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국회도서관 홈으로 정보검색 소장정보 검색

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동의어 포함

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Title page 1

Contents 1

Abstract 2

Non-technical summary 3

1. Introduction 6

2. Macroeconomic Implications of stablecoins 16

3. Model 20

3.1. Stablecoins 21

3.2. The household problem 24

3.3. Calibration 28

4. Results 29

4.1. Macro-Financial Stability: The Risks of the Global Safe Asset Channel 30

4.2. Impulse-responses 32

4.2.1. U.S. shocks: Monetary Policy and TFP 33

4.2.2. Non-issuer country shock: Monetary Policy and TFP 37

4.2.3. Negative shock to stablecoin demand 37

4.3. Welfare Implications 39

4.4. Extensions and Robustness 39

5. Empirical Validation 40

6. Conclusion 42

References 45

Online appendix 52

A. Model 52

B. Alternative specifications 69

Acknowledgements 85

Figures 9

Figure 1. Stablecoin market capitalization and holdings of U.S. debt by countries and stablecoin issuers 9

Figure 2. Stablecoin holdings of U.S. Treasury bills compared to major hedge fund holdings, 2024 11

Figure 3. Description of the model 22

Figure 4. Demand for stablecoins against returns differential 27

Figure 5. Stability map 31

Figure 6. Stability map 33

Figure 7. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock 34

Figure 8. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock 35

Figure 9. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 36

Figure 10. Impulse responses to a stablecoin preference shock 38

Figure 11. Response of U.S. yields to U.S. and euro area monetary policy shocks 42

Figure 12. Response of U.S. yields at different maturities to U.S. monetary policy shocks 43

Appendix Tables 60

Table A.1. Calibration 60

Appendix Figures 61

Figure A.1. Demand for stablecoins against returns differential - extreme holdings 61

Figure A.2. Demand for stablecoins against returns differential - full solution 62

Figure A.3. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock 63

Figure A.4. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock 64

Figure A.5. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 65

Figure A.6. Impulse responses to a TFP shock from country 2 66

Figure A.7. Impulse responses to stablecoin preference shock 66

Figure A.8. Welfare changes relative to the model without stablecoins for different level of U.S. yield reduction 67

Figure A.9. Response of stablecoin market capitalization to U.S. monetary policy shocks 68

Figure B.1. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock - constant μsc,c 69

Figure B.2. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock - constant μsc,c 70

Figure B.3. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 - constant μsc,c 70

Figure B.4. Impulse responses to a TFP shock from country 2 - constant μsc,c 71

Figure B.5. Stability map 72

Figure B.6. Stability map 73

Figure B.7. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock - money-in-utility 73

Figure B.8. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock - money-in-utility 74

Figure B.9. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 - money-in-utility 74

Figure B.10. Impulse responses to a TFP shock from country 2 - money-in-utility 75

Figure B.11. Stability map when stablecoins are issued only domestically or only internationally 76

Figure B.12. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock - U.S. vs foreign issuance 77

Figure B.13. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 - U.S. vs foreign issuance 77

Figure B.14. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock - U.S. vs foreign issuance 78

Figure B.15. Impulse responses to a TFP shock from country 2 - U.S. vs foreign issuance 78

Figure B.16. Stability map 79

Figure B.17. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock - estimated model 80

Figure B.18. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock - estimated model 80

Figure B.19. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 - estimated model 81

Figure B.20. Impulse responses to a TFP shock from country 2 - estimated model 81

Figure B.21. Impulse responses to a U.S. monetary policy shock - model with redemption fee 82

Figure B.22. Impulse responses to a U.S. TFP shock - model with redemption fee 83

Figure B.23. Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock from country 2 - model with redemption fee 83

Figure B.24. Impulse responses to a TFP shock from country 2 - model with redemption fee 84