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Title page 1

Contents 6

Foreword 4

Acknowledgements 5

Abbreviations and acronyms 9

Executive summary 11

1. Overview 13

1.1. The multilateral development system, built for scale and complementarity, is facing multiple pressures 14

1.1.1. Development co-operation covers a wide spectrum of needs, risks and financing contexts 14

1.1.2. Pressure on multiple fronts means the multilateral development system must adapt to survive 16

1.2. After years of expansion, funding to the multilateral development system has reached a turning point 20

1.2.1. The growth in donors' multilateral contributions has reversed, and structural challenges are now visible 20

1.2.2. What the funding dry-out means for the multilateral development system 23

1.3. Continued growth in multilateral outflows contrasts with early signs of strain on the UNDS 27

1.3.1. Record multilateral outflows in 2024 mask mounting pressure beneath the surface 27

1.3.2. The coming squeeze raises implications for multilateral outflows 29

1.4. Stronger together: An agenda to reset the multilateral development system 33

1.4.1. Recommendations for member states 33

1.4.2. Recommendations for multilateral development organisations 34

References 36

2. The landscape of multilateral development co-operation 39

2.1. Understanding the multilateral development system and its financial structure 40

2.1.1. The system's architecture is multifaceted and interconnected 40

2.1.2. Multilateral development co-operation covers a wide spectrum of needs, risks and financing contexts 43

2.2. Pressure on multiple fronts means the multilateral development system must adapt to survive 47

2.2.1. The rise of a more fragmented geopolitical order could mark the end of a golden age of multilateralism 47

2.2.2. The global aid crisis threatens to unravel the financial foundations of multilateral development co-operation 50

2.2.3. Cost efficiency considerations are driving multilateral reform 52

References 57

3. Funding to the multilateral development system 59

3.1. After years of expansion, funding to the multilateral development system has reached a turning point 60

3.1.1. Funding to the multilateral development system is in decline 60

3.1.2. Heavy reliance on a few DAC donors leaves the system highly exposed 63

3.1.3. Core contributions continue to lose out to earmarked funding 64

3.1.4. Tightening budgets among the system's traditional donors may open space for emerging donors to play a greater role 68

3.2. What constrained aid budgets mean for the multilateral development system 73

3.2.1. In a context of shrinking funding, donors face difficult trade-offs 73

3.2.2. The growing use of earmarked funding risks compounding the effects of declining multilateral contribution and threatens the... 74

3.2.3. Funding vulnerability differs markedly across multilateral development organisations 76

References 82

4. Financing from the multilateral development system 85

4.1. Continued overall growth in multilateral outflows contrasts with early signs of strain in parts of the system 86

4.1.1. Multilateral outflows reached a new record high in 2024, but pressure is mounting beneath the surface 86

4.1.2. The rise in overall multilateral outflows masks already observable pressures on UNDS programmes 87

4.1.3. Recent crises have displaced the geographical and sectoral centre of gravity of multilateral development finance 91

4.2. The coming squeeze raises implications for multilateral outflows 94

4.2.1. Impacts on the system's reach and ambition may be substantial and lasting 94

4.2.2. Uncoordinated funding cuts to central multilateral channels risk triggering system-wide delivery failures 96

4.2.3. Concessional resources are at risk, with consequences for the most vulnerable 98

References 101

Tables 8

Table 2.1. Intensifying pressures are pushing the multilateral development system to adapt 47

Table 3.1. Key vulnerability dimensions determine how a multilateral development organisation will be affected by funding cuts 76

Figures 7

Figure 1.1. Multilateral organisations are designed to play complementary roles, providing development finance across different contexts 15

Figure 1.2. Donors' incentives increasingly resemble a prisoner's dilemma 17

Figure 1.3. The eleven DAC members that have announced aid cuts account for a significant share of major MDOs' total funding 18

Figure 1.4. The UN's programme budget for 2026 reflects the institution's efforts to contain its costs 19

Figure 1.5. Core and earmarked contributions to the multilateral system declined by 15% in 2024 20

Figure 1.6. The 11 DAC members that have publicly announced cuts in their ODA in 2025-27 accounted for roughly two-thirds of total DAC... 21

Figure 1.7. Contributions to the multilateral development system are set to continue declining 22

Figure 1.8. Donor choices on how to allocate multilateral contributions involve explicit trade-offs 23

Figure 1.9. Core multilateral contributions are being squeezed by rising bilateral and earmarked multilateral allocations 24

Figure 1.10. Most UNDS entities exhibit a high reliance on voluntary contributions 26

Figure 1.11. Overall multilateral outflows have increased markedly over the past two decades in response to global crises 27

Figure 1.12. Major UNDS organisations are already experiencing a significant drop in their outflows 28

Figure 1.13. More than 70% of survey respondents anticipate scaling back or suspending projects due to funding cuts 29

Figure 1.14. Defunding multilateral leveraged mechanisms risks generating outflow losses that far exceed the budgetary savings achieved 30

Figure 1.15. Cuts affecting central MDOs could significantly impair the system's capacity to support the most in need 31

Figure 1.16. Low-income countries and social and humanitarian sectors are particularly exposed to cuts in multilateral concessional finance 32

Figure 2.1. The multilateral development system serves as a major conduit for development cooperation 40

Figure 2.2. The system involves myriad organisations addressing a wide range of sustainable development issues 42

Figure 2.3. Multilateral organisations are designed to play complementary roles, providing development finance across different contexts 44

Figure 2.4. Multilateral roles connect along a broadly logical progression from higher risk needs to more bankable forms of finance 45

Figure 2.5. Multilateral organisations tend to outperform bilateral actors on key measures of development co-operation effectiveness 46

Figure 2.6. Donors' incentives increasingly resemble a prisoner's dilemma 48

Figure 2.7. The multilateral development architecture is evolving from broad-based donorship to narrower issue-specific coalitions 49

Figure 2.8. The 11 DAC members cutting their ODA in 2025-27 accounted for roughly two-thirds of total DAC contributions to the system in 2024 51

Figure 2.9. The UN's programme budget and staff cuts reflect efforts to enhance cost efficiency 53

Figure 2.10. Portfolio and organisational overlaps in some parts of the system suggest room for consolidation 54

Figure 3.1. Contributions to the multilateral system declined by 15% in 2024 60

Figure 3.2. Tapering crisis response, tightening aid budgets and evolving donor priorities drove the recent drop in multilateral funding 61

Figure 3.3. Contributions to the multilateral development system are set to continue falling 62

Figure 3.4. Four countries accounted for half of DAC members' multilateral contributions in 2024 63

Figure 3.5. The 11 DAC members that have announced aid cuts account for a significant share of major MDOs' total funding 64

Figure 3.6. Bilateral and earmarked multilateral contributions are rising at the expense of core contributions 65

Figure 3.7. Earmarked contributions continue to increase as a share of total multilateral contributions 66

Figure 3.8. Changes in core and earmarked contributions show contrasting adjustment patterns across DAC donors 67

Figure 3.9. Nordic and Benelux countries provide significantly more than their "fair share" of core funding to the multilateral system 68

Figure 3.10. DAC countries' UNDS contributions rose steadily over 2014-2024, while emerging donor contributions have weakened 69

Figure 3.11. China, the UAE, Qatar and India have risen up the ranks of leading non-DAC donors to the UNDS 70

Figure 3.12. The Gates Foundation has replaced the United States as the leading donor to the World Health Organization's programme budget 72

Figure 3.13. Donor choices on how to allocate multilateral contributions involve explicit trade-offs 74

Figure 3.14. Most UNDS entities exhibit a high reliance on voluntary contributions 78

Figure 3.15. The composition of DAC countries' funding to UNESCO has shifted in recent years 80

Figure 4.1. Multilateral outflows have increased markedly over the past two decades in response to global crises 86

Figure 4.2. The rise in multilateral outflows is driven by MDBs and EU Institutions 88

Figure 4.3. MDBs have continued to deliver increasing volumes of financing, driven by outflows from the World Bank Group and the AsDB 89

Figure 4.4. Major UNDS organisations are already experiencing a significant drop in their outflows 90

Figure 4.5. Multilateral outflows to Europe have substantially increased in recent years, driven by support to Ukraine 92

Figure 4.6. Middle-income countries receive three-quarters of multilateral outflows 93

Figure 4.7. The distribution of multilateral outflows by sector reflects a shift towards short-term crisis response 94

Figure 4.8. More than 70% of survey respondents anticipate scaling back or suspending projects due to funding cuts 95

Figure 4.9. Defunding multilateral leveraged mechanisms risks generating outflow losses that far exceed the budgetary savings achieved 96

Figure 4.10. Cuts affecting central MDOs could significantly impair the system's capacity to support the most in need 97

Figure 4.11. Low-income countries and humanitarian and social sectors are particularly exposed to cuts in multilateral concessional finance 98

Figure 4.12. More than half of multilateral development finance delivered is now non-concessional 100

Boxes 8

Box 2.1. UN80: responding to financial pressure while revisiting long-standing structural issues 55

Box 3.1. The World Health Organization's evolving funding structure 72

Box 3.2. MOPAN's assessments of UNESCO underscore that limited reprioritisation in the face of funding shocks can constrain organisational effectiveness 81

Box 4.1. The case of the World Food Programme illustrates the direct implications of funding volatility for humanitarian aid 91