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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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Title page 1

Contents 1

Abstract 2

Non-technical summary 3

Introduction 5

Statement 1: Trust and credibility are central to central banking 6

Statement 2: Trust, not popularity, matters 7

Statement 3: Trust helps anchor inflation expectations and reduce uncertainty about future inflation 8

Statement 4: Trust helps contain political pressure on the central bank 9

Statement 5: Trust facilitates the achievement of the central bank objective 10

Statement 6: Trust is determined by many factors, some of which lie outside the central bank's control 12

Statement 7: Trust is more easily lost than gained 14

Statement 8: There are ways to enhance trust 16

Statement 9: To monitor trust, it needs to be measured; this is not straightforward 19

Statement 10: Several developments will make it more challenging to maintain trust going forward 23

Conclusion 24

References 25

Acknowledgements 32

Figures 15

Figure 1. Trust in the ECB 15

Figure 2. Satisfaction with the Bank of England 15

Figure 3. Share of Eurobarometer respondents with identical answers for trust in 4 EU institutions 21

초록보기

Trust in the central bank is an essential ingredient for a successful conduct of monetary policy. However, for many central banks trust has recently declined, for instance in the wake of the post-pandemic inflation surge, due to large errors in central banks’ inflation forecasts, or given problems when exiting from forward guidance. The rapid, substantial and persistent erosion of trust makes it clear that trust needs to be earned continuously. This paper reviews why trust is important, what determines it and how central banks can enhance it. It also argues that it is important for central banks to improve the measurement and monitoring of trust. It ends by highlighting some future challenges for maintaining trust.