본문 바로가기 주메뉴 바로가기
22대 대한민국 국회 국회정보길라잡이 국회의원검색
회원가입 로그인
HOME

정보검색

소장정보 검색

국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

결과 내 검색

동의어 포함

고급검색

인명/단체명

저자정보 상세정보
인명/단체명을 입력하세요.

키워드

  • 대표어

  • 외국어

-

목차보기

Title page 1

Contents 6

Foreword 4

Acknowledgements 5

Executive summary 8

1. Safeguarding the independence of supreme audit institutions 10

1.1. Independent supreme audit institutions are a key pillar of sound public governance 11

1.2. Supreme audit institutions face growing challenges to their independence 12

1.3. Beyond legal frameworks, informal factors also determine independence 14

References 17

2. How other actors shape the independence of supreme audit institutions 18

2.1. The supreme audit institution as part of a country's accountability ecosystem 19

2.2. The role of the executive 20

2.2.1. To limit undue involvement in external audit functions, the executive could clarify and strengthen its responsibility for internal control... 21

2.2.2. To strengthen fiscal transparency, the executive could clarify policy priorities underpinning fiscal rules and their application 22

2.2.3. To strengthen accountability and support SAI independence, the executive could improve the follow-up of audit recommendations... 23

2.2.4. To reinforce the independence of SAIs, in jurisdictions where the executive has a constitutionally defined role in the nomination... 25

2.2.5. The executive could carefully consider potential unintended consequences related to legal reforms proposals affecting the mandate... 25

2.3. The role of the legislature 29

2.3.1. Through their lawmaking, the legislature can support SAI independence by strengthening laws and regulations that underpin... 30

2.3.2. Strengthening their own internal institutional arrangements and capacities could improve the effectiveness and credibility... 37

2.3.3. By engaging with the SAI through transparent and well-defined procedures, the legislature can balance effective oversight... 41

2.4. The role of other actors beyond the executive and the legislature 46

2.4.1. The judiciary could be engaged with the SAIs through structured mechanisms and supported by clear legal and operational... 46

2.4.2. Donors could provide co-ordinated and systemic support to SAIs, aligned with national priorities and the broader accountability ecosystem 47

2.4.3. SAI independence can benefit from, and contribute to, the strengthened independence of other oversight institutions 48

References 50

3. Reputation as a safeguard for SAI independence 53

3.1. A SAI's reputation is a key safeguard to its independence 54

3.2. How SAIs can strengthen their reliability and responsiveness 55

3.2.1. To strengthen the reliability of their work, SAIs could enhance their implementation of international standards and good practices... 56

3.2.2. SAIs could enhance their responsiveness by ensuring that audit topics, findings and recommendations are timely, relevant and aligned... 59

3.3. How SAIs can strengthen their openness, integrity and fairness 63

3.3.1. SAIs could fulfil their statutory transparency responsibilities and adopt a proactive approach to openness, including the systematic... 63

3.3.2. By establishing strong internal integrity frameworks, SAIs can mitigate risks of undue influence, reinforce credibility, demonstrate... 69

3.3.3. To enhance fairness and credibility, SAIs could establish transparent policies to manage informal interactions between auditors and auditees 71

References 72

4. Summary of Recommendations 73

4.1. Executive 73

4.2. Legislature 74

4.3. Other actors beyond the executive and the legislature 74

4.4. Supreme audit institutions 75

Annex A. Data collection methods 76

Annex B. Models of supreme audit institutions (SAIs) 79

Annex C. INTOSAI regional organisations 81

Tables 7

Table 2.1. Interaction of SAIs with other actors throughout the audit process 20

Table 3.1. OECD Framework on Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions applied to SAI practices and reputation outcomes 55

Figures 7

Figure 1.1. Number of SAI Independence Rapid Advocacy Mechanism (SIRAM) cases by region, 2018-2025 (18 in total) 13

Figure 1.2. Factors undermining or strengthening SAI independence according to SAIs 16

Boxes 7

Box 1.1. The Principles of the Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence 11

Box 1.2. Main findings on SAI independence from the Global SAI Stocktaking Report 2023 12

Box 1.3. The OECD and IDI Global Project on SAI independence 14

Box 2.1. Public accounting and control framework in Estonia 22

Box 2.2. Strengthening relationships between the SAI and the executive in the follow-up of audit recommendations 24

Box 2.3. Sequenced legal consistency reform in France 27

Box 2.4. Examples of independent SAI staffing structures 32

Box 2.5. European Court of Auditors (ECA) - Staggered terms by design 33

Box 2.6. Non-political background of the President of the Audit Bureau of Jordan 33

Box 2.7. Transparency in the Paraguayan Head of SAI appointment process 34

Box 2.8. The term of the Auditor-General of New Zealand 36

Box 2.9. Australia's Parliamentary Budget Office 39

Box 2.10. Parliamentary technical expertise at the Bundestag, Germany 41

Box 2.11. Mechanisms to strengthen co-ordination between the SAI of Indonesia (BPK) and the House of Representatives (DPR) 41

Box 2.12. Example from the United States - Protocols in place for audit request from the legislature 42

Box 2.13. Parliamentary follow-up process in Kenya 44

Box 2.14. Legal and procedural tabling requirements in Canada 45

Box 2.15. International engagement: The case of the Court of Accounts of São Tomé and Príncipe 47

Box 3.1. SAI PMF - a tool to assess the implementation of international standards 57

Box 3.2. Enhancing impact through follow-up: The Austrian Court of Audit (ACA) 58

Box 3.3. Strengthening audit follow-up: Liberia's General Auditing Commission (GAC) introduces dedicated follow-up mechanism 59

Box 3.4. Annual audit work programme: Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) 60

Box 3.5. Preventive control guides of the Auditor-General of South Africa 61

Box 3.6. Using audit insights to disseminate good practice: The United Kingdom's National Audit Office (NAO) 62

Box 3.7. INTOSAI-P 20: Transparency and accountability of supreme audit institutions 64

Box 3.8. Enhancing transparency and access to audit information: Mexico's public audit consultation system 65

Box 3.9. Co-ordination arrangements of the Court of Accounts within Morocco's accountability ecosystem 66

Box 3.10. Stakeholders' engagement through peer support within the INTOSAI community 67

Box 3.11. Communication and dissemination of audit results: The case of the SAI of Norway 68

Box 3.12. Institutional communication and public engagement: Spanish Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas) 69

Box 3.13. Building credibility and trust: The case of the Auditor General's Department of Jamaica 70

Annex Tables 7

Table A A.1. Coverage of data collected per stakeholder type 77

Table A A.2. Information on country visits 77

Table A B.1. SAI models 79

Table A C.1. INTOSAI regional organisations and their regional coverage 81

Annex Figures 7

Figure A A.1. Four main data sources 76

Figure A A.2. SAI data collected by model of SAI 76

Annex Boxes 7

Box A B.1. Case of the Cour des comptes (Court of Accounts) of France 80

추천서가 (다양한 추천 자료를 만나보세요)

권호기사보기

권호기사 목록 테이블로 기사명, 저자명, 페이지, 원문, 기사목차 순으로 되어있습니다.
기사명 저자명 페이지 원문 기사목차

권호

기사명 원문보기 기사목차
닫기