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Acknowledgements
Introducing The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis
1 Canvassing a realistic Cathedral with efficiency amongst its pillars
1 Total welfare maximisation and the twentieth-century synthesis
2 Some pieces that do not quite fit
3 How the total welfare standard harms antitrust and consumer law scholarship
4 Making the Samuels-Calabresi Theorem explicit
4.1 Pars Destruens: a unilateral view of the Cathedral is not enough
4.2 Pars Construens: entering the Cathedral
5 The rest of the book in a nutshell
PART I ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY CAN BE ABOUT CONSUMER WELFARE
2 A triangle is not a crown
1 Introduction
2 Perfect competition and allocative efficiency
3 Allocative efficiency, total welfare, and the deadweight loss triangle
4 Economists can be concerned with monopoly exploiting and distorting consumers
5 Principals and shareholders, yes; but consumers, no?
6 The consumer is sovereign, the producer is servant
7 Market failures overthrow the sovereign consumer
8 Consumer sovereignty between welfare and independence
9 Beyond consumer sovereignty there can be pretty much anything
3 The giants before us
1 Introduction
2 The pioneers of economic market analysis: Adam Smith, Marshall, and Pigou
2.1 Adam Smith
2.2 Alfred Marshall
2.3 Arthur Cecile Pigou
3 Efficiency-label economists: Pareto, Kaldor, and Hicks
3.1 Vilfredo Pareto
3.2 John Richard Hicks
3.3 Nicholas Kaldor
4 The pillars of the Chicago school: Knight, Stigler, and Coase
4.1 Frank Hyneman Knight
4.2 George Joseph Stigler
4.3 Ronald Harry Coase
5 Consumer sovereignty in Austrian economics
6 Allocative efficiency, consumer welfare, and equality
PART II ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY IS ABOUT CONSUMER WELFARE IN EU ANTITRUST AND CONSUMER LAW
4 How to search for allocative efficiency in law
1 Back to the future: taking Posner's efficiency hypothesis seriously
2 The efficiency hypothesis revisited
3 Reverse engineering legal reasoning
3.1 Three shades of explanation
3.2 The anatomy of the dataset
4 Reasoning with total and consumer welfare
4.1 Harm: all instrumentally relevant or not?
4.2 Defences and exceptions: internal fuzziness and external clarity or vice versa?
4.3 Sanctions: to deter and redress harm or to internalise social costs?
4.4 Deadweight loss, elasticity, and productive efficiency: quantity-effects over price-effects or vice versa?
4.5 Concise exposition of the disagreements
5 The dataset: overview
5.1 Antitrust law
5.2 Consumer law
5.3 Case selection
5.4 The subdivision of the dataset
5 Allocative efficiency in EU antitrust law
1 Introduction
2 Explaining Article 101 TFEU with "efficiency"
2.1 The prohibition of Article 101(1) and harm
2.2 Defences and exceptions in Article 101
2.3 Article 101, deadweight loss, elasticity, and productive efficiency
3 Explaining Article 102 TFEU with "efficiency"
3.1 The prohibition of Article 102 and harm
3.2 Defences and exceptions in Article 102
3.3 Article 102, deadweight loss, elasticity, and productive efficiency
4 EU antitrust law and sanctions
4.1 Pecuniary sanctions--fines and damages
4.2 Non-pecuniary sanctions--nullity and injunction
5 Findings
6 Allocative efficiency in EU consumer law
1 Introduction
2 Explaining EU consumer empowerment law with "efficiency"
2.1 Consumer empowerment and harm
2.2 Defences and exceptions in consumer empowerment
2.3 Sanctions in consumer empowerment
3 Explaining EU consumer protection law with "efficiency"
3.1 Consumer protection and harm
3.2 Defences and exceptions in consumer protection
3.3 Sanctions in consumer protection
4 Findings
Conclusions on The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis
1 The consumer welfare hypothesis fits with EU antitrust and consumer law
2 A partial view of the legal-economic nexus
3 The way ahead: working towards a synthesis for the twenty-first century
Legislation and cases
Bibliography
Index

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The consumer welfare hypothesis in law and economics : towards a synthesis for the 21st century 이용현황 표 - 등록번호, 청구기호, 권별정보, 자료실, 이용여부로 구성 되어있습니다.
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