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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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동의어 포함

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Title page 1

Contents 3

SUMMARY 2

1. INTRODUCTION 5

2. A CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOECONOMIC LANDSCAPE 9

2.1. A MORE INWARD-LOOKING AND LESS RELIABLE US 10

2.2. AN INCREASINGLY ASSERTIVE AND PROACTIVE CHINA 17

2.3. WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR THE EU AND ITS TRADE LINKAGES? 20

3. BEYOND TRADE DEPENDENCIES 23

3.1. FADING US FDI 24

3.2. CHINA'S SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE WEST-CENTRED MONETARY AND FINANCIAL SYSTEM 29

3.3. WHY DO FDI AND THE SHAPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM MATTER FOR THE EU? 31

4. THE EU POLICY TOOLBOX FOR ECONOMIC SECURITY 34

4.1. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EU TOOLBOX 34

4.2. TRADE POLICY OPTIONS IN A NEW LANDSCAPE 37

4.3. EU INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY - WIDENING SCOPE AND CHALLENGES 40

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 42

REFERENCES 48

Tables 3

Table 1. US tariffs since the start of Trump's second term 13

Table 2. Overview of the retaliatory measures against the US 14

Figures 3

Figure 1. Capital investment in the US related to FDI and reshoring 16

Figure 2. EU bilateral trade: EU-China and EU-US imports and exports of goods and services, EUR billion, 2010-2023 21

Figure 3. Global linkages 23

Figure 4. EU FDI flows: assets (outbound) and liabilities (inbound) vis-à-vis the US, 2015Q4-2024Q2 25

Figure 5. Greenfield FDI project, total (left panel) and by the investor's country of origin (right panel) 27

Figure 6. Euro area FDI outflows (assets, left panel) and inflows (liabilities, right panel), % world GDP 28

Boxes 4

Box 1.Overview of recent US initiatives and measures to strengthen its economic security 10

Box 2. The IRA's impact on manufacturing reshoring in the US 16

Box 3. China's increasing resort to economic coercion and trade retaliation 19

Box 4. EU-China and EU-US FDI stocks: A different scale of integration 26

Box 5. EU instruments and measures to promote competitiveness and resilience 34

Box 6. EU-Instruments and measures to protect EU economic interests 36

Box 7. The paralysis of the WTO trade dispute system 38

초록보기

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has hit the EU like a tornado. Until the end of 2024, concerns about trade dependencies remained primarily focused on imports from China. However, the US’ increasingly aggressive stance towards its trade partners has shifted attention to EU exports, demanding urgent and far-reaching adjustments. Consequently, the EU must confront a dual challenge posed by both China and the US. This should serve as a lesson that achieving EU economic security requires a comprehensive approach. It is not just about imports and exports but also about cross-border investment linkages and the slow yet undeniable shifts in the global monetary system that shape how trade and investment take place. While the EU has been expanding its policy toolkit for a less benevolent global environment, many of the fundamental assumptions underpinning its economic framework – such as a stable rules-based system, free markets and reliable alliances – no longer hold. In this new reality, developing new instruments alone will not be enough. The EU faces critical political choices, from its commitment to the WTO to the creation of a genuine EU industrial policy and the necessity, rather than the mere aspiration, of deepening its single market and turning its focus inward. These decisions will shape the foundations of its economic security in the years ahead.