본문 바로가기 주메뉴 바로가기
22대 대한민국 국회 국회정보길라잡이 국회의원검색
회원가입 로그인
HOME

정보검색

소장정보 검색

국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색
결과 내 검색 동의어 포함
결과 내 검색 동의어 포함

-

목차보기

Title page

Contents

Glossary 12

Introduction 19

CHAPTER 1. Manufacturing compliance with 'rule by design' 27

1.1. Transitional scenarios in China and the state's 'rule by design' 29

1.2. Manufacturing compliance in the state-individual interaction 32

Coercion or consent: why coercion alone cannot do the work 33

Generating compliance: a two-actors model and the state's options 35

Constraints, choices, and state-individual interaction in transitional situations 38

Conclusions 40

References 41

CHAPTER 2. Who gets what and how: governance based on subpopulations 45

2.1. How do entitlements differ: differentiation in benefit entitlement 46

2.2. Pension reforms in China: a de-synchronised story 48

2.3. Generosity and coverage: segmented resource allocation 56

The pension plans for government employees (PGE) and public institution employees (PPIE) 56

The pension plan for enterprise employees (PEE) 58

The pension plan for urban non-salaried residents (PUR) and rural residents (PRR) 61

Conclusions 62

References 64

CHAPTER 3. Who deserves benefits and why - constructingfairness, pension expectations,and subjectivity 67

3.1. Text analysis of state discourses 68

3.2. Pension reforms as instruments of broader socio-economic reforms 76

3.3. Reconstructing fairness and deservingness in welfare redistribution 84

Redistribution among different social groups 84

Redistribution between different generations 92

3.4. A renewed state-individual relationship: the 'socialised self' 94

Unfolding the locus of responsibility: topic-based promotions 95

Promoting shared responsibility: the glory of being employed and the common interest 103

Conclusions 106

References 107

CHAPTER 4. Maximising support for pension reform using policy experimentation, and the potential to backfire 109

4.1. Risks in the pension reform and the statecraft of policy experiments 110

4.2. Policy effects on how the public sees the locus of responsibility for pension contributions 121

4.3. The concurrent effects of experiments and media campaigns on political trust 130

Conclusions 138

Acknowledgements 139

References 140

CHAPTER 5. Falsification of 'manufactured compliance'and wider legitimation and governmentality issues 146

5.1. 'Falsification' and methods for exploring it 147

5.2. Different faces of compliance: the words in shadow 160

5.3. The dual track of political knowledge 169

5.4. Ignorance, apathy, and collective conservatism 174

5.5. Heterogeneity of social groups: education and generations 181

5.6. Heading (no)where: actions or agencies 186

Conclusions 190

References 192

CHAPTER 6. Pension issues, state governmentality, and falsified compliance in a comparative perspective 197

6.1. Government and legitimation issues in China 198

6.2. Welfare reforms and state rationales in a comparative lens 204

Conclusions 211

References 212

Appendix A. Data explanation and model validations 216

Appendix B. Data replication codebooks 249

Bibliography 255

Tables

Table 2.1. Comparison between different pension schemes in China (in 2015) 50

Table 2.2. Pension benefit for government employees and public institution employees 58

Table 2.3. Pension benefit for enterprise employees and others 60

Table 2.4. Pension benefit for rural residents 62

Table 2.5. Raw population numbers by type of pension scheme recipient 63

Table 3.1. Selected topics with keywords explanations 73

Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics of document categories 95

Table 3.3. Topic proportion by covariate: types of responsibility 101

Table 3.4. Topic proportion by multiple covariates: types of responsibility and other categories 102

Table 4.1. Descriptive data of two rounds social survey respondents 124

Table 4.2. Where people see the locus of government responsibility for pensions by policy effects 129

Table 4.3. Effect of pilot policy and policy propaganda on the locus of government responsibility 130

Table 4.4. Effect of pilot policy and policy propaganda on political trust (2009 data) 132

Table 4.5. Effect of policy duration and policy propaganda on political trust (2009 data) 134

Table 4.6. Short-term and long-term propaganda effects on directly targeted group in piloted provinces (2009 urban data) 137

Table 5.1. Qualitative data collection on falsified compliance 160

Figures

Figure I.1. Levels of economic development and the type of polity in China, 1950-2020 20

Figure I.2. Education and urbanisation development in China, 1950-2020 22

Figure 1.1. Thought map of compliance typology and respective statecraft 36

Figure 2.1. The timeline of segmented pension plan reforms, 1955-2011 52

Figure 2.2. Pension benefit for enterprise employees (averaged), 1995-2015 61

Figure 3.1. Correlations of topics 75

Figure 3.2. Topic proportions by year: economic reform and pension reform for enterprise employees 78

Figure 3.3. Topic proportions by year: birth control 84

Figure 3.4. Topic proportions by year: social justice and rural migrants 91

Figure 3.5. Topic by covariate: different types of responsibility emphasised 96

Figure 3.6. Some other topics by covariate: different types of responsibility emphasised 98

Figure 4.1. Visualisation of three waves pilot policy 125

Figure 4.2. Provincial variations of the dependent variable: locus of responsibility perception 125

Figure 4.3. Provincial variation of local official 'policy propaganda' efforts 126

Appendix Tables

Table A.1. Codebook of pension schemes comparison and statistical data 219

Table A.2. Topics with keywords with STM 226

Table A.3. Topics with keywords with Topicmodels 230

Table A.4. Coding validation 232

Table A.5. Performance of supervised models 235

Table A.6. Topic proportion by multiple covariates ('denounce') 236

Table A.7. Balance check: event history analysis (EHA) of the provincial index 241

Table A.8. Descriptive statistics of the main demographic variables 242

Table A.9. Robustness test with ordered logit model 243

Table A.10. Robustness test with multilevel model (random intercept at provincial level) 244

Table A.11. Robustness test with intergenerational difference 245

Table A.12. Robustness test with other confounding variables 246

Table A.13. Case list 247

Table B.1. Codebook for Chapter 3 250

Table B.2. Codebook for Chapter 4 252

Appendix Figures

Figure A.1. Urban labour types: employment in different types of units 217

Figure A.2. Number of documents in the full corpus 220

Figure A.3. Optimal topic number with Topicmodels validation 1 221

Figure A.4. Optimal topic number with Topicmodels validation 2 222

Figure A.5. Optimal topic number with perplexity 223

Figure A.6. Optimal topic number with STM validation 1 224

Figure A.7. Optimal topic number with STM validation 2 225

Figure A.8. Flowchart of hand coding 233

Figure A.9. Time trend of provincial index 239

출판사 책소개

알라딘제공

Rapid economic growth is often a disruptive social process threatening the social relations and ideologies of incumbent regimes. Yet far from acting defensively, the Chinese Communist Party has lead a major social and economic transformation over forty years, without yet encountering fundamental challenges subverting its rule. A key question for political sociology is thus - how have the logics of China's governmentality been able to help maintain compliance from the governed while acting so radically to advance the state's growth priorities?

This book explores the issue by analysing the detailed trajectories, rationale, and effects of China's pension reforms. It uses strong methods, including institutional analysis of resource allocation in the multiple pension schemes and programmes, and quantitative text analysis of the knowledge construction in official discourse along with the reforms. Causal identification estimates the effects of key policy instruments on public opinion about pension responsibility and political trust. Moving beyond the pension issues, the analysis discusses with qualitative evidence why falsified compliance might exist in China's society and the mechanisms that may lie behind it. Where active counter-conduct (such as resistance) is confined, individuals may choose cognitive rebellion and falsify their public compliance.

The Chinese state's strategy to generate public compliance is hybrid, organic, and dynamic. The state rules society by its customised governance design and constant adjustments. Public compliance is not only acquired through 'buying off' the public with governmental performance and transfer benefits, but is also manufactured through achieving cultural changes and new ideological foundations for general legitimation.


추천서가 (다양한 추천 자료를 만나보세요)

권호기사보기

권호기사 목록 테이블로 기사명, 저자명, 페이지, 원문, 기사목차 순으로 되어있습니다.
기사명 저자명 페이지 원문 기사목차