Fig. 2.1. The LPG tank farm at the Chiba refinery after the earthquake-triggered fires and explosions (©2012 Google, ZENRIN) 20

Fig. 2.2. Location of the refinery of Tupras 22

Fig. 2.3. Aerial view of the Tupras refinery after the Kocaeli earthquake 23

Fig. 2.4. Tank fire at Tupras refinery due to collision of the floating roof with the tank wall (Courtesy of Tupras A.S. (TUPRAS, 2000)) 24

Fig. 2.5. Burned cooling tower (left) by the radiant heat of the burning tanks and damaged heater due to collapse of the stack (left) at TUPRAS refinery 24

Fig. 2.6. Damage and fire at the pipe rack due to collapsed stack at TUPRAS refinery 25

Fig. 2.7. Locations of damaged and burned tanks (JSCE, 1999) 25

Fig. 2.8. Elephant foot buckling of a bolted steel tank 28

Fig. 2.9. Pulling out and twisting of the anchor bolts (Lau et al. 1995) 29

Fig. 2.10. Part of the Sendai refinery's western section that was consumed by flames(©2011 Google, ZENRIN) 36

Fig. 2.11. Burned hydrocarbon tank at the JX Sendai refinery (TCLEE, 2012) 36

Fig. 2.12. Heavy oil release due to tsunami-triggered damage at the Sendai refinery(©2011 Google, ZENRIN) 37

Fig. 3.1. Fracture at the Zipingpu dam's crown (taken from Lekkas, 2008) 43

Fig. 3.2. Failure of the Niedow dam in Poland due to flooding (taken from Fry et al., 2012) 49

Fig. 4.1. The ground-supported unseated crude oil unloading pipeline fell from the supports at TUPRAS refinery due to inertial effects (Courtesy of TUPRAS (2000)) 57

Fig. 4.2. Failure (wrinkling) of a large diameter welded steel pipe crossing the ruptured fault in Arifiye (East of Izmit (left) (Takada et al., 2001) and buckled steel pipe connection (Bilham et al. 2003) 57

Fig. 4.3. Trans-Alaska pipeline crossing the Denali fault line (USGS, 2003) 60

Fig. 5.1. Damage to gas pipes following the L'Aquila earthquake: gas welded joint of a LP steel pipe pulled apart in Paganica (Esposito et al., 2013) 65

Fig. 5.2. Repair operations addressing damage to buried components for the entire gas network: number of repairs distinguished with respect to pressure level and pipe material (Esposito et al., 2013) 65

Fig. 5.3. Damage to stations: repairs to the input/output network of Onna M/R and inclusion of stop-system (left); RG housed in a masonry kiosk closed to building and damaged following the earthquake (right) (Photos courtesy of ENEL Rete Gas) 65

Fig. 5.4. Repair operations addressing damage to buried components for the portion of the gas network located in Zone 1: number of repairs for different buried components(Esposito et al., 2013) 66

Fig. 5.5. Observed resilience-related curve for the L'Aquila gas network following the 2009 event (Esposito et al., 2013) 68

Fig. 5.6. Damaged support of aboveground gas line (Lau et al., 1995) 70

Fig. 5.7. Buried gas line exposed by landslide (Lau et al., 1995) 70

Fig. 5.8. Shear failure of gas line (Lau et al., 1995) 70

Fig. 5.9. Compression failure of gas and water lines (Lau et al., 1995) 71

Fig. 5.10. Tension failure of gas line (Lau et al., 1995) 71

Fig. 5.11. Cycled compression, tension and buckling failure of gas line (Lau et al., 1995) 71

Fig. 5.12. Burning of leaked gas from ruptured gas line 73

Fig. 6.1. Field observation of RHD for damaged quay walls at the Rokko Island in Kobe port (Inatomi et al., 1997) 79

Fig. 6.2. Extremely extensive damage to apron pavements 79

Fig. 6.3. Lateral spreading, liquefaction and settlement along the shore of the Port of Kobe 79

Fig. 6.4. Seaward displacement and tilting of quay-walls 80

Fig. 6.5. Typical damage modes for gravity type quay walls and parameters for damage criteria (Na et al., 2008) 80

Fig. 6.6. Damage to a quay-wall at the port of Kobe (Nozu et al., 2004) 81

Fig. 6.7. Seaward lateral movement of rail foundation and differential settlement of rails (Rokko Island) 82

Fig. 6.8. Crane total collapse. Various damages to other cranes like plastic hinges and bending of their members (Rokko Island) 82

Fig. 6.9. Crane damage due to deformation of foundation soil 82

Fig. 6.10. Sand emersion near container cranes (Port Island) 82

Fig. 6.11. Map of Kobe showing the seismologically inferred earthquake fault and acceleration stations showing the recorded PGA. The shaded region shows the area of highest structural damage (Dakoulas and Gazetas, 2008) 83

Fig. 6.12. Restoration of the port of Kobe after the Hyogo-Ken Nanbu 1995. earthquake (Chang, 2000a) 85

Fig. 6.13. Ship cargo traffic in Asia during the years 1992-1997 (Chang, 2000b) 85

Fig. 6.14. Sendai Port (Percher, 2014) 87

Fig. 6.15. Lateral spreading in the backlands along the original shoreline (Percher, 2014) 89

Fig. 6.16. Rotated wharf closure bulkhead at the east end of the Takasago wharf (Percher, 2014) 89

Fig. 6.17. Significant vertical settlement near the east end the Takasago wharf (Percher, 2014) 90

Fig. 6.18. Ground failure behind the quay wall at Sendai port (TCLEE, 2012) 90

Fig. 6.19. Differential vertical movements of the crane rail girders and settlement of fill surface (Percher, 2014) 91

Fig. 6.20. Landside crane rails at the eastern side of Takasago Wharf (Percher, 2014) 93

Fig. 6.21. Crane damage at Sendai Port (TCLEE, 2012) 93

Fig. 6.22. Movement of waterside base isolated crane rails (Percher, 2014) 94

Fig. 6.23. Comparison of velocity response spectra due to different soil conditions (Motosaka, 2012) 94

Fig. 6.24. Location of port structures around Izmit Bay 97

Fig. 6.25. Collapse of ground slabs due to settlement at the Navy port in Gölcük (left) and damage at Derince port (right) 98

Fig. 6.26. Damage at the navy port in Golcuk (left) and failed column at SEKA port (right) 98

Fig. 6.27. A displaced steel piped jetty in Izmit (left) and a damaged jetty at Goolcuk Naval Base (Bilham et al., 2003) 98

Fig. 6.28. Inundation heights in Sendai Port (Percher, 2014) 105

Fig. 6.29. Container ship swept ashore by tsunami at Sendai Port and damage on crane (TCLEE, 2012) 107

Fig. 6.30. Scattered containers Sendai Port after the tsunami (Tomita and Yoem, 2012) 107

Fig. 6.31. Sendai tsunami inundation hazard map (Koshimura, 2012) 108

Fig. 7.1. Collapse of roof and wall elements of an old tilt-up building (Photo by G. Sakkestad) 115

Fig. 7.2. Damage to industrial storage racks and equipment during Northridge Earthquake (Photos taken from FEMA 460 (2005) and FEMA E-74 (2011)) 115

Fig. 7.3. Precast Industrial buildings sustained various degrees of structural damage (taken from Saatciocglu et al., 2001) 118

Fig. 7.4. Precast structures in the same industrial zone under different construction stages and corresponding damage levels (taken from Saatcioglu et al. (2001)) 118

Fig. 7.5. Observed damage to precast industrial buildings (taken from Saatcioglu et al., 2001) 119

Fig. 7.6. Double cantilever to column connection failures (taken from Saatcioglu et al., 2001) 119

Fig. 7.7. Damage to structural elements observed by Toniolo and Colombo (2012) 122

Fig. 7.8. Damage to connections and fastenings (Toniolo and Colombo, 2012) 122

Fig. 7.9. Collapse of precast wall panels (Di Sarno et al., 2011) 123

Fig. 7.10. Minor cracking in concrete panels (taken from Henry and Ingham (2011)) 125

Fig. 7.11. Out-of-plane buckling of concrete wall panels (taken from Henry and Ingham (2011)) 126

Fig. 7.12. Panel collapse due to steel frame connection failure (taken from Marshall and Gould (2012)) 126

Fig. 7.13. Observed damage to industrial buildings (taken from Liberatore et al. (2013)) 129

Fig. 7.14. Observed damage to beam-column connections (Source: Roberto Nascimbene, Eucentre) 130

Fig. 7.15. Inclined beam (a) and knee portal (b) sawtooth roofs (Liberatore et al., 2013) 133

Fig. 7.16. Inundation level at industrial estates near northern Bangkok 140

Fig. 7.17. Inundated automotive factory and submerged cars in Ayutthaya Province 142