initiative and MOF’s Obstruction 533.2 MITI’s Changed Proposal and MOF’s ReluctantAcceptance 553.3 Finalized as a State Financier, Not a State-OwnedOil Company in the Diet 583.4 JPDC’s Activities for Overseas Oil Development 604 Summary and Conclusion 623 The Establishment of PEDCO in the 1970s 651 Korea’s Political Institutions in the 1970s 661.1 Institutional Veto Players: The President, the MTIand the EPB 661.2 Partisan Veto Players 751.3 Weak Presence of Interest Groups 802 The Debate on PEDCO Law 822.1 Background: The Oil Shock and the Late-Comerin the Oil Industry 822.2 The Establishment of the Korea PetroleumDevelopment Corporation 903 Summary and Conclusion 1024 The Attempt to Establish a Japanese State-Owned OilCompany in the Early Twenty-First Century 1051 Japan’s Political Institutions in the Early Twenty-FirstCentury 1061.1 Institutional Veto Players: The Prime Minister,the Ministry, and the Diet 1061.2 Partisan Veto Players: The LDP Councilsand Coalition Partners 1151.3 Interest Groups: Keidanren, the PAJ, and the JPDA 1202 Background: Economic Downturn and Japan’s OverseasOil Development 1232.1 Japan’s Financial Crisis and Economic Downturn 1232.2 Japan’s Overseas Oil Ventures and JNOC’s Performance 1243 JNOC and the State-Owned Oil Company Debacle 1283.1 Inception of a Proposal for a State-Owned OilCompany 1283.2 First Quarrel on a Proposal Before Finalizingthe Reform Plan 1333.3 The Compromise Among Veto Players 1344 A New Debacle on the Reform Before the Legislation 1364.1 METI’s Draft Bill and the LDP’s Obstruction 1364.2 Discussion of the Proposal in the Diet 1414.3 Evading Veto Players Through INPEX 1445 Summary and Conclusion 1465 A Business-Friendly President and the Strengtheningof Korea’s State-Owned Oil Company 1491 Korea’s Political Institutions in the Early Twenty-FirstCentury 1501.1 Institutional Veto Players: The President,the Ministry, and the National Assembly 1501.2 Partisan Veto Players: The Majority Ruling Party 1591.3 No Interest Group Veto Players 1622 Strengthening of the Korea National Oil Corporation(KNOC) 1642.1 Background: Oil Price Hike and Korea’s OverseasOil Development 1642.2 Discussion of the Reinvigoration of a State-OwnedOil Company 1683 Active in M&A and Increasing Self-Sufficiency Ratio 1774 One Argument: Level of Economic Development? 1794.1 Overseas Oil Development Before 2004 1794.2 The Private Sector’s Capacity and the AsianFinancial Crisis 1845 Summary and Conclusion 1866 Conclusion 1891 Main Findings 1902 Alternative Explanation 1933 Theoretical Implications of This Study 1954 Practical Implications 1965 Minor but Interesting Findings 1986 Questions for Further Study 1997 Epilogue 2011 Japan: Consistent Energy Security Policy 2021.1 Policy Direction 2021.2 Energy Diplomacy 2041.3 Subsidy and Loan 2051.4 Strengthened Role of INPEX 2062 Korea: Shrinking Role of KNOC and KOGAS 2082.1 Policy Direction 2082.2 Not Energy Diplomacy but Inspectionand Investigation 2082.3 Subsidy and Loan 2102.4 Role of Public Energy Corporation 211Appendix A: State-Business Arrangement in Overseas OilDevelopment 215Appendix B: Chronology of Postwar Overseas EnergyInvestment of Korea and Japan 245Bibliography 251Index 283