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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색
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Title page

Contents

Abstract 3

1. Introduction 4

2. Economic Environment 8

2.1. Context 8

2.2. Samples of Jobseekers and Firms 9

2.3. Job Talash Platform 10

2.4. Platform Use 14

2.5. Experimental Design and Interpretation 15

3. Search Effort and Returns to Search 16

3.1. Treatment Effects on Search Effort and Search Outcomes 16

3.2. Returns to Inframarginal Search and Treatment-Induced Marginal Search 18

4. Explaining Marginal Returns to Search 21

4.1. Conceptual Framework 22

4.2. Additional Tests of the Conceptual Framework 24

4.3. Understanding Application Costs 25

4.4. Evaluating Alternative Explanations 27

5. Spillover Effects 29

6. Conclusion 30

References 31

Appendices for Online Publication Only 37

A. Additional Information about the Platform and Sample 38

B. Additional Analysis on Search Effort and Returns to Search 44

B.1. Average & Heterogeneous Effects on Interview- and Application-Related Outcomes 44

B.2. Robustness Checks 48

B.3. Addressing Possible Violations of the IV Monotonicity Assumption 50

B.4. Addressing Possible Complications around the IV Exclusion Assumption 53

B.5. Treatment Effects on Employment and Off-Platform Search 57

B.6. Adjusting for Selection into Survey Response 59

C. Additional Analysis on Explaining Marginal Returns to Search 62

C.1. Overview 62

C.2. Conceptual Framework Appendix 66

C.3. Methods for Complier / Latent Type Analysis 69

C.4. Additional Tests of the Conceptual Framework 70

C.5. Understanding Application Costs 80

C.5.1. Pecuniary and Time Costs 80

C.5.2. Reminder Effects 81

C.5.3. Encouragement and Pressure to Apply 83

C.6. Evaluating Alternative Explanations 85

C.6.1. What Types of Vacancies Receive Marginal & Inframarginal Applications? 85

C.6.2. Which Jobseekers Submit Marginal & Inframarginal Applications? 85

C.6.3. Does Treatment Provide More Information About Matches? 89

C.6.4. Does Treatment Affect Jobseekers' Beliefs About The Value of Applications? 92

C.6.5. Random Search 94

D. Additional Analysis on Spillover Effects 96

Appendix References 103

Tables

Table 1. Jobseeker Summary Statistics, Selection into Applications, and Balance Tests 11

Table 2. Vacancy- and Match-level Summary Statistics and Selection into Applications 13

Table 3. Treatment Effects on Job Search & Search Returns 17

Figures

Figure 1. Application Decisions for Treated and Control Jobseekers Facing High versus Low Costs 23

Appendix Tables

Table A.1. Summary Statistics for Experimental and External Comparison Samples 39

Table A.2. Registration and Job Application Processes on Job Talash and Other Job Search Platforms 41

Table A.3. Job Application Rates on Search and Matching Platforms 42

Table B.1. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects 46

Table B.2. Treatment Effects on Attributes of Marginal Interviews 47

Table B.3. Robustness of Main Results to Alternative Controls, Weighting, and Clustering 49

Table B.4. Treatment Effects on Non-Application Measures of Platform Use 53

Table B.5. Sensitivity of Treatment Effects to Accounting for Changes in Jobseeker Profile and Preferences on Platform 54

Table B.6. Alternative Test for Constant Returns to Search 56

Table B.7. Treatments Effects on Off-Platform Search and Work 57

Table B.8. Treatment Effects on Off-Platform Search (Intensive Margin) 58

Table B.9. Comparing Platform Use for Survey Respondents and Non-Respondents 60

Table B.10. Effect of Randomized Survey Features on Probability of Answering Survey Modules 61

Table C.1. Treatment Effects on Job Search & Search Returns, Controlling for All Other Treatments 62

Table C.2. Additional Tests of the Conceptual Framework - Covered in Detail in Appendix C.4 63

Table C.3. Understanding Application Costs - Covered in Detail in Appendix C.5 64

Table C.4. Evaluating Alternative Mechanisms - Covered in Detail in Appendix C.6 65

Table C.5. Comparing Observed Characteristics of Inframarginal and Marginal Job Applications 78

Table C.6. Treatment Effects on Dispersion of Value of Matches Receiving Applications 79

Table C.7. Treatment Effects on Applications of Reductions in Pecuniary and Time Costs 80

Table C.8. Treatment Effects on Applications of Reminder Text Messages 81

Table C.9. Treatment Effects on Applications by Timing of Phone Call and Length of Application Window 82

Table C.10. Response Persistence Between Periods 84

Table C.11. Comparing Observed Characteristics of Jobseekers Submitting Marginal and Inframarginal Applications 87

Table C.12. Treatment Effects on Job Search & Search Returns Using Jobseeker Fixed Effects 88

Table C.13. Treatment Effects on Job Search & Search Returns, Controlling for Crossover Matches 88

Table C.14. Treatment Effects on Job Search & Search Returns Excluding Matching Rounds when Call Center Agents had More Information About Vacancies 90

Table C.15. Treatment Effects on Recalling Receiving Matches 91

Table C.16. Treatment Effects on Beliefs About Potential Returns to Search on Job Talash Platform 93

Table C.17. Treatment Effects of Lowering Cost of Applying to Randomly Chosen Vacancies 95

Table D.1. Spillover Effects Between Jobseekers 99

Table D.2. Descriptive Analysis of Application-Interview Relationship at the Vacancy Level 102

Appendix Figures

Figure A.1. Salary Distribution for Experimental and External Comparison Sample 40

Figure A.2. Sample Text Message in English (Actual Messages are Sent in Urdu) 42

Figure A.3. Information Structure for Phone Call Treatment and Control Jobseekers 43

Figure B.1. Treatment Effects on Jobseeker-level Numbers of Applications and Interviews 45

Figure B.2. Bounding the Local Average Treatment Effect Without Monotonicity 52

Figure C.1. Application Decisions for Treated & Control Jobseekers Facing High Versus Low Costs 67

Figure C.2. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Applications by Quintiles of Match Values 73

Figure C.3. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Applications by Quintiles of the Within-Jobseeker Distribution of Match Values 74

Figure C.4. Treatment Effects on the Number of Applications per Jobseeker × Matching Round 75

Figure C.5. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Applications by Quintiles of Mean Batch Values 76

Figure C.6. Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Applications by Quintiles of Maximum Batch Values 77

Figure C.7. Proportion of Applications by Order in which Vacancies are Listed 84

Figure D.1. Variation in Treatment Rate Between Vacancies 97

Figure D.2. Relationship between Vacancy-Level Treatment Effects on Interviews and Treatment Rates 101

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