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Title page 1

Contents 6

Foreword 4

Acknowledgements 5

Executive summary 11

1. Drivers of trust over time: Lessons from the third wave of the OECD Trust Survey 13

1.1. INTRODUCTION 15

1.2. THE CONTEXT OF THE 2025 TRUST SURVEY DATA COLLECTION 17

1.3. LEVELS AND CHANGES IN TRUST IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 20

1.3.1. On average, 40% of the population across the OECD and ¼ across the participating OECD accession countries express high... 20

1.3.2. Trust in the national government is stabilising on average across the OECD 21

1.3.3. Yet some countries still show substantial changes in trust compared to 2023 22

1.4. DRIVERS OF TRUST IN THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 26

1.4.1. People's perceptions of complex decision making are most strongly associated with trust in the national government 26

1.4.2. Consequently, important changes in levels of trust in the national government are found to be related to changes in perceptions... 31

1.5. LEVELS AND DRIVERS OF TRUST IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 33

1.5.1. The police, judicial system and armed forces generally elicit the highest levels of trust 34

1.5.2. Local government remains substantially more trusted than the national government 35

1.5.3. A higher share trust the national civil service than the national government 38

1.6. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTION TO ENHANCE TRUST 40

1.7. OUTLOOK FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE REPORT 40

REFERENCES 44

NOTES 45

2. Socioeconomic conditions, political agency and trust 46

2.1. INTRODUCTION 48

2.2. DIFFERENCES IN TRUST LEVELS BETWEEN POPULATION GROUPS 48

2.2.1. Perceived political agency and partisanship most strongly correspond with levels of trust 49

2.2.2. Lower socio-economic status is associated with lower trust in public institutions 54

2.2.3. The smallest trust gaps are associated with demographic characteristics 59

2.2.4. Many trust gaps have remained broadly stable since 2021, but the educational trust gap is widening and the age-related... 61

2.3. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTION TO ENHANCE TRUST 63

REFERENCES 66

NOTES 67

3. Day-to-day interactions with public institutions and their implications for trust 68

3.1. SATISFACTION WITH ESSENTIAL PUBLIC SERVICES 70

3.1.1. People with immediate experience of education and health services are more likely to be satisfied with these systems 70

3.1.2. Satisfaction with administrative services is generally high and rising 73

3.1.3. Positive experiences with individual quality aspects underpin the high level of satisfaction with administrative services 75

3.2. VIEWS ON DAY-TO-DAY INTERACTIONS WITH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 78

3.2.1. A majority of the OECD population find it likely that administrative information are easily available and that they would be... 78

3.2.2. Even simple interactions with government institutions can contribute to improving perceptions 81

3.2.3. A perceived 'right to error' in administrative interactions has ambiguous relationship with institutional trust 83

3.3. PERCEPTIONS OF THE RESPONSIVENESS OF PUBLIC SERVICES 85

3.4. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTIONS TO INCREASE TRUST 87

REFERENCES 89

NOTES 89

4. Views of government decision making on complex policy issues and trust 90

4.1. INTRODUCTION 92

4.2. PERCEPTIONS OF THE OUTCOMES OF GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING ON COMPLEX POLICY ISSUES 92

4.2.1. People generally feel government will better protect them from large-scale emergencies than economic crises 93

4.2.2. Fewer people are confident in policymaking on emerging and long-term issues 95

4.3. PERCEPTIONS OF THE PROCESSES OF GOVERNMENT DECISION MAKING ON COMPLEX POLICY ISSUES 97

4.3.1. Policymaking is not always perceived as responsive to the best available evidence nor as adaptive to changes in society's needs 97

4.3.2. Few view policymakers as receptive to criticism of a policy or capable of co-operating with key stakeholders in solving important policy challenges 98

4.4. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTIONS TO INCREASE TRUST 103

REFERENCES 104

NOTES 104

5. Trustworthy artificial intelligence in the public sector 105

5.1. MOST PEOPLE REMAIN SCEPTICAL OF AI DEPLOYED IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 107

5.2. AI HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BECOME A TRUST-ENHANCING FORCE DEPENDING ON PUBLIC GOVERNANCE CHOICES 112

5.3. ATTITUDES TOWARDS AI USE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR ARE UNEVEN ACROSS POPULATION GROUPS 116

5.3.1. Patterns of optimism towards government use of AI mirror several of the socio-economic and demographic gaps observed... 116

5.3.2. Greater familiarity with AI is associated with higher expectations of its benefits 117

5.4. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE LEVERS FOR MORE TRUSTWORTHY AI 120

5.4.1. Confidence in the government's regulatory approach for emerging technologies is associated with positive perceptions of AI... 121

5.4.2. Confidence in government stewardship on long term issues is associated with positive perceptions of AI use in government 122

5.4.3. Confidence in the government's use of personal information is associated with positive perceptions of AI use in the public sector 123

5.5. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTION TO INCREASE TRUST 126

REFERENCES 127

NOTES 128

6. Political voice, barriers to participation and implications for trust in government 129

6.1. INTRODUCTION 130

6.2. VOTING REMAINS AT THE CORE OF POLITICAL VOICE IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACIES 131

6.2.1. Voting is by far the most common way by which people engage in political and civic life 131

6.2.2. Most say voting has an impact on government actions 132

6.2.3. Despite people's views that they can influence what government does through voting, there is widespread scepticism that political... 133

6.3. BARRIERS TO INFLUENCE AND PARTICIPATION 134

6.3.1. Public consultations or self organised political participation are not filling the gap 134

6.3.2. Political officials are viewed as out of reach 136

6.3.3. Socioeconomic factors, like financial insecurity, influence ability to participate 138

6.3.4. Information can be perceived as a barrier to having a say even among those relying on news media for information about politics... 139

6.4. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTION TO INCREASE TRUST 142

REFERENCES 143

NOTES 143

7. The evolution of trust in the national legislature and its drivers 144

7.1. THE IMPORTANCE OF TRUST IN THE LEGISLATURE 146

7.2. LEVELS OF AND TRENDS IN TRUST IN NATIONAL LEGISLATURES 146

7.2.1. Trust in the national legislature is relatively low in OECD and participating OECD accession candidate countries 146

7.2.2. Following a minor decline between 2021 and 2023, average trust levels across 19 OECD countries have stabilised in 2025 148

7.2.3. Levels of trust in the legislature vary more with individuals' perception of having a say in what government does and partisanship... 149

7.3. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DRIVERS OF TRUST IN LEGISLATURES 155

7.3.1. Ensuring that different interests and needs are taken into account is the most critical driver of trust in legislatures 157

7.3.2. Perception of being listened to is positively associated with trust in legislatures 158

7.3.3. Effectively fulfilling their function as an institutional check and balance strengthens public trust in legislatures 159

7.3.4. The relationship between most perceptions of day-to-day interactions and trust in legislature is relatively limited 160

7.4. AREAS FOR POLICY ACTION TO ENHANCE TRUST 161

REFERENCES 162

NOTES 162

Annex A. Technical details about the data collection and regression analysis 163

Tables 9

Table 1.1. Participation of OECD countries in the different Trust Survey waves 17

Table 1.2. A majority across the OECD is concerned about the cost of living 20

Table 1.3. Share of population with high or moderately high trust in different public institutions and the media, 2023 and 2025 42

Table 2.1. Evolution of trust gaps across different population groups over time 64

Figures 7

Figure 1.1. A majority across the OECD view the cost of living as among the three most important issues facing their country, while more than... 18

Figure 1.2. About four in ten people across the OECD have high or moderately high trust in the national government 21

Figure 1.3. On average across the OECD, the share that place high or moderately high trust in the national government has remained... 22

Figure 1.4. Increases and declines in trust levels in Greece have become more pronounced since the early 2010s 24

Figure 1.5. The share with high or moderately high trust among individuals that identify corruption as a main concern is substantially lower... 26

Figure 1.6. A slight majority is confident that government institutions are prepared to protect people's lives in a major emergency,... 27

Figure 1.7. Only around one third of people feel people like them have a say in what government does and that the national government... 28

Figure 1.8. In many OECD countries a majority is satisfied with administrative services and the protection of personal data by government agencies 29

Figure 1.9. The drivers of trust in national government in 2025 30

Figure 1.10. Changes in perceptions of public governance drivers related to complex decision making account for the largest share of changes... 32

Figure 1.11. A majority across the OECD have high or moderately high trust in security and judicial institutions 34

Figure 1.12. Police, courts and the armed forces are the most trusted public institutions in many countries 35

Figure 1.13. Local governments and the national civil service are usually trusted more than national governments 36

Figure 1.14. Trust in local government and the civil service has been stable 37

Figure 1.15. The drivers of trust in local government in 2025 38

Figure 1.16. The drivers of trust in the civil service in 2025 39

Figure 2.1. Trust in the national government varies more strongly along perceived political agency and partisan lines than across socio-economic... 49

Figure 2.2. People who feel they have political agency express higher trust in the national government 50

Figure 2.3. Trust in the national government tends to be higher among voters for a current governing party 51

Figure 2.4. Institutional trust differs systematically by partisanship 52

Figure 2.5. Trust gaps in the civil service by partisanship have increased over time 53

Figure 2.6. Across all countries, fewer people with financial concerns trust the national government 55

Figure 2.7. People with lower educational attainment almost universally have lower trust in government 56

Figure 2.8. Trust in national government of those self-identifying as belonging to a discriminated group varies consistently across countries 57

Figure 2.9. Trust gaps by interpersonal trust are comparatively larger for political institutions, 2025 58

Figure 2.10. Men tend to trust the national government more than women do 59

Figure 2.11. Trust in the national government is usually higher among older people 60

Figure 2.12. Trust gaps remain broadly stable over time, with narrowing age differences and widening education divides 61

Figure 2.13. Education-related trust gaps are widening over time, but with substantial variation across countries 63

Figure 3.1. A majority of recent service users across the OECD are satisfied with the education and healthcare systems 71

Figure 3.2. Satisfaction with the education and healthcare system rose modestly over the past two years 72

Figure 3.3. In each OECD country, a majority of recent administrative services users are satisfied with these services 73

Figure 3.4. Satisfaction with administrative services has improved slightly over recent years 74

Figure 3.5. Across the OECD countries a majority have positive views of different administrative service quality aspects 76

Figure 3.6. People who are satisfied with the speed and ease of accessing the administrative service remain particularly likely to be satisfied... 77

Figure 3.7. An important majority see information on administrative services as easily available 79

Figure 3.8. Around half of the population in OECD countries expect fair treatment when applying for government benefits or services 80

Figure 3.9. In OECD and OECD accession countries, more people find it unlikely than find it likely that a government employee would turn down... 81

Figure 3.10. Recent contact with administrative services appears to boost perceptions of day-to-day interactions and even trust in the civil... 82

Figure 3.11. At the country level, the share who find it likely that a public employee would help individuals fix mistakes in applications is far more... 84

Figure 3.12. The share of people who view public services as responsive to complaints and to innovative ideas are similar in most countries 85

Figure 3.13. The share who view public services as responsive across OECD countries has slightly risen since 2021 86

Figure 4.1. A majority is confident in the ability of government to protect lives in emergencies, larger than the share who believe government... 93

Figure 4.2. Across countries, more people think government institutions can protect lives in an emergency than support individuals affected... 94

Figure 4.3. Nearly four in ten are confident in their government reducing GhG emissions, slightly higher than the share confident that their... 96

Figure 4.4. People's opinions about government being evidence-informed and planning ahead to changing societal needs are related 98

Figure 4.5. Only around four in ten people find it likely that an unpopular policy would be changed, but this share is increasing over time 99

Figure 4.6. There are few countries where a majority is confident that government co-operates well with other stakeholders to tackle long-term challenges 100

Figure 4.7. There are more people who find it unlikely than people who find it likely that a politician would refuse a well-paid private sector job... 101

Figure 4.8. Only around one third think government withstands undue influence - a small increase from 2023 102

Figure 5.1. Around four in ten people have moderately or very positive views about the potential of AI use by government institutions 109

Figure 5.2. People are more likely to believe that AI in the public sector can improve service quality and efficiency than to believe it will be fair,... 111

Figure 5.3. Use cases appear most present in public service design and delivery, civic participation, and justice administration 112

Figure 5.4. Socio-economic and demographic characteristics are associated with varying levels of optimism/pessimism towards AI use in the public sector 117

Figure 5.5. Four in ten people across the OECD assess their knowledge of artificial intelligence as sufficiently strong to explain it to others 118

Figure 5.6. Familiarity with AI is associated with more positive expectations towards AI use in the public sector 119

Figure 5.7. People who find it likely that government appropriately regulates new technologies to help businesses and citizens use them responsibly... 121

Figure 5.8. Around four in ten find it likely that government adequately regulates new technologies 122

Figure 5.9. Just over half across the OECD find it likely that government agencies use personal data for legitimate purposes 124

Figure 6.1. Voting is the most common form of political activity across countries, followed by signing petitions and boycotting products 132

Figure 6.2. A vast majority believe voting in elections and referendums can influence government 133

Figure 6.3. In almost all OECD and OECD accession countries, only a minority feel confident in their own ability to participate in politics and... 134

Figure 6.4. Government is perceived as unlikely to adopt public opinions expressed in consultations 135

Figure 6.5. Around three in ten of people who did not vote in any election or participate in public consultations or townhall meetings chose not to do so 137

Figure 6.6. The perception that political officials are out of touch is seen as a top barrier to having an effective say in policymaking 138

Figure 6.7. Broadcast journalism and social media are the most frequent sources of information about politics and current affairs 140

Figure 6.8. Perceptions of engagement opportunities with officials are only slightly related to trust in the national government, while officials' concern... 141

Figure 7.1. Almost half of the population across OECD and accession countries, on average, report low or no trust in national legislatures 147

Figure 7.2. On average and in many individual countries, fewer people have high or moderately high trust in the national legislature than in national government 148

Figure 7.3. Trust in the national legislature has been relatively stable across the OECD since 2021 149

Figure 7.4. The share with high or moderately high trust in the national legislature is particularly low among individuals who do not believe people... 150

Figure 7.5. The gap in trust in the national legislature associated with perceptions on whether people have a say in what government does is substantial... 151

Figure 7.6. The partisan gap for trust in the legislature is pronounced in many countries 152

Figure 7.7. Feeling economically insecure is generally associated with lower trust in national legislatures 153

Figure 7.8. Men and older cohorts show higher levels of trust in national legislatures than women and younger people 154

Figure 7.9. The trust gap in the national legislature associated with differences in educational attainment has increased over time 155

Figure 7.10. Drivers of trust in national legislatures in 2025 156

Figure 7.11. Slightly more than one in three people across the OECD find it likely that the national legislature appropriately balances between the needs... 157

Figure 7.12. On average, only about one-third believe that if they contacted elected representatives, they would receive a meaningful response 159

Figure 7.13. Close to 40% believe that the legislature can hold governments accountable 160

Boxes 10

Box 1.1. The 2025 OECD Survey on the Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions (Trust Survey) 16

Box 1.2. Recovering trust in public institutions in Greece 23

Box 1.3. The relationship between popular concerns and trust in the national government 25

Box 2.1. Do partisan differences in trust extend beyond political institutions? 53

Box 2.2. Institutional trust varies substantially by levels of interpersonal trust 58

Box 3.1. Fostering human-centred public services through government innovation 87

Box 5.1. National efforts to gather evidence on public attitudes towards AI use in the public sector in Australia, the UK and Belgium 110

Box 5.2. Balancing efficiency and integrity concerns in the use of AI in the UK and Spain's Judicial Systems 114

Box 5.3. Risks around AI use in government 115

Box 5.4. Bolstering confidence in data privacy 125

Box 6.1. Why not participate? Insights on abstention from political activities 136

Box 6.2. Barriers to participation vary across groups 139

Box 7.1. Trends and changes in legislative trust gaps, 2021-2025 154

Annex Tables 10

Table A.1. The measurement of drivers of trust in the 2025 OECD Trust Survey 163

Table A.2. Overview of hard and soft sampling quotas 165

Table A.3. Data collection overview 165

Table A.4. Overview of regression results for trust in the national government 169

Table A.5. Overview of regression results for trust in the national civil service and legislature and local government 171