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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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Title page 1

Contents 1

Abstract 2

Non-technical summary 3

Introduction 4

1. Descriptive Evidence 8

1.1. Households' direct emissions 8

1.2. Firms' direct emissions 11

2. A spatial heterogeneous-agent model 14

2.1. Households 14

2.2. Production: goods, energy and housing 16

2.2.1. Regional Goods & Services sector 16

2.2.2. National electricity sector 17

2.2.3. Imported fossil fuel sector and the rest of the world 17

2.2.4. Regional housing supply sector 17

2.3. Fiscal authority 17

2.4. Market clearing conditions and equilibrium 18

3. Calibration on French macro and micro data 19

3.1. Households 19

3.2. Migration costs 21

3.3. Firms 24

3.4. Fiscal authority 24

4. Quantitative results 25

4.1. The distributive effects of carbon taxes 26

4.2. Migration and welfare 29

5. Optimal transfer policies 33

6. Conclusion 36

References 38

Appendix 41

A. Descriptive Evidence 42

A.1. City types 42

A.2. Households: energy consumption patterns 43

A.3. Firms: emission patterns 44

A.4. Predicted energy shares and emissions 46

B. Algorithm 49

C. Calibration 52

C.1. Data on income 53

C.2. Household energy consumption: estimation of σ 53

C.3. Other untargeted moments 54

D. Additional results - Section 4 56

E. Additional results - Section 5 60

E.1. τh vs τf 60

E.2. Recycling policies: additional results 60

E.3. Migration & Transfers 61

E.4. Alternative Pareto Weight 62

E.5. Alternative transfer rule 63

F. Robustness 65

F.1. Elasticities of substitution 65

F.2. Partial Equilibrium vs General Equilibrium 66

F.3. Endogenous fossil fuel price 67

Acknowledgements 69

Tables 10

Table 1. Energy share in total consumption (%) for several countries 10

Table 2. Median welfare change by location and income 34

Table 3. Descriptive statistics: households consumption, BdF 2017 43

Table 4. Descriptive statistics: age groups, BdF 2017 44

Table 5. Share of workers (%) in each sector, by geography and income quintile 45

Table 6. Share of city type and income quintile by sector, % of workers 46

Table 7. Regressions 48

Table 8. Table of parameters 52

Table 9. Geographical composition of each revenue decile 53

Table 10. Revenues and taxes by income decile (thousand euros) 53

Table 11. Optimal taxes to reduce emissions by 10% 60

Table 12. Average welfare change by location and income 61

Table 13. Share of losers by location and income 61

Table 14. Average welfare change by location and income, Negishi weights 63

Table 15. Average welfare change by location and income, alternative transfer rule 64

Table 16. Average welfare change by location and income, different elasticities 65

Table 17. Median welfare change by location and income 67

Table 18. Average welfare change by location and income, pF endogenous 68

Figures 9

Figure 1. Energy share in total consumption (regression-adjusted) 9

Figure 2. Emissions imputed to workers and % of workers in emissions-intensive firms 12

Figure 3. Spatial distribution of fossil fuel share and emissions per workers 13

Figure 4. Energy share in total consumption 20

Figure 5. income distribution of households 21

Figure 6. Migration matrix and migration parameters 22

Figure 7. Average welfare effect by region and income 26

Figure 8. Migration choices by wealth quantiles 30

Figure 9. Welfare effect with and without migration, and at different horizons 32

Figure 10. Distribution of welfare gains within income quintiles 36

Figure 11. Spatial distribution of city types, France 42

Figure 12. Consumption ratio (eh/c) and relative price of energy (ph) 54

Figure 13. Income composition and taxes by income quintile 55

Figure 14. Wealth inequalities and MPC heterogeneity 55

Figure 15. Decomposition of the welfare effect 56

Figure 16. Decomposition of the welfare effect at horizon t = 5 57

Figure 17. Density change by income and region between steady states 58

Figure 18. Mobility changes at different time horizon, τh only 59

Figure 19. Mobility changes at different time horizon, τf only 59

Figure 20. Migration dynamics 62

Figure 21. Inverse formula vs. formula 7 64