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북한은 김정은 체제 등장 이후에도 ‘비핵화’ 문제로 주변국과의 군사안보적 긴장 관계를 유지하고 있으나, 한국을 포함한 국제사회는 북한의 사회경제적, 정치적 변화에 대한 다양한 시나리오를 준비할 필요가 있다. 이러한 맥락에서 본 연구는 북한에 대한 국제사회의 개발협력이 본격화되기 전 주요 의제로 등장할 가능성이 높은 국제금융기구의 ‘이행조건’을 분석하였다. 이를 위해 ‘이행조건’의 정의, 변천 과정, 관련된 주요 쟁점과 정책적 논의를 고찰하고, 특히 ‘이행조건’에 대한 비판을 극복하기 위해 최근 국제금융기구들이 강조하고 있는 수원국의 주인의식, 이행조건의 최소화, 국별 특성에 부합하는 거버넌스개혁과 기술지원, 국제금융기구 간 협업과 조정, 공여국과 수원국 간 파트너십, 이행조건 수행에 대한 사전⋅사후 명확한 합의 등 이행조건 관련 원칙들의 핵심 내용을 정리했다. 또한, 신규 회원국, 체제전환국, 저소득 스트레스 국가(LICUS)에 적용되었던 이행조건들을 사례로 하여, 이행조건의 실제 적용 실태와 문제점, 유형별 특징을 분석함으로써 북한에 대한 시사점을 도출하였다.

North Korea has maintained military and security tensions with neighboring countries over the issue of ‘denuclearization’ even after the Kim Jongun regime emerged. However, the international community, including South Korea, needs to consider various scenarios for socioeconomic and political changes in North Korea. In this context, the study sought to analyze the ‘aid conditionality’, which is prerequisite for financial aid to North Korea by international financial institutions(IFIs). To this end, examined were the definition of ‘aid conditionality’, the process of application, related policy discussions and major issues. The present study also analyzed key principles of conditionality proposed by the IFIs such as national ownership, collaborations and coordination among the IFIs, clarification of the conditionality and so on. On top of that, the study investigated the contents of major implementation conditionality such as partnership between donor and recipient countries, willingness and past achievements of recipient countries, cooperation and harmonization between donor countries/organizations. Finally, the implications for North Korea were derived by analyzing the characteristics of these implementation of conditionalities applied to developing countries, transition countries, and low-income stress countries(LICUS).

권호기사

권호기사 목록 테이블로 기사명, 저자명, 페이지, 원문, 기사목차 순으로 되어있습니다.
기사명 저자명 페이지 원문 목차
1960년대 유럽 3국의 선택과 한국의 '맞춤형 억제전략' = Europe's nuclear decision in the 1960s : implication for the ROK's tailored deterrence strategy 황일도 p. 1-29
일본과 유럽의 '자유롭고 열린 인도태평양' 안보협력 = Japan-Europe security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific 이기태 p. 77-110
EU의 사이버제한조치에 대한 국제법적 평가와 한국의 사이버위협 대응 = The EU cyber restrictive measures as a regime for collective retorsion : its implications for South Korea's cybersecurity 박주희 p. 111-160
북한의 '우리 국가제일주의'와 국기(國旗) 콘텐츠를 활용한 문화예술 = North Korea's "Our State First" slogan and cultural arts using contents based on the national flag 전영선 p. 161-188
국제금융기구의 '이행조건' 분석과 북한 개발협력 시사점 = International financial institution's aid conditionality and implications for development cooperation with North Korea 최창용, 문경연 p. 31-75

참고문헌 (64건) : 자료제공( 네이버학술정보 )

참고문헌 목록에 대한 테이블로 번호, 참고문헌, 국회도서관 소장유무로 구성되어 있습니다.
번호 참고문헌 국회도서관 소장유무
1 Adams, C. S., G. Chambas, P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont, and J. W. Gunning. “Performance-Based Conditionality: A European Perspective.” World Development Vol. 32, No. 6 (2004), pp. 1059-1070. 미소장
2 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Transition Report 1999: Ten Years of Transition. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999. 미소장
3 International Monetary Fund. Guidelines on Conditionality, Prepared by the Legal and Policy Development and Review Departments (In consultation with other departments), Approved by Timothy F. Geithner and François Gianviti, September 25, 2002. 미소장
4 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Finance Corporation. “COUNTRY ASSISTANCE STRATEGY (CAS) Progress Report for the Republic of Columbia, for the period FY03-FY07.” September 9, 2005. 미소장
5 International Development Association, Resource Mobilization Department (FRM). “IDA’s performance-based allocation system: a review of the governance factor”, October 2006. 미소장
6 Kapur, D., Lewis, J. P., and Webb, R. C. The World Bank: its first half century. Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 미소장
7 Koeberle, et al. 2005. Conditionality revisited: Concepts, experiences, and lessons. World Bank, Washington D.C., 2005. 미소장
8 North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press. 1990. 미소장
9 김민주. “원조수혜국의 거버넌스: 원조수혜를 위한 이행조건인가? 선택조건인가?” 한국행정학보, 제 45권 4호(2011), pp. 253-281. 미소장
10 이한희⋅최동주. “국제금융기구의 대북개발지원의 방향.” 국제지역연구, 제23권 2호(2019), pp. 3-36. 미소장
11 임을출⋅최창용. “경제개혁과 이행조건 그리고고 공공거버넌스: 북한 적용 가능성, 함의 및 과제.” 통일정책연구, 제6권 1호(2007), pp. 53-78. 미소장
12 장형수. “북한 개발 지원을 위한 국제협력 방향: 재원조달 방안을 중심으로.”통일정책연구, 제 17권 1호(2008), pp. 315-338. 미소장
13 ADB. “Mainstreaming the Results-Based Lending for Programs.” ADB Policy Paper, August, 2019. 미소장
14 Aslund, Anders. “Prospects and Preconditions for Market Economic Transformation in North Korea,” in Ahn Choongyong, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Lee Young-sun, eds., A NewInternational Engagement Framework for North Korea? Contending Perspectives. Washington, D.C.: Korean Economic Institute, 2005. 미소장
15 Babson, Bradley O. “Designing Public Sector Mobilization Strategies for the DPRK,” in Ahn Choong-yong, Nicholas Eberstadt, and Lee Young-sun, eds., A New International Engagement Framework f or North Korea? Contending Perspectives. Washington, D.C.:Korean Economic Institute, 2005. 미소장
16 Babson, Bradley O. “Implications of a ‘Bold Switchover’ in Security Policy for Involving the International Financial Institutions in Financing North Korean Economic Development.” Paper presented at a conference on “The Regional Economic Implications of North Korean Security Behavior—The ‘Bold Switchover’ Concept,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, March 2006. 미소장
17 Banister, G. I. and K. Thugge. “International Trade and Poverty Alleviation”, Finance and Development 38 (December 4, 2001), pp. 48-51. 미소장
18 Bird, G., & Willett, T. “IMF conditionality, implementation and the new political economy of ownership.” Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3 (2004), pp. 423–450. 미소장
19 Boockmann, B., & Dreher, A. “The contribution of the IMF and the World Bank to economic freedom.” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 19, No. 3(2003), pp. 633–649. 미소장
20 Boone, P. “Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid.” European Economic Review 40(1996), pp. 289-329. 미소장
21 Bretton Woods Project. “IMF lending programmes: old wolf in sheep’s clothing?” November 2009, 미소장
22 Buira, Ariel. “An Analysis of IMF Conditionality, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.” United Nations Center for International Development, Harvard University, G-24Discussion Paper Series, No. 22, August 2003. 미소장
23 Campodonico, Humberto. “Conditionality in Latin America.” Forum on the Future of Aid, 2008. 미소장
24 Chae, Suchan, and Hyoungsoo Zang. “Interim Development Assistance for North Korea,” Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1(Spring/Summer, 2002), pp. 137-49. 미소장
25 Collier, Paul. “Policy-Based Lending in LICUS countries.” Development Policy Forum. World Bank, Washington D.C. 2004. 미소장
26 Congressional Research Service. “Foreign Aid Reform Agency Coordination.”2009. 미소장
27 Erikson, Daniel P. “Bridging the Gap: IMF and World Bank Membership for Socialist Countries, Cuba in Transition.” ASCE 2003. 미소장
28 Department for International Development. “Partnerships for poverty reduction: changing aid conditionality.” Mimeo, 2004. 미소장
29 Dollar, D., and V. Levin. “The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984-2002.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3299, 2004. 미소장
30 Dreher, A. “The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality.” HWWA Discussion Paper 165, 2002. 미소장
31 Dreher, A. “IMF and Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality.” World Development, Vol. 34, No. 5 (2006), pp. 769–788. 미소장
32 Dreher, A., & Vaubel, R. “The causes and consequences of IMF conditionality.” Emerging Markets, Vol. 40, No. 3(2004). 미소장
33 Easterly, W. 2005. “What did structural adjustment adjust. The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans.” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 76, No. 1(2005), pp. 1–22. 미소장
34 EURODAD (European Network on Debt and Development) Submission to the World Bank / IMF 2005 PRS Review 2005, June 8, 2005. 미소장
35 EURODAD. “Letter on World Bank Conditionality.” June 30, 2005. 미소장
36 Gunning, J. W. “The reform of aid: Conditionality, selectivity and ownership.” Mimeo CSAE Oxford University, 2000. 미소장
37 IMF-World Bank. “Strengthening IMF-World Bank collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality.” World Bank SecM 2001-0461/1 and IMF SM/01/219: Washington, D.C., 2001. 미소장
38 IMF-World Bank. “Strengthening IMF-World Bank collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality- Progress Report”, World Bank SecM2002-443 and IMF SM/02/271: Washington, D.C., 2002. 미소장
39 IMF-World Bank. “Strengthening IMF-World Bank collaboration on Country Programs and Conditionality– Second Progress Report.”World Bank Sec M2004-0070 and IMF SM/04/57: Washington, D.C., 2004. 미소장
40 International Monetary Fund. “Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 05/52, IMF Executive Board Discusses Review of the Conditionality Guidelines.” April 15, 2005. 미소장
41 Koeberle, S. G. “Should policy-based lending still involve conditionality?”World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 18, No. 2(2003), pp. 249-273. 미소장
42 Koeberle, S. G. and T. Malesa. “Experience with World Bank conditionality.” Chapter 4 in Ed. by Koeberle, S., H. Bedoya, P. Silarszky, and G. Verheyen, eds. Conditionality revisited:concepts, experiences, and lessons. World Bank: Washington, DC., 2005. 미소장
43 Marchesi, S. and J. P. Thomas. “IMF conditionality as a screening device.” Economic Journal, Vol. 109 (1999), pp. 111-125. 미소장
44 Lim, E.C. and Choi, C. “Prospects and Strategies for Development Assistance for North Korea: the linkage between technical assistance and PRSPs.” Unification Policy Studies, Vol. 14 No. 2(2005), pp. 49-78. 미소장
45 Mayer, W. and A. Mourmouras. “IMF conditionality and the theory of special interest politics.” Comparative Economic Studies 46(2002), pp. 400-422. 미소장
46 Morrissey, O. “Recipient governments’ willingness and ability to meet aid conditionality”. WIDER Discussion Paper 2002/105 (2002). 미소장
47 Morrissey, O. “Conditionality and aid effectiveness re-evaluated.”World Development, Vol. 27, No. 2(2004), pp. 153-172. 미소장
48 Mosley, P., F. Noorbakhsh, and A. Paloni. “Compliance with World Bank conditionality: implications for the selectivity approach to policy-based lending and the design of conditionality.” CREDIT Nottingham Working Paper 03/20 (2003). 미소장
49 Mosley, P., J. Hudson, and A. Verschoor. “Aid, poverty reduction and the ‘new conditionality’.” Economic Journal, Vol. 114, No. 496(2004), pp. F217-F243. 미소장
50 North, Douglass C. “Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction”. World Development. Vol. 17, No. 9 (1989), pp. 1319–1332. 미소장
51 Oxfam International. “Oxfam International Submission to World Bank Review of Conditionality.” June 14th 2005. 미소장
52 Oxfam. “From ‘Donorship’ to Ownership? Moving Towards PRSP Round Two.” 2004. 미소장
53 Ramón, C. Barquín III. “Comparison of International Monetary Fund and World Bank Conditionalites and Cuba’s Economic Reforms of the 1990s, Cuba in Transition.” ASCE 1996. 미소장
54 Svensson, J. “Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?.” Journal of Development Economics 70 (2003), pp. 381-402. 미소장
55 Thomas, M. A. “Can the World Bank enforce its own conditions?.”Development and Change, Vol. 35, No. 3(2004), pp. 485-497. 미소장
56 United Nations Development Group and World Bank. “An Operational Note on Transitional Results Matrices: Using Results-Based Frameworks in Fragile States.” 2005. 미소장
57 World Bank. “Conditionality Revisited: Concepts, Experiences and Lessons.” 2005. 미소장
58 World Bank. “Review of World Bank Conditionality: Recent trends and practices operations policy and country services.” World Bank, June 30, 2005. 미소장
59 World Bank. “Evaluation of World Bank Support to Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS).” 2001. 미소장
60 World Bank. “IDA at Work: Afghanistan: Supporting State-building and Developmen.” July, 2009. 미소장
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64 World Bank. “World Bank Group Work in Low-Income Countries Under Stress: A Task Force Report.” September 2002 . 미소장

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