본문 바로가기 주메뉴 바로가기

전체메뉴

국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

결과 내 검색

동의어 포함

목차보기


1. The Issue of Regional Conflict and Secession
2. Secession, Representative Elections, and Political Governance
3. Regional Integration and Secession with Rent-Seeking
4. Integration and Secession Under Threat of Third Region
5. Integration, Third Region Effect, and Policy Commitment
6. Secession and Fiscal Policy
7. Voting and Secession
8. Resource Sharing, Civil Conflict, and Secession
9. Empirical Analyses of Secession and Integration: What Determines National Size?
Index

이용현황보기

Regional economic analysis of power, elections, and secession 이용현황 표 - 등록번호, 청구기호, 권별정보, 자료실, 이용여부로 구성 되어있습니다.
등록번호 청구기호 권별정보 자료실 이용여부
0002520777 320.15 -A19-3 서울관 서고(열람신청 후 1층 대출대) 이용가능
B000017383 320.15 -A19-3 부산관 서고(열람신청 후 2층 주제자료실) 이용가능

출판사 책소개

알라딘제공
The main object of this book is to explain some of the mechanisms of integration and secession among regions from the point of view of game theory. To attain this goal, the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to secede and the conditions in the way for the member countries of a federation to leave peacefully are examined. Tensions over secession have become more and more serious, including separatist tensions in China, India, Iraq, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Studies included in this book stress differing preferences in the type of policy in each region and the influence of a third region on the power of secession. Decentralization strategies of tax-subsidy policy and governance policy in a political or economic group composed of two regions are shown to be important as a way to avoid wasteful conflict for the secession incentive of a minority region. How those incentives depend on heterogeneity costs associated with different preferences over the type of region and the relative size of the two regions is shown. Also provided is an analytical framework in which secessions are the equilibrium outcome of explicit civil conflict, where regions with different preferences invest in costly conflict activities. Finally, an empirical analysis is made of determinant factors of secession movements in many regions to verify the validity of our theories of secession. This book is recommended to researchers who are interested in a new economic geography and an interdisciplinary approach for regional economics.

New feature

The main object of this book is to explain some of the mechanisms of integration and secession among regions from the point of view of game theory. To attain this goal, the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to secede and the conditions in the way for the member countries of a federation to leave peacefully are examined. Tensions over secession have become more and more serious, including separatist tensions in China, India, Iraq, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Studies included in this book stress differing preferences in the type of policy in each region and the influence of a third region on the power of secession. Decentralization strategies of tax-subsidy policy and governance policy in a political or economic group composed of two regions are shown to be important as a way to avoid wasteful conflict for the secession incentive of a minority region. How those incentives depend on heterogeneity costs associated with different preferences over the type of region and the relative size of the two regions is shown. Also provided is an analytical framework in which secessions are the equilibrium outcome of explicit civil conflict, where regions with different preferences invest in costly conflict activities. Finally, an empirical analysis is made of determinant factors of secession movements in many regions to verify the validity of our theories of secession. This book is recommended to researchers who are interested in a new economic geography and an interdisciplinary approach for regional economics.