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Title page 1

Contents 4

Acknowledgements 8

Editorial: Under pressure 9

1. General assessment of the macroeconomic situation 11

Introduction 12

Recent developments 15

Scenarios 32

Risks 41

Policies 51

References 66

Annex 1.A. Policy and other assumptions underlying the projections in the time-limited disruption scenario 69

2. From energy shocks to stronger resilience 70

Introduction 71

Energy prices have surged but exposure differs across countries, firms and households 73

Many countries have acted quickly to provide relief 76

Lessons from the 2022-23 energy crisis 80

Enhancing administrative capacity to deliver targeted and timely support 84

Strengthening the resilience of energy systems 86

References 95

3. The fiscal and economic impacts of higher defence spending 98

Summary 99

Defence spending is on the rise 99

Large increases in defence spending add pressure to the public finances 104

Defence spending could provide a near-term boost to economic activity 105

Longer-term economic effects of defence spending are highly uncertain 111

References 112

4. Developments in individual OECD and selected non-member economies 115

Argentina 116

Australia 119

Austria 122

Belgium 125

Brazil 128

Bulgaria 132

Canada 135

Chile 139

China 142

Colombia 146

Costa Rica 149

Croatia 152

Czechia 155

Denmark 158

Estonia 161

Euro area 164

Finland 168

France 171

Germany 175

Greece 179

Hungary 182

Iceland 185

India 188

Indonesia 192

Ireland 196

Israel 199

Italy 202

Japan 206

Korea 210

Latvia 213

Lithuania 216

Luxembourg 219

Malaysia 222

Mexico 225

Morocco 228

Netherlands 231

New Zealand 234

Norway 237

Peru 240

Philippines 243

Poland 246

Portugal 249

Romania 252

Saudi Arabia 255

Slovak Republic 258

Slovenia 261

South Africa 264

Spain 267

Sweden 270

Switzerland 273

Thailand 276

Türkiye 279

Ukraine 282

United Kingdom 285

United States 289

Viet Nam 293

Tables 7

Table 1.1. Global GDP growth is projected to moderate in the time-limited disruption scenario 15

Table 2.1. Policy options to improve responses and strengthen resilience to energy shocks 72

Table 2.2. Selected energy support measures announced in response to the 2026 energy crisis 79

Table 3.1. Selected estimates of defence spending multipliers 106

Figures 6

Figure 1.1. The Persian Gulf countries have a significant role in the global economy 16

Figure 1.2. A steep pick up in energy and other commodity prices is beginning to weigh on economic activity 17

Figure 1.3. Strait of Hormuz transits and commercial flights remain severely restricted, raising supply backlogs 17

Figure 1.4. Oil and gas stock levels differ substantially across countries 18

Figure 1.5. The Persian Gulf is an important export destination for African and Asian economies 20

Figure 1.6. Persian Gulf shares of world exports of key products 21

Figure 1.7. Countries' exposure to selected Persian Gulf products 22

Figure 1.8. Reduced policy uncertainty has helped to boost trade 23

Figure 1.9. AI related trade has supported global growth, particularly in Asia 24

Figure 1.10. US import tariffs on most countries have fallen this year 25

Figure 1.11. Labour market conditions remain broadly stable with limited signs of AI-related displacement 26

Figure 1.12. The energy price shock is beginning to feed through to consumer prices 28

Figure 1.13. Inflation expectations have moved higher following the energy price shock 29

Figure 1.14. Financial conditions remain mildly accommodative but have tightened amidst higher market volatility 30

Figure 1.15. Equity prices declined substantially following the escalation of the Middle East conflict 31

Figure 1.16. Sovereign bond yields have increased since the onset of the conflict in the Middle East 31

Figure 1.17. Global growth prospects depend heavily on the duration of the conflict 32

Figure 1.18. Headline inflation is projected to rise in many economies this year 34

Figure 1.19. Global trade growth is projected to moderate 35

Figure 1.20. Current account imbalances are projected to decline slightly 36

Figure 1.21. A prolonged disruption scenario raises inflation and hits growth 38

Figure 1.22. Reliance on Persian Gulf energy imports varies across economies 39

Figure 1.23. Indirect linkages significantly increase economies' exposure to Persian Gulf energy 39

Figure 1.24. Exposure to Persian Gulf energy varies widely across sectors 40

Figure 1.25. Companies face challenges from elevated debt and rising debt refinancing costs 43

Figure 1.26. AI investment is rising rapidly, with increased reliance on market-based financing 43

Figure 1.27. Performance of private credit and equity funds and their exposure to the software sector 45

Figure 1.28. Banking sector exposure to NBFIs is rising in advanced economies 46

Figure 1.29. Agricultural reliance on Persian Gulf imports for nitrogen fertilisers 48

Figure 1.30. Fertiliser price rises raise food prices 49

Figure 1.31. Real long-term interest rates have remained high compared to pre-pandemic levels 52

Figure 1.32. Policy rates projections in the time-limited disruption scenario 53

Figure 1.33. Government debt ratios are projected to increase further in many countries 55

Figure 1.34. Many countries need stronger fiscal balances to stabilise public debt in the near term 56

Figure 1.35. Quantitative easing and quantitative tightening have been the main drivers of changes in central bank balance sheet size 59

Figure 1.36. Productivity growth has slowed and the share of the working age population has started to decline 63

Figure 1.37. Reform recommendations to strengthen the foundations for growth and competitiveness 65

Figure 2.1. Energy prices have spiked 73

Figure 2.2. Many large oil importers have significant short-term buffers, but the level of coverage varies 75

Figure 2.3. The share of energy in household consumption differs across countries 75

Figure 2.4. Classification of energy support measures 76

Figure 2.5. Countries have not converged towards a targeted approach following the 2022 energy crisis 80

Figure 2.6. The bulk of support measures in 2022-23 were untargeted 81

Figure 2.7. Energy support measures announced as of 18 May 2026 83

Figure 2.8. Energy efficiency gains since 2000 have resulted in energy savings in many OECD countries 88

Figure 2.9. Progress in adoption varies across energy efficiency policies 89

Figure 2.10. Use of energy to create value added differs among countries and sectors 90

Figure 2.11. Degree of energy diversification varies across countries 92

Figure 2.12. Share of electricity in final energy consumption 94

Figure 3.1. Recent military spending increases are large and highly synchronised across countries 100

Figure 3.2. Defence spending composition varies across countries 101

Figure 3.3. NATO Europe's import dependency varies by military equipment type 102

Figure 3.4. Recent large military spending increases have tended to occur in lower debt countries 105

Figure 3.5. The transmission of higher defence spending to the real economy 106

Figure 3.6. Many households expect higher taxes or spending cuts to fund rearmament 108

Figure 3.7. Capacity utilisation is below past peaks in some economies' defence-related industries 109

Figure 3.8. Gains from some defence purchases may be highly concentrated by industry 110

Figure 3.9. Job ads at European defence firms surged in 2022-23 but subsequently moderated 110

Figure 3.10. Defence budget research and development allocations 112

Boxes 7

Box 1.1. Exports of critical materials from the Middle East 20

Box 1.2. Exposures to energy supply from the Persian Gulf 38

Box 1.3. The potential impact of an energy price shock on AI infrastructure 41

Box 1.4. Fertiliser exports from the Persian Gulf, food price risks and policy options 47

Box 1.5. How large should central bank balance sheets be? 59

Box 2.1. Automatic activation and delivery: country examples of targeted support in practice 86

Box 3.1. Considerations for cost assessment, price risk management and effective procurement 103