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Preface=v

1. Do We Get What We Expect?=1

1.1. Decisions=1

1.1.1. Decisions=2

1.1.2. Surf, Snow, or Governor Jesse Ventura?=2

1.1.3. Correct decisions=4

1.1.4. Good information to confusion=4

1.1.5. Bad outcomes=7

1.2. What does an outcome mean?=8

1.3. Which procedure?=9

1.3.1. Milk, wine, or beer?=10

1.3.2. Another election=12

1.3.3. For a price, I will=13

1.4. Engineering and manufacturing=14

1.4.1. One source of inefficiency=15

1.5. Economics and other topics=17

1.5.1. Locating a new plant=18

1.5.2. Law and other areas=19

1.6. What goes wrong?=19

2. Arrow's Theorem=21

2.1. Introduction=21

2.1.1. But, does Arrow's Theorem really matter?=24

2.1.2. The real culprit=25

2.2. Choice Theory=26

2.2.1. Is the plurality vote broke=27

2.2.2. What is wrong?=28

2.2.3. Real world examples=28

2.3. Shopping for cars - and election procedures=30

2.3.1. A little game=31

2.3.2. Garbage in, garbage out=32

2.3.3. Transitive preferences and points along a line=34

2.3.4. Procedures=36

2.4. Arrow's Theorem=42

2.4.1. Examples=43

2.5. Consequences of Arrow's Theorem=45

2.5.1. Comparisons with pairwise elections=46

2.5.2. More general comparisons=51

2.5.3. Don't expect compatibility=52

2.5.4. Further Implications=53

2.6. Sen's Theorem=56

2.6.1. Three alternatives=57

2.6.2. More alternatives=58

2.6.3. Libertarians=59

2.6.4. Prisoner's Dilemma=63

2.6.5. Relationship between Sen and Arrow=66

2.6.6. What else?=67

3. Explanations And Examples=69

3.1. Are all methods unfair?=69

3.2. Sen's Theorem=70

3.2.1. Lost information=71

3.2.2. Loss of transitivity=72

3.2.3. Costs of Minimal Liberalism=74

3.2.4. More examples=76

3.2.5. Salles' example=77

3.2.6. Designing examples as complex as desired=78

3.2.7. A converse=79

3.2.8. Gibbard's cycles=80

3.3. Arrow=81

3.3.1. Too many parts=81

3.3.2. A beer party and the free rider problem=83

3.3.3. Pairwise vote=84

3.3.4. Ranking disk=87

3.3.5. Winning against unanimity=93

3.3.6. How to win your way=94

3.3.7. Arrow's dictator=100

3.3.8. Avoiding Arrow's dictator=101

4. What Else Can Go Wrong?=103

4.1. Some assembly required=103

4.1.1. Expect the unexpected=104

4.1.2. General approach=105

4.2. Simpson's Paradox=106

4.2.1. The paradox=107

4.2.2. More relevant examples=108

4.2.3. Lessons from Arrow's Theorem=109

4.2.4. Simpson problems in sunny California=110

4.2.5. Creating new examples=112

4.2.6. Even more general behavior=113

4.3. Gambling - and the financial market=114

4.4. Law=116

4.4.1. Genome mapping=116

4.4.2. Legal cycles=117

4.4.3. If the Catholic bishop would only get married=119

4.5. Kindness through personal understanding=120

4.6. Majorities and democracies=123

4.6.1. Anscombe Paradox=123

4.6.2. Ostrogorski concerns=126

4.7. Learning how to cause trouble=128

4.7.1. Apportionment of US Congress=130

4.7.2. Causing problems=132

4.7.3. Shifting populations=134

4.7.4. Other apportionment methods=135

4.8. Strategic Voting=135

5. More Perversities=139

5.1. Economics: Supply and Demand=140

5.1.1. Sonnenschein, Mantel, Debreu=141

5.1.2. A misleading theory?=142

5.1.3. Subeconomies=143

5.2. Individual demand and consumer benefits=144

5.3. Can excellence breed inefficiency?=147

5.3.1. A simple decentralization model=148

5.3.2. Inefficiency in engineering?=148

5.4. Elections with triplets, or=150

5.4.1. An Arrow-like Theorem=151

5.4.2. Consequences for our elections=154

5.4.3. Resolution?=156

5.5. Still more examples=156

6. A Search For Resolutions=157

6.1. Introduction=157

6.1.1. Homogeneity=158

6.1.2. Free rider=159

6.1.3. Sen=160

6.2. Altering assumptions=161

6.2.1. From a new pope to an oligarchy=161

6.2.2. Tinkering with other assumptions=164

6.3. Profile restrictions=165

6.3.1. Bad news=166

6.3.2. Non-dictatorial procedures=169

6.3.3. Black's Conditions=173

6.4. Good news=182

6.4.1. Trouble causing profiles=182

6.4.2. New problems?=183

6.5. Resolutions through new axioms=187

6.5.1. Intensity of binary independence=190

6.5.2. Other acceptable procedures=192

6.6. What next?=193

7. From Sen To Prisoners and Prostitution=195

7.1. Annoying others=196

7.1.1. Source of the problem=197

7.1.2. Negative vibes=198

7.2. Thou shall not annoy others=199

7.3. Return to the Prisoner's Dilemma=200

7.3.1. Again and again and=201

7.3.2. Learning from prostitution and drug sales=202

7.4. Summary=203

8. Glossary, Notes, and Technical Talk=205

8.1. Glossary=205

8.2. Notes=208

8.3. Axioms=213

8.3.1. The use and abuse of axioms=213

8.3.2. More fundamental complaints=214

8.4. A proof of Arrow's Theorem=217

8.4.1. Geometry of rankings=217

8.4.2. Moving about=220

8.4.3. Societal changes=222

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알라딘제공
It is not uncommon to be frustrated by the outcome of an election or a decision in voting, law, economics, engineering, and other fields. Does this 'bad' result reflect poor data or poorly informed voters? Or does the disturbing conclusion reflect the choice of the decision/election procedure? Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow's famed theorem has been interpreted to mean 'no decision procedure is without flaws'. Similarly, Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen dashes hope for individual liberties by showing their incompatibility with societal needs. This highly accessible book offers a new, different interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems. Using simple mathematics, it shows that these negative conclusions arise because, in each case, some of their assumptions negate other crucial assumptions. Once this is understood, not only do the conclusions become expected, but a wide class of other phenomena can also be anticipated.

A highly accessible book offering a new interpretation and resolution of Arrow's and Sen's theorems.